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Abstract  
A lay adjudication system that has been the subject of international and domestic reforms 
democratising criminal justice procedures often reveals a challenging balance amongst the 
intertwined principles of criminal procedures. In addition, the various stages of lay 
adjudication procedures, such as its introduction, practice, development, and abolition, have 
been influenced by political and societal force.  Lay adjudicator participation may be an 
important mechanism for introducing and sustaining the concept of democracy in criminal 
trial procedures. Whilst the establishment of well-balanced links between international 
fundamental human rights principles, efficiency and popular justice are significant features in 
judicial reforms internationally and domestically, the introduction of a lay adjudication 
procedure can be an appealing addition to judicial reform. A fundamental concern is whether 
it represents a successful mechanism for democratising criminal procedures. This thesis 
addresses the issue by examining the Saiban-in no Sankasuru Keijisaiban ni kansuru Horitsu, 
promulgated in 2009, as a result of the 1999 judicial reform in Japan. It does this by firstly 
setting out evaluative criteria developed through an examination of theoretical perspectives 
of lay adjudication. It then applies these criteria using quantitative data derived from the 
Japanese Supreme Court and qualitative data from interviews with former citizen judges and 
legal professionals who have experience of citizen judge trials. It argues that the introduction 
and practice of the citizen judge system has been successful. Both procedural and practice 
tests of the citizen judge system have shown the extent to which citizen judge participation 
has been accepted and has achieved its targets. The representative and engaging format of 
the citizen judge system has led to satisfaction and confidence in their duties as citizen judges. 
However, powerful controls by legal professionals have remained in place throughout the 
four stages of the citizen judge procedures - the pre-trial arrangement conference process, 
the selection process of citizen judges, the decision-making process, and the post-trial phrase. 
Moreover, the controls have supported citizen judges’ participation but, at the same time, 
they could be a direct and indirect impediment to the democratic functions of citizen judges.  
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CHAPTER 1 INTRODUCTION 
 
In 2001 the Japanese government announced the introduction of Saiban-in Seido1 
(hereinafter the citizen judge system 2 ), and in 2009, the Saiban-in no Sankasuru 
Keijisaiban ni kansuru Horitsu 3  (hereinafter the Citizen Judge Act (CJA) was promulgated 
as part of the Judicial Reform started in 1999. The purpose of introducing the new 
system was ‘to promote the understanding of the people and to enhance their trust in 
the justice system’4. The introduction of the citizen judge system has been a significant 
and complex challenge facing society as a whole, including the government, lawmakers, 
personnel involved in trials, such as professional judges, public prosecutors, defence 
attorneys and lay people whether or not they are selected as citizen judges. My interest 
in studying the introduction of the CJA derives from the dramatic challenges that grew 
out of the preparation for its promulgation and enforcement between 2002 and 2009. 
This introductory chapter is organised into six sections in order to reveal the background 
analysis of the citizen judge system [Saiban-in Seido]. Before giving a brief outline of 
Japanese Judicial Reform in 1999 in Section 1.2, Section 1.1 will present an assessment 
of the surrounding criminal justice reform, international historical developments and 
the current characteristics of the lay adjudication system. Section 1.3 sets out the aims 
of the research, and definitions of terms used in this research are clarified in Section 1.4. 
Section 1.5 explains methodologies and the last section summaries the contents of this 
thesis. 
                                                          
1In this thesis, the Hepburn Romanisation system will be used in order to transcribe the Japanese 
language into the Latin alphabet. JC Hepburn, A Japanese and English Dictionary: With an English and 
Japanese Index (Shanghai; American Presbyterian Mission Press 1867). 
2There are different translations for the Saiban-in Seido, such as ‘quasi-Jury system’, ‘lay assessor 
system’, ‘lay judge system’, but throughout this research, the citizen judge system will be used. See K 
Anderson and E Saint, 2005, ‘Japan’s Quasi-Jury (Saiban-In) Law: An Annotated Translation of the Act 
Concerning Participation of Lay Assessors in Criminal Trials’ 6 Asian-Pacific Law & Policy Journal 233–
283; A Dobrovolskaia, 2004, ‘An All-Laymen Jury System Instead of the Lay Assessor (Saiban-In) System 
for Japan? Anglo-American-Style Jury Trials in Okinawa under the US Occupation’ 37 Vanderbilt Journal 
of Transnational Law 966–973; A Suto, ‘The Role of the Empirical Science in Saiban-in System (Lay 
Judge System) - A Case Study About the Circumstances Appraisal’ (2011) 18 The Faculty Journal of 
Komazawa Women’s University 151–159. 
3Act No.63 of 2004. 
4Ibid, art. 1. 
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Establishing lay participation in governmental institutions has become an essential 
concern for democratic countries seeking to improve or balance the relationship 
between the state and its citizens. Criminal justice systems are reflections of a nation’s 
government, whether, for example, federal or confederate, democratic socialist or, 
communist and also a reflection of the nation’s political history including its political 
evolution 5 . Although Ebbe suggests that criminal procedures are one of the most 
inconsistent areas of law enforcement and correction mechanisms 6 , the courts in 
authoritarian regimes play an important role in social control by maintaining the 
legitimacy and authority of the state's power7. In other words, lay participation in court 
procedures is important in democratic societies as a safeguard against oppressive state 
power8. Thus, an analysis of lay participation in criminal procedure can indicate the 
relationship between the important ‘socio-political’ platform of a government9, and 
variables established by fundamental citizen participation10. 
The analysis of the performative and constitutive functions of a criminal trial 
influenced by legal norms is important to explain how the state controls a given society. 
Restricting the power of the state by legal norms in democratic constitutional states can 
be shown in a fair trial model with five basic features: bringing a case to court, the 
imposition of a court verdict on the offender, the importance of unwritten positive law 
as well as oral testimony, equality of power between the prosecution, defence, 
professional judges, and independence of professional judges from the state 11. The 
emphasis on unwritten positive law and institutional legitimacy for a participatory 
                                                          
5O Ebbe, ‘The Purpose of Comparative and International Criminal Justice Systems’ in Obi N Ignatius Ebbe 
(ed), Comparative & International Criminal Justice Systems: Policing, judiciary, and corrections 
(Butternman-Heinemann 1996) 3-8 , 4. 
6Ibid, 7.  
7HL Packer, The Limits of the Criminal Sanction (Stanford UP 1968); N Luhmann, ‘Legal Argumentation: 
An Analysis of Its Form’ (1995) 58 The Modern Law Review 285–298, 286, . 
8M Singer, Jury Duty: Reclaiming Your Political Power and Taking Responsibility (Santa Barbara, CA; 
Praeger 2012), ix. 
9H Fukurai and R Krooth, ‘What Brings People to The Courtroom? Comparative Analysis of People’s 
Willingness to Serve as Jurors in Japan and the U.S.’ (2010) 38 International Journal of Law, Crime and 
Justice 198–215, 198. 
10R Lempert, ‘The Internationalization of Lay Legal Decision-Making: Jury Resurgence and Jury Research’ 
(2007) 40 Cornell International Law Journal 477–88, 482. 
11M Hildebrandt, ‘Trial and “Fair Trial”: From Peer to Subject to Citizen’ in Antony Duff and others (eds), 
The Trial on Trial, Volume 2, Judgment and Calling to Account (Hart Publishing 2006), 18-22. 
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democracy strongly supports the idea of lay participation in criminal procedures12. In 
spite of profound support, the practice and establishment of lay justice has been highly 
controversial and influenced by an emphasis on popular rights13, judicial corruption and 
politicisation14, throughout the world since the 18th century.  
The lay adjudication system has important historical antecedents which demonstrate 
clearly its influence upon the legal system. As many scholars have claimed, the origins 
of lay adjudication seemed to be in Athens in the fifth century B.C.15. The system then 
spread to the other parts of Europe through the Roman Empire. The Normans adapted 
the existing Saxon jury for their own purposes in 106616.  Since then, lay adjudication 
systems in different legal systems have repeatedly increased or decreased in their use 
within the system. For example, because of the French Revolution 1789, the jury model 
of a lay adjudication system was introduced in continental European countries, such as 
in France in 178917, Greece in 1844, Germany in 1848, Russia in 1864, Spain in 1872, and 
Italy in 187318. Moreover, the cooperative structure between professional judges and 
lay adjudicators – the mixed judge model - was replaced by the jury model in Belgium 
(1919), Spain (1931), France (1932), and Austria (1934) through reform19. The jury model 
was also introduced in East India as a result of British colonisation20, but it was abolished 
                                                          
12E Taman, ‘Lay Participation in Criminal Justice: Enhancing Justice System Legitimacy in Post-Confluct 
States’ (2003) 12 Dalhousie Journal of Legal Studies 33–62, 34. 
13CT Coleman, ‘Origin and Development of Trial by Jury’ (1919) 6 Virginia Law Review 77–86, 78. 
14G Durston, Crime and Justice in Early Modern England: 1500-1750 (Chichester; Barry Rose Law 
Publishers 2004), 472. 
15There are some arguments about the origin of the concept, for example some scholars have claimed 
the concept originated in 1066 and the original form of a lay adjudication was circulated to other parts 
of Europe by the Roman conquest. See AW Alschuler and AG Deiss, ‘A Brief History of the Criminal Jury 
in the United States’ (1994) 61 University of Chicago Law Review 867–928, 867;SJ Adler, The Jury Worth 
Saving? The Jury: Trial and Error in the American Courtroom (Times Books 1994); S Lloyd-Bostock and C 
Thomas, ‘Decline of the “Little Parliament”: Juries and Jury Reform in England and Wales’ (1999) 62 
Law and Contemporary Problems 7–40. 
16ER Sheyn, ‘A Foothold for Real Democracy in Eastern Europe: How Instituting Jury Trials in Ukraine Can 
Bring About Meaningful Governmental and Juridical Reforms and Can Help Spread These Reforms 
Across Eastern Europe’ (2010) 43 Vanderbilt Journal of Transnational Law 649–700, 655. 
17J Donovan, ‘Magistrates and Juries in France, 1791-1952’ (1999) 22 French Historical Studies 207–209. 
18H Fukurai, K-W Chan, & S Miyazawa, ‘Introduction to the Special Issue: The Future of Lay Adjudication 
and Theorizing Today’s Resurgence of Civic, Legal Participatory Systems in East and Central Asia’ (2010) 
38 International Journal of Law, Crime and Justice 141–148, 141. 
19R Vogler, A World View of Criminal Justice (Aldershot; Ashgate 2005), 237. 
20JA Jaffe, ‘Custom, Identity, and the Jury in India, 1800–1832’ (2014) 57 The Historical Journal 131–155. 
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after independence, following several reforms21. The developments of lay adjudication 
systems including introductions, modifications, and abolishment of lay adjudication 
procedures have happened primarily because of political and societal upheavals22.  
Throughout their development, the long-lasting liberal admiration of a lay 
adjudication system, in particular in criminal trials, has been bolstered by the belief in 
democracy. Therefore, having a lay adjudication system is widely considered to be a 
symbol of democracy23. 
By way of contrast, legal professionals, in particular professional judges, have felt 
threatened by lay adjudicators’ participation from the start of the lay adjudication 
system. The threat seems to be derived from doubts over the legitimacy of judgments 
reached by lay adjudicators’ ‘consciousness’ and not by evidence24, and a reliance on the 
legislative role and judicial tasks of government or legal professionals25. In his analysis of 
the English jury system, Auld points out that ‘… a law should be declared, by statute if 
need be, that juries have no right to acquit defendants of the law or in disregard of the 
evidence, and that judges and advocates should conduct criminal cases accordingly’26. 
However, Bushell’s case in 1670 in England27 was a significant milestone in the history 
of legal control over lay adjudication28 decisions by the cancellation of attaint29. Before 
this case, the English jury system allowed professional judges to examine a verdict 
                                                          
21N Vidmar, ‘The Jury Elsewhere in the World’ in Neil Vidmar (ed), World Jury Systems (Oxford; Oxford 
University Press 2000), 425-6; K Ramnath, ‘The Colonial Difference between Law and Fact: Notes on 
the Criminal Jury in India’ (2013) 50 Indian Economic & Social History Review 341–363. 
22For example, the colonisations and released from the English Empire influenced the introduction and 
abolishment of the lay adjudication system in India. See ibid. 
23N Vidmar, ‘We the Jury: The Jury System and the Ideal of Democracy by Jeffrey Abramson Review by 
Neil Vidmar’ (1996) 25 Contemporary Sociology 97-99; N Vidmar, World Jury System (Oxford; Oxford 
University Press 2000). 
24K Crosby, ‘Jury Independence and the General Verdict: A Genealogy’ (University of Leicester 2013), 65. 
25See, C Weinberg-Brodt, ‘Jury Nullification and Jury-Control Procedures’ (1990) 65 New York University 
Law Review 852–870. 
26A Auld, ‘Review of the Criminal Courts of England and Wales’ (London 2001) 
<http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/+/http://www.criminal-courts-
review.org.uk/auldconts.htm>, accessed 31 April 2016, para.107. 
27Bushell’s Case, 124 Eng. Rep. 1006 (C.P, 1670). 
28See Lloyd-Bostock and Thomas, supra note 15, 9; J Clark, ‘The Social Psychology of Jury Nullification’ 
(2000) 24 Law and Human Behavior 39–57; JA Hostettler, ‘Jury Power - Illusion or Really?: A Critical 
Study of Criminal Trial by Jury in England: 1219-2003’ (University of Sussex 2004). 
29The Honorable Dann, ‘“Learning Lessons” and “Speaking Rights”: Creating Educated and Democratic 
Juries’ (1993) 68 Indiana Law Journal 1229–1280, 1233-4. 
5 
 
reached by a jury, reject it, and retry the case30. The jurors in the trial of William Penn 
and William Mead, including Edward Bushell, were accused and fined because the jury 
panel did not reach a verdict the court accepted and they had refused a guilty verdict 
contrary to the court’s admonition31.  They refused to pay the fine and were imprisoned 
for contempt of court32. On appeal by way of Habeas Corpus, Judge Vaughan accepted 
the possibility of disagreement between professional judges and jurors. Moreover, he 
expressed support for a jurors’ independence of verdict and the principle that jurors 
should not be punished for contempt of court following any disagreement33. As a result, 
this case has greatly influenced not only the English system but also the fundamental 
idea of the role of lay adjudicators, in particular, in a jury model of lay adjudication 
systems 34 . McClanahan pointed out the main three influences of the case: the 
prevention of judicial oppressive pressure over lay adjudicators’ decision-making, the 
lay adjudicators’ power to nullify unjust laws, and the lay adjudicators’ capability to 
investigate government oppression on specified matters 35 . In addition, Landsman 
pointed out that Bushell’s case showed that the jurors could reject evidence presented 
in court and are recognised as reaching their decision based on their own personal 
knowledge36. Therefore, the decision in Bushell’s case has been recognised as triggering 
the concept of jury nullification as well as impacting on the fundamental principle of lay 
adjudication, which is that lay adjudication is ‘a worthy barometer of what is [was] truly 
just and moral’37.  
Notwithstanding the symbolic respect for the lay adjudication system and the 
international historical events that have suggested that lay adjudicators’ participation is 
                                                          
30JH Langbein, The Origins of the Adversarial Criminal Trial (Oxford; Oxford University Press 2003), 321. 
31T Regnier, ‘Restoring the Founders’ Ideal of the Independent Jury in Criminal Cases’ (2011) 51 Santa 
Clara Law Review 775–852, 764. 
32Alschuler and Deiss, supra note 15, 912. 
33K Crosby, ‘Controlling Devlin ’ S Jury : What the Jury Thinks , and What the Jury Sees Online’ (2012) 1 
Criminal Law Review 15–29, 25. 
34IA Horowitzt, ‘Jury Nullification The Impact of Judicial Instructions , Arguments , and Challenges on 
Jury Decision Making’ (1988) 12 Law and human behavior 439–453, 440. 
35J McClanahan, ‘Citizen Participation in Japanese Criminal Trials: Reimagining the Right to Trial by Jury 
in the United States’ (2011) 37 North Carolina Journal of International Law and Commercial Regulation 
725–792, 731-2. 
36S Landsman, ‘A Brief Survey on the Development of the Adversary System’ (1983) 44 Ohio State Law 
Journal 713–39, 722. 
37JE Carroll, ‘The Jury’s Second Coming’ (2012) 100 Georgetown Law Journal 657–708, 667. 
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an important mechanism for introducing and sustaining the concepts of democracy in 
criminal trial procedures, there remain widespread doubts about the system because of 
some widely debated events. American high-profile cases in the twentieth century, such 
as those of O.J. Simpson38, the Menendez brothers39, and Rodney King40, increased public 
concerns about the impartiality of the lay adjudication system, and competence of lay 
adjudicators.  
In spite of the concerns, since the late twentieth century, the (re)introduction of a lay 
adjudication system has occurred in several countries. Russia (1993)41, Spain (1996)42, 
Kazakhstan (2007)43, The Republic of Korea (2008)44, and Georgia (2011)45 all introduced 
lay adjudication systems, although the details of each lay adjudication procedure differ. 
The collapse of the former Soviet Union resulted in international movements for the 
introduction of lay participation in the legal system motivated by liberal democratic 
ideologies46. Russia, Spain, and Korea introduced the jury model of lay adjudication in 
their non-adversarial systems, while Kazakhstan and Japan introduced a mixed judge 
system in their non-adversarial systems. The aim of the introduction of these changes 
was to increase ‘the democratic legitimacy, the transparency, and the credibility of the 
judicial process’47, and were regarded as symbolic of introducing democracy into these 
                                                          
38See A Moore, ‘The O.J. Simpson Trial - Triumph of Justice or Debacle?’ (1996) 41 Saint Louis University 
Law Journal; LK Griffin, ‘Defending the Jury’s Territory at the Heart of the Democratic Process’ (1990) 
75 Nebraska Law Review 333–376. 
39S Burns, ‘Impeachment Work in the Menendez Brothers’ Murder Trial’ (2000) 2 Sociology of Crime, 
Law and Deviance 233–256. 
40TM Riordan, ‘Copping an Attitude: Rule of Law Lessons from the Rodney King Incident’ (1993) 27 
Loyola of Los Angeles Law Review 675–733. 
41M Nemytina, ‘Trial by Jury : A Western or a Peculiarly Russian Model ?’ (2001) 72 Revue internationale 
de droit pénal 365–370, 366. 
42SC Thaman, ‘Spain Returns to Trial by Jury’ (1997) 21 Hastings International and Comparative Law 
Review 241–537, 242. 
43NP Kovalev and G Suleymenova, ‘New Kazakhstani Quasi-Jury System: Challenges, Trends and 
Reforms’ (2010) 38 International Journal of Law, Crime and Justice 261–278, 265. 
44J-S Choi, ‘Korean Citizen Participation in Criminal Trials: The Present Situation and Problems’ (2013) 
September International Journal of Law, Crime and Justice 1–20, 2. 
45A Smirnov and NP Kovalev, ‘The Nature of the Russian Trial by Jury’ (2014) 22 European Journal of 
Crime, Criminal Law and Criminal Justice 115–133, 118. 
46SC Thaman, ‘Should Criminal Juries Give Reasons for Their Verdicts?: The Spanish Experience and the 
Implications of the European Court of Human Rights Decision in Taxquet v. Belgium’ (2011) 86 Chicago-
Kent Law Review 613–668, 619. 
47K Park, YH Han and YR Seong, ‘The Effect of Double Judgments on Public Confidence in Court Decisions 
for the Trial by Citizen-Participation in Korea’ (2010) 38 International Journal of Law, Crime and Justice 
166–174, 166. 
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countries48. As part of an international tendency, a new lay adjudication system has been 
developed in Japan as a part of the Judicial Reform started in 1999. The international 
movements seem to be driven by ideas about the democratisation of the criminal justice 
system. 
The introduction of democracy into the criminal justice system appears to be founded 
on Western countries’ support for democratic reform in transitional countries moving 
from authoritarianism to democracy in Eastern Europe, Africa, and Latin America49 and, 
for example, in Poland and Serbia50. The liberal idealism inspired by Western countries 
has encouraged the transformation of their criminal procedures, in particular 
adversarial procedures including a lay adjudication system51. 
The international movement supporting democratic principles in criminal procedures 
has revealed the main issues and challenges to the practice of lay adjudication systems. 
The problems relate to the lay adjudicators themselves, such as how representative the 
lay adjudicator panel is of the people, the competence of lay adjudicators, their 
reliability as decision-makers, and the challenges related to lay adjudication procedures 
such as lay adjudicators’ perceptions, comprehension, confidence and satisfaction 52 
within the operation of the system. The rise of these concerns has led to an increase in 
international lay adjudication studies comparing different legal systems53.   
                                                          
48Sheyn, supra note 16, 653. 
49I Shapiro, Democratic Justice (New Haven, London; Yale University Press 1999). 
50T Carothers, ‘Democracy Assistance: Political vs. Developmental?’ (2008) 20 Journal of Democracy 5–
19, 11. 
51For example, Croatia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Georgia, and the former Soviet Union countries have 
transplanted adversarial criminal procedure elements into their procedures. See SK Ivkovich, Lay 
Participation in Criminal Trials: The Case of Croatia (Austin and Winfeld Publishers; Lanham 1999); LJ 
Nettelfield, Courting Democracy in Bosnia and Herzegovina: The Hague Tribunal’s Impaact in a Postwar 
State (Cambridge University Press; New York 2010); R Vogler & G Jokhadze, ‘Plea Bargaining in Georgia: 
A Utilitarian Perspective’ Ministry of Justice (Georgia) (Tiblisi 2011); NP Kovalev, Criminal Justice 
Reform in Russia, Ukraine and the Former Republics of the Soviet Union: Trial by Jury and Mixed Courts 
(Lewiston, NY; Edwin Mellen Press 2010).    
52J Goodman-Delahunty and others, ‘Practices , Policies and Procedures That Influence Juror Satisfaction 
in Australia, No.87’, vol 2007 (2007), 2. 
53Vidmar, supra note 21; supra note 23.; JD Jackson and NP Kovalev, ‘Lay Adjudication and Human 
Rights in Europe’ (2006) 13 Columbia Journal of European Law 83–124; SC Thaman, ‘Europe’s New Jury 
Systems: The Cases of Spain and Russia’ (1999) 62 Law and Contemporary Problems 233–259. 
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1.1 Assessment of Criminal Justice Reform and Popular Justice 
Current reviews of domestic criminal justices reform often reveal international 
influences. Asmal confirms that globalisation, through social, economic, and political 
transactions, ‘affects law reform of criminal justice both at an international and 
domestic level’54. Similarly, Menski points out the recent pressure that globalisation in 
Western terms puts on Asian countries including people, and laws55. Domestic criminal 
justice reforms in non-Western countries may bring confusion between their indigenous 
and legal cultures. Twenty-first century ideas should not be based on specific 
understanding of only Western cultures. As Boughey has suggested, indigenous cultures 
can continue to be represented or influenced by Western perspectives at various stages 
in criminal justice systems56. As a result, ‘the moral justifications for punishment and the 
perceived legitimacy of sentencing outcomes’ transferred from Western countries57 into 
non-Western countries may conflict with indigenous concepts, and therefore, the moral 
justifications should be reviewed from both the indigenous as well as Western 
perspectives. 
This section considers links between international fundamental human rights 
principles, efficiency, and popular justice in the examination of criminal justice. Muncie 
claims that the ‘homogenisation of criminal justice policies’ is due to reflections of the 
mixture between international human rights developments in society and the economy, 
and extending policy transfers58. In addition, promoting efficiency and effectiveness 
along with delivering justice is one of the significant targets of the function of a criminal 
                                                          
54K Asmal, ‘Human Rights and the Administration of Criminal Justice: Law Reform in the Age of 
Globalism’, 14th International Conference of the International Society for the Reform of Criminal Law 
(2000), 1. 
55W Menski, Comparative Law in a Global Context: The Legal Systems of Asia and Africa (2nd edn, 
Cambridge Univ Press 2006), 1-5. 
56J Boughey, ‘Administrative Law: The Next Frontier for Comparative Law’ (2013) 29 International and 
Comparative Law Quarterly 17-30, 22. 
57R Henham, ‘Penal Ideology, Sentencing and the Legitimacy of Trial Justice’ (2011) 57 Crime, Law and 
Social Change 77-98, 84. 
58J Muncie, ‘The Globalization of Crime Control--the Case of Youth and Juvenile Justice: Neo-Liberalism, 
Policy Convergence and International Conventions’ (2005) 9 Theoretical Criminology 35–64, 36. 
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justice system in many legal systems59 and international courts60. As the emphasis of 
popular justice is also a recent international movement, popular justice can lead to links 
between the state and indigenous perspectives on criminal justice,61 although it can be 
manipulated by a dominating party and external influences 62 . The balance of the 
tripartite relationship should be considered in order to examine current criminal justice.  
According to Howard-Hassman, current globalisation is ‘the second great 
transformation spreading capitalism over the world’63, and ‘may well create a world of 
increased prosperity, democracy, and protection of human rights.’ 64  Moreover, 
globalisation by obvious democratising institutions and standards has been adopted in 
international organisations such as the U.N. as well as domestic authorities65. As Frank 
has claimed, the right to democracy is subsidiary to the right to peace66. According to 
Article 21 of the 1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights, ‘[e]veryone has the right 
to take part in the government of his country, directly or through freely chosen 
representatives’67, and ‘everyone has the right of equal access to public service in his 
country.’68 In other words, the right to self-govern in the globalised democratic society 
is required to protect human rights. This principle is accepted as a foundation of human 
rights in both international treaties and laws in many domestic legal systems 69 . 
Buergenthal claimed that the Declaration has been ‘the centrepiece of the international 
                                                          
59For example, regarding the England system, see, M Zander, ‘Lord Justice Auld’s Review of the Criminal 
Courts: A Response’ (2001) <https://www.lse.ac.uk/collections/law/staff publications full 
text/zander/auld_response_web.pdf> accessed 30 June 2016, 5. 
60S Ford, ‘Complexity and Efficiency at International Criminal Courts’ (2014) 29 Emory International Law 
Review 2–68. 
61SE Merry, ‘Popular Justice and the Ideology of Social Transformation’ (1992) 1 Social & Legal Studies 
161–176, 163. 
62Vogler examines the historical events of manipulations in colonial native courts in Rwanda, China, 
Cuba, Mozambique, and South Africa. See,  supra note 19, ch.13; Johnson studies the American cases 
in DT Johnson, ‘Vigilance and the Law: The Moral Authority of Popular Justice in the Far West’ (1981) 
33 American Quarterly 558–586. 
63RE Howard-Hassmann, ‘The Second Great Transformation: Human Rights Leapfrogging in the Era of 
Globalization’ (2005) 27 Human Rights Quarterly 1–40, 1. 
64ibid, 5. 
65ibid, 166.  
66M F Thomas, ‘The Emerging Right to Democratic Governance’ (1992) 86 American Journal of 
International Law 46, 87. 
67Sec. 1.  
68Sec. 2. 
69K Bard, ‘Trial and Sentencing: Judicial Independence, Training and Appointment of Judges, Structure of 
Criminal Procedure, Sentencing Patterns, the Role of the Defence in the Countries in Transition’, 
Criminological Research Conference (Strasbourg; Kluwer Law 1999). 
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human rights revolution’ ranking with the Magna Carta, the French Declaration of the 
Rights of Man, and the American Declaration of Independence70. The Constitutions and 
legislation in various legal systems71 was proclaimed to be based on the principle of the 
Declaration. Therefore, it could be said that achieving a fair trial in open court with a 
protection of human rights in criminal procedures has been a considerable goal in not 
only international but also domestic criminal procedures. 
Democratic countries throughout the world seeking the developments of their 
criminal justice systems often share challenges in terms of ‘inefficiencies, growing costs 
or lack of timeliness’ as well as the maintenance of the essential aspect of a fair and 
effective criminal justice systems72. England and Wales has adopted the ‘criminal justice 
system efficiency programme’ in order to modernise and reform the system which has 
protected victims and the public since 201373. In the U.S. the bipartisan bill called the 
SAFE Justice Act 2015, which will greatly decrease prison costs and population, was 
introduced in the House of Representatives 74 . The reforms for an efficient criminal 
justice systems appear to be sought by applying highly technological procedures and 
having alternative correctional processes75. Sanders presents the nine goals of criminal 
justice as follows: 
1. preventing crimes; 
2. reduction of reoffending; 
3. bringing offenders to justice; 
4. respecting victims and witnesses, and not creating secondary victimisation; 
5. protecting the innocent; 
6. invading the rights and liberties of suspects and offenders; 
                                                          
70T Buergenthal, ‘International Human Rights Law and Institutions: Accomplishments and Prospects’ 
(1988) 63 Washington Law Review 1–20, 6. 
71See GR Newman, JP Stamatel and H-E Sung, Crime and Punishment Around the World, vol.1, Africa and 
the Middle East, vol 1 (GR Newman, JP Stamatel and H Sung eds, Calfornia; ABC-CLIO 2010), 91, 101.  
72Y Dandurand, ‘Criminal Justice Reform and the System’s Efficiency’ (2014) 25 Criminal Law Forum 383–
440, 386-7. 
73Ministry of Justice, ‘Reforming the Criminal Justice System’ [Japanese] (2013) 
<http://www.justice.gov.uk/about/justice/criminal-justice-system-efficiency-programme2> accessed 6 
August 2015. 
74Sensenbrenner-Scott Over-Criminalization Task Force Safe, Accountable, Fair, Effective Justice 
Reinvestment Act, H.R. 2944, 114th Cong. (2015). 
75Such as alternative community-based corrections. See UNODC, ‘Compendium of United Nations 
Standards and Norms in Crime Prevention and Criminal Justice’ (New York; 2006). 
11 
 
7. adversely affecting only people directly involved; 
8. using scarce resources that could be put to better use proportionately, not 
disproportionately;  
9. securing appropriate public respect for, and trust in, the criminal justice system76. 
These essential aspects of criminal justice systems should not compromise efficiencies. 
Transitional countries moving from authoritarian to democratic systems tend to focus 
on ‘the promotion of the role of law, good governance, police training, and the 
development of international human rights standards’77 for criminal justice reforms. 
This provokes questions as to whether the success or failure of the reforms should be 
evaluated by societal factors rather than the institutional structures78. 
Two main scholars have influenced contemporary criminal justice research: Herbert 
Packer and Mirjan Damaska. There is no existing pure system of theoretical categories 
presented by either scholar owing to the mixtures and transformations that have 
occurred in different criminal justice systems 79 . Packer has presented the principle 
aspects in terms of the policy of the criminal justice system: the crime control model and 
the due process model80. The crime control model emphasises the conviction of the 
guilty, while the due process model emphasises the organisation and function of 
legitimate procedures, including the notion of human rights and the accused person's 
rights. The normative procedural categories of criminal justice procedures, Damaska has 
claimed, are ‘the adversarial’ or ‘non-adversarial models’ at the trial stage 81 . The 
inquisitorial model can be defined as taking a stance, which is ‘the initial probability that 
a crime has been committed’, and the procedural target is the justification of the facts 
and criminal sanctions82.  On the other hand, the adversarial model can be defined as 
                                                          
76A Sanders, ‘Reconciling the Apparently Different Goals of Criminal Justice and Regulation: The 
“Freedom” Perspective’ in Hannah Quirk, Tody Seddon and Graham Smith (eds), Regulation and 
Criminal Justice: Innovations in Policy and Research2 (Cambridge University Press 2010),Ch 3, 42-71, 
44-5. 
77A Robertson, ‘Criminal Justice Policy Transfer To Post-Soviet States: Two Case Studies Of Police Reform 
In Russia And Ukraine’ (2005) 11 European Journal on Criminal Policy and Research 1-28, 1. 
78S C Krasnokutski, ‘Human Rights in Transition: Ths Success and Failure of Polish and Russian Criminal 
Justice Reform’ (2001) 13-69, 68. 
79H Kuhne and others, Criminal Procedure Systems in the European Community (Butterworths 1993). 
80Packer, supra note 7. 
81M Damaska, ‘Evidentiary Barriers to Conviction and Two Models of Criminal Procedure: A Comparative 
Stude’ (1973) 121 University of Pennsylvania Law Review 506-589, 506. 
82ibid, 564. 
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taking a stance, which valued the ‘search for the procedural truth’. Therefore, the 
procedural target is the conflicts between each party (the prosecution and the 
defendant)83. He also put forward two types of organisational structure: the hierarchical 
and co-ordinated models 84 . The ‘hierarchical model’ puts emphasis on the 
professionalism of officials, the hierarchical engagement and the technical guidelines for 
the decision-making process, while the ‘coordinate model’ puts emphasis on the 
separations and equal power of authority85. Both Packer and Damaska presented these 
standards in order to examine enormously diverse criminal procedures throughout the 
world. 
However, on the basis of those standards and the need to develop them, many 
scholars have suggested various theoretical frameworks in order to evaluate diverse 
criminal procedures. These evaluations have different viewpoints and focuses86. For 
example, Frase evaluated macro- and micro- level models in terms of the teaching of 
comparative law and criminal procedures with a particular focus on international human 
rights standards and challenges87. As a result of arguments about ‘types of control’ in 
criminal procedures including the ‘psychological analysis’ of Thibaut and Walker and the 
victim-centred model by Roach, Vogler presents a conceptual framework of three 
models: the adversarial, inquisitorial, and popular justice models, in terms of 
relationships between ‘state, civil society, and the defendant’ 88 . The dominant 
participants in the adversarial model are lawyers, and those in the inquisitorial are 
judges, prosecutors, police and other state officials89. Those in popular justice are lay 
participants90. 
                                                          
83K Ambos, ‘International Criminal Procedure:“adversarial”,“inquisitorial” or Mixed?’ (2003) 3 
International Criminal Law Review 1–37. 
84M Damaska, The Faces of Justice and State Authority: A Comparative Approach to the Legal Process 
(New Haven; Yale University Press 1986). 
85Ibid, 18-23. 
86See J Thibaut and L Walker, Procedural Justice: A Psychological Analysis (Hillsdale, NJ.; Wiley 1975); E 
Luna, ‘A Place for Comparative Criminal Procedure’ (2004) 42 University of Louisville Law Review 277–
328. 
87RS Frase, ‘Main-Streaming Comparative Criminal Justice: How to Incorporate Comparative and 
International Concepts and Materials into Basic Criminal Law and Procedure Courses’ (1997) 100 West 
Verginia Law Review 773–798. 
88Vogler, supra note 19, 14-5. 
89Ibid, 15. 
90Ibid. 
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A popular justice system, which Depew defines as a ‘communitarian model’91, leads 
to links between those models and efficiency. In addition to the modelled procedures 
suggested by Packer and Damaska, a popular justice system based on community 
participation leads to a decrease in the power of the criminal justice agencies 92 . A 
popular justice system looks for appropriate personal adjustment by the cooperative of 
individuals in terms of aiming at establishing psychological parameters focusing on 
emotions and feelings93. Vogler presented ‘unmediated popular justice’ and ‘mediated 
popular justice’ 94  in the study of historical transformations and developments in 
particular European and other legal systems in the 20th century95. A lay adjudication 
system functions differently in different legal traditions. Therefore, it will be reasonable 
to evaluate the functions of a lay adjudication system in terms of the relationships 
between lay adjudicators and legal professionals as well as those between popular 
justice and the adversarial/inquisitorial approaches, if the subjects of relate to those 
approaches. 
What components of criminal justice should be used to examine the success or failure 
of the criminal justice reform? Stuntz has argued for a focus on the judicial power 
balance between courts and legislatures in criminal procedure, and emphasised the 
weak power of the courts for substantive criminal law96. Moreover, the significance of 
procedural regulation has been emphasised by a comparison with the decrease of focus 
on substantive regulation97. In criminal justice reform studies, it is important to examine 
the procedural and substantive regulations which are essential to enforcement98. 
In examining criminal justice reform, there is a clearly intrinsic connection between 
law and society. Cohen et al argued that Parsons emphasised the significance of belief 
                                                          
91R Depew, ‘Popular Justice and Aboriginal Communities-Some Preliminary Considerations’ (1996) 36 J. 
Journal of Legal Pluralism 21–67, 23. 
92DR Longmire, ‘A Popular Justice System: A Radical Alternative to the Traditional Criminal Justice 
System’ (1981) 5 Contemporary Crises 15–30, 25. 
93Depew, supra note 91, 24. 
94R Vogler, supra note 19,197. 
95Ibid, part III. 
96W J Stuntz, ‘The Uneasy Relationship between Criminal Procedure and Criminal Justice’ (1997) 107 
Yale Law Journal 1-76, 68-9. 
97Ibid. 
98R Pound, ‘Law in Books and Law in Action’ (1910) 44 American Law Review 12–36. 
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in legitimacy in his analysis of the foundation of power in social structures 99 . The 
legitimacy of the rule of law is as ‘a significant political weapon’ which offers limitations 
in arbitrary discretion and faces legal concessions by the authorities 100 . Both the 
legitimacy and the effectiveness of the law, in particular the criminal law, depend on 
‘the moral credibility’ achieved by the observations of the citizens 101 . However, 
effectiveness is important but not essential for legitimacy, as Bottoms and Tankebe 
argue 102 . Ideally, therefore, democratic states should have a structured ‘dialogic’ 
procedural law that establishes the relationship between power-holders, the citizens, 
and provides procedural justice 103 . The procedural justice leads to the people’s 
satisfaction with the verdict and to their acceptance of the legitimacy of the decisions104. 
Criminal justice reform should assess substantive and procedural applicable law and 
social context to produce the reform as well as traditional legal cultures.  
The citizen judge system in the Japanese criminal justice were introduced as a result 
of the Judicial Reform started in 1999. The next section provides a brief overview of the 
reform which triggered the introduction.  
 
1.2 The Japanese Judicial Reform 1999 
To clarify the role to be played by justice in Japanese society in the twenty-
first century, and to examine and deliberate fundamental measures 
necessary for the realization of a justice system that is easy for the people to 
utilize, measures necessary for participation by the people in the justice 
system, measures necessary for … strengthening the functions of the legal 
                                                          
99J Cohen, L Hazelrigg and W Pope, ‘Deparsonizing Weber: A Critique of Parsons’ Interpretation of 
Weber's Sociology’ (1972) 40 American Sociological Review 229-241, 238. 
100EP Thompson, Whigs and Hunters: The Origin of Black Art (Allen Lane 1975; London), 258-9. 
101J Fagan, ‘Legitimacy and Criminal Justice’ (2008) 6 Ohio State Journal of Criminal Law 123-140, 134. 
102A Bottoms and Justice Tankebe, ‘Criminology: Beyond Procedural Justice: A Dialogic Approach To 
Legitimacy in Criminal Justice’ (2012) 102 Journal of Criminal Law & Criminology 119-170, 147. 
103Ibid. 
104L Ellis and S S Diamond, ‘Race, Diversity, and Jury Composition: Battering and Bolstering Legitimacy’ 
(2003) 78 Chicago-Kent Law Review 1033-1060, 1040. 
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profession, and other reforms of the justice system as well as improvements 
in the infrastructure of that system105. 
The Judicial Reform Council (JRC) was established by the Prime Minister Keizo Obuchi 
Diet in July 1999 and the establishment was a part of the Structural Reforms (Kozo 
Kaikaku), which represented the most drastic social reformation in over sixty-years of 
the post-war history of Japan. As stated in the Judicial Reform Council Establishing Act, 
referred to above, the reform aimed at enhancing popular justice and the effectiveness 
in the judiciary system and developing the functions of legal authorities. 
Japanese reforms of the administrative and economic structure were necessary 
because of the financial crisis in 1999. Economic stagnation in Japan started with a sharp 
share price plunge in 1990, and the following year Japanese stock and real estate 
markets overheated and collapsed106. This was the start of the Heisei Recession [Heisei107 
Fukyo]108. The great Hanshin-Awaji Earthquake occurred in 1995, and there was an Act 
to aid people affected by the earthquake109. Consumption tax was raised from 5% to 
8%110, and fiscal structural reform began in 1997 with the establishment of the Act on 
Special Measures Concerning Promotion of Fiscal Structural Reform [Zaiseikozo Kaikaku 
no Shuishin ni Kansuru Tokubetsu Secchi Ho]111. The reforms also served as the initial 
trigger for a series of social changes preparing the ground for judicial reform, such as 
reforms to the system of administrative guidance and the electoral system in 1994. Four 
laws, named Seijikaikaku Yonho (Political Reform Four Laws), were enacted. They were 
related to parallel voting112 and party subsidies113. The JRC recommendation about the 
                                                          
105Art. 2 of the Justice System Reform Council Establish Act [Shiho Seido Kaikaku Shingikai Settchi Ho] 
Act No. 68 of 1999. 
106S Yasui, ‘On the Japanese Long-Term Depression in the Nineties [Nihon No Fukyojokyo]’ [Japanese] 
(2002) 2 Onomichi University Economic Information Journal 1–14. 
107Heisei is the name of an era in Japan. The first year of Heisei was 1989, so Heisei Recession started 
from the third year of Heisei. 
108H Akitomi, ‘The Speculation of the Heisei Recession and the Structural Reform from the Point of View 
of Economic History [Heisei Fukyo toKozokaikaku No Rekishiteki Kosatsu]’ (2007) 61 Aoyama Gakuin 
Women’s Junior Colledge Journal 85–109. 
109Act for Extraordinary Expenditures and Assistance to Cope with Hanshin-Awaji Earthquake, act no. 16 
of 1995. 
110It was raised in 2015 again from 8% to 10%. 
111Act no. 109 of 1997. 
112Act about Establishing an Inquiry Committee about the House of Representatives Election Zone, act 
no. 3 of 1994. 
113For example, one of the laws is the Party Subsidies Act, Act no. 5 of 1994. 
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criminal justice system was for the ‘realisation of a more accessible and user-friendly 
judicial system, public participation in the judicial system, redefinition of the legal 
profession and reinforcement of its function.’114 The seven major purposes of the reform 
were: unification of the legal profession; the introduction of the lay adjudication 
system115; expansion of the judiciary budget; the expansion of the number of defence 
attorneys; the organisation of public law firms and legal advice institutions; and 
reinforcement of administrative litigation procedure116. Therefore, the introduction of a 
lay adjudication system and the democratisation of the justice system was the target of 
the 1999 Judicial Reform from the early stages, and this introduction prepared for the 
reforms of the political system117. 
Many Japanese are not familiar with the concepts of democracy in the criminal justice 
system although some concepts of democracy are guaranteed in the Constitution and 
in positive laws. Most Japanese people were not familiar with popular justice 
mechanisms to solve their disputes. This might have historically resulted from the 
Confucian concept of government, which emphasised their duty ‘as teaching their 
subjects to behave in accordance with certain standards of conduct and morality’118. In 
spite of the lack of popular justice mechanisms in Japanese criminal procedure, most of 
the international conceptions of human rights and procedural fairness standards are 
established in the Constitution and protected by law. For example, the 1945 
Constitution guarantees equality before the law119, the fundamental human rights of the 
citizens120, the right to silence121, the right to be tried by an open court122, and freedom 
                                                          
114The Judicial Reform Council, ‘Recommendations of the Justice System Reform Council - For a Justice 
System to Support Japan in the 21st Century’ [Japanese] (2001) 
<http://www.kantei.go.jp/foreign/policy/sihou/singikai/990612_e.html> accessed 14 August 2015, 
Introduction. 
115In the recommendation, the details of the lay adjudication system including the name ‘citizen judge 
system’ was not determined.  
116Ibid. 
117Z Wang and H Fukurai, ‘Popular Legal Participation in China and Japan’ (2010) 38 International Journal 
of Law, Crime and Justice 236–260, 237. 
118M Dean, ‘Trial by Jury: A Force for Change in Japan’ (1995) 44 International and Comparative Law 
Quarterly 379–404, 383. 
119Art. 14. 
120Art. 11, 97.  
121Art. 38. 
122Art. 37. 
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from torture123. The presumption of innocence is guaranteed in Article 31 which states 
the principles of due process: ‘No person shall be deprived of life or liberty, nor shall any 
other criminal penalty be imposed, except according to procedure established by law.’  
In addition, Japan has ratified a series of international treaties such as the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights124, and the International Covenant on Civil and Political 
Rights 125which establish the requirements for procedural fairness and due process. 
However, the lack of procedural transparency in the Japanese criminal justice is 
particularly apparent. This absence seems to be derived from historical and societal 
background126. 
There have been two democratisation processes in the history of the Japanese 
criminal justice system: Taisho Democracy 127 , and Post-war Democracy [Sengo 
Democracy]128. The democratisation in the post war period is often criticised for being 
introduced because of the intruding pressures from General Headquarters, the Supreme 
Commander for Allied Powers (GHQ). Moreover, it is suggested that Japanese traditional 
culture, which valued community mechanisms, was destroyed by the development of 
democratic and constitutional conceptions as well as by economic growth129. In addition, 
‘developmentalism’ in the 1990s accelerated Japan towards the collapse of community 
consensus 130 . There are also distinctive arguments about democracy through the 
Constitution. It guarantees freedom, human rights, and equality for the citizens, which 
are universal values shared by the international community. On the other hand, there is 
an argument that Article 9 of the Constitution, the non-belligerency provision131, leads 
                                                          
123Art. 38 sec. 2.  
124For example, Art. 5: freedom from torture, and Art. 7: equality before the law. 
125For example, Art. 6: the inherent right to life, Art. 9, and 14: equality before the law, procedural 
fairness and due process. 
126Johnson examined the secrecy through capital punishment in Japan. See DT Johnson, ‘Japan’s 
Secretive Death Penalty Policy: Contours, Origins, Justifications, and Meanings’ (2006) 7 Asian-Pacific 
Law & Policy Journal 62–124. 
127S Giffard, ‘The Development of Democracy in Japan’ (1996) 27 Asian Affairs 275–284, 280. 
128K Kendo, Y Baba, and others, The Change of Postwar Democracy [Sengo Demokurashi No Henyo] 
(Tokyo; Iwanami Shoten 1991). 
129CA Ford, ‘The Indigenization of Constitutionalism in the Japanese Experience’ (1996) 28 Case Western 
Reserve Journal of International Law 3–62; F Halicioglu, AR Andrés and E Yamamura, ‘Modeling Crime 
in Japan’ (2012) 29 Economic Modelling 1640–1645, 1644. 
130M Suzuki, M Ito, and others, ‘Individualizing Japan: Searching for Its Origin in First Modernity.’ (2010) 
61 The British Journal of Sociology 513–38, 533. 
131Art. 9 of the Constitution states that ‘… the Japanese people forever renounce war as a sovereign 
right of the nation and the threat or use of force as means of setting international disputes.’ 
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to the lack of a sense of the relationship between the State and its citizens. While 
promoting democracy in the criminal justice system is fundamental as a part of the 
judicial reform, it is important for Japanese society to acknowledge that citizens obtain 
guaranteed freedom, human rights, equality, and also, take responsibilities. This may 
conflict with the traditional culture in society and the criminal justice system. Both 
analysis of the procedural law and the culture which accept the reform recognises the 
parameters and challenges within international standards.  
It is noteworthy that there are, according to some scholars, serious conflicts between 
human rights and lay adjudication132. For example, lay adjudicators’ lack of competence 
and potential bias could be seen as a violation of the right to be heard by an 
‘independent and impartial tribunal’ as stated in international treaties133. Moreover, an 
independent jury cannot give a reasoned judgement but merely indicates guilt or 
innocence, with no explanation. In the case of Taxquet v Belgium it was argued that this 
failure by a jury to give a reasoned judgement explaining the grounds for the conviction, 
was in itself a breach of the defendant’s right to a fair trial134. However, the European 
Court of Human Rights Grand Chamber decision was ‘flexible’ rather than ‘demanding’ 
and did not require formal professional judge instructions135. It held that, provided the 
judgement of the jury was explicable in the context of the trial process as a whole and 
the defendant could clearly understand the grounds on which he or she had been 
convicted, there was no breach of Convention rights136. Moreover, should the trial by lay 
adjudicators be regarded as a fundamental constitutional right?137 This question will be 
argued in the following chapters, but the ‘flexible’ decision of the ECHR seems to give 
                                                          
132See, for example P Roberts, ‘Does Article 6 of the European Convention on Human Rights Require 
Reasoned Verdicts in Criminal Trials?’ (2011) 11 Human Rights Law Review 213–235; P Garde, ‘The 
Danish Jury’ (2001) 72 Revue internationale de droit pénal 87–120, 96; G Daly and R Pattenden, ‘Racial 
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133Art. 6 of the European Convention of Human Rights. See K Quinn, ‘Jury Bias and the European 
Convention on Human Rights: A Well-Kept Secret?’ 998–1014. 
134Taxquet v Belgium (Application No.926/05), ‘European Human Rights Law Review Case Comment 
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6 Case Comment 1–4. 
135Thaman, supra note 46, 663. 
136NS Marder, ‘An Introduction to Comparative Jury Systems’ (2011) 86 Chi.-Kent. L. Rev. 453–466, 460. 
137In some legal systems, trial by lay adjudicators is a constitutional entitlement, such as in the U.S. and 
Canada. See, NJ King, ‘The American Criminal Jury’ (1999) 1 Law and Contemporary Problems, 42 ;N 
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each lay adjudication system the opportunity to structure respective relationships 
between democratic justice and human rights process. 
In summary, the Judicial Reform 1999 aimed at democratisation in the criminal justice 
system, and, as part of the democratisation, the citizen judge system was introduced. 
However, Japan has unique historical developments which mix International/Western 
and indigenous legal concepts and this has resulted in a deficit of democratic concepts 
in criminal justice procedures. Introducing a lay adjudication system in criminal trials 
was one of the most significant changes in the 1999 reform and has been a first step in 
embracing democratic values in criminal procedure. Research about the citizen judge 
system will be fruitful in obtaining clear and deep insights relating to a review of the 
whole criminal justice system.  
In addition, it is important for research to be conducted into the citizen judge system 
which will lead to the improvement of practice. Article 9 of the supplement of the Citizen 
Judge Act (CJA) declared a review of the system in 2011, and the amendment of the CJA 
in 2015 extended the review period until 2018. Several committees, such as the 
Investigative Commission about the Citizen Judge System [Saiban-in Seido ni Kansuru 
Kentokai] in the Ministry of Justice and Discussion Session with Experts on the Citizen 
Judge System [Saiban-in Seido no Unyo nado ni Kansuru Yushikisha Kondankai] in the 
Supreme Court, were established to discuss the practice of the system. Civil groups, for 
example, the Network of Citizen Judges [Saiban-in net] have held workshops and have 
monitored citizen judge trials138. Updated research regarding the citizen judge system 
will provide crucial perspectives and impacts on the reviews.  
I undertook an extensive review of reports and surveys that have been conducted by 
the Japanese Supreme Court and the District Courts as well as academic literature on 
various areas of the citizen judge system, some of which relate to the preparation period 
for its introduction. These studies have adopted a variety of qualitative and quantitative 
research techniques and interviews with the former citizen judges of different 
backgrounds. The following are some reports referred to: 
                                                          
138See Saiban-in Net, ‘Citizen Judge Net [Saiban-in Network]’ <http://www.saibanin.net/> accessed 21 
June 2016. 
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• The Supreme Court’s ‘Implications of the Citizen Judge System’ was based on 
annual statistical surveys between 2009 and 2016139. 
• The Supreme Courts’ ‘Questionnaire Data from Former Citizen Judges’ collected 
annual questionnaires between 2009 and 2016140. 
• The Supreme Court’s ‘Discussion Sessions with Experts on the Citizen Judge 
System’ from 2009 and 2016 discussed the practice of the citizen judge trials 27 
times in total141. 
• 48 District Courts and a few branches published meeting minutes of conferences 
in which legal professionals and former citizen judges exchange their opinions. 
The number of meeting minutes and conferences, which vary depending of the 
courts, was 453 in total at the end of May 2016142. 
The information from these reports provided valuable evidence relevant to the 
standards of the evaluative test for the citizen judge system. From my review of this 
documentary data, I also collated some quantitative data on crime statistics published 
by the Supreme Court143.  
A range of academic research and proposals for the reform of the citizen judge 
system were also reviewed, such as by Oshiro, Taguchi, et al. who suggested focusing 
on citizen judges’ mental burden,144 and Plogstedt’s observation research of the citizen 
judge trials145. International comparative research between the citizen judge system and 
other lay adjudication systems, for instance, the American and Korean systems, 
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140The Supreme Court, ‘Each District Court’s Meeting for Exchanging Opinions’ 
<http://www.courts.go.jp/nagasaki/saibanin/index.html> accessed 3 July 2016. 
141The Supreme Court, ‘Discussion Session with Experts on the Citizen Judge System’ 
<http://www.courts.go.jp/saikosai/iinkai/saibanin_kondan/> accessed 3 July 2016. 
142The Supreme Court, supra note 140. 
143N Fielding, ‘Mixed Methods Research in the Real World’ (2010) 13 International Journal of Social 
Research Methodology 127–138. 
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conducted by Fukurai146, Foote147, and Miyazawa148, focused on the Japanese traditional 
procedural cultures. Vanoverbeke’s ‘Juries in the Japanese Legal System’ traced the 
history of the lay adjudication system and evaluated the citizen judge system in terms 
of the establishment of the CJA and the former citizen judges’ sentiments about their 
experience performing adjudicator duties149. 
Hopefully, my research will contribute to the review process by providing useful and 
illuminating insights into the operation of the current citizen judge system as well as 
suggesting its possible reform.  
 
1.3 Aim of this Thesis 
This thesis is conceptually and analytically concerned with the impact of the 
introduction of the new Japanese lay adjudication system, in particular of the 
relationship between the use of the citizen judge system and the injection of democratic 
values into the criminal justice system. My central research question is: has the citizen 
judge system been successful? This of course will raise the question: what is a ‘successful’ 
citizen judge system? Regarding the aims and expected functions of a lay adjudication 
and the 1999 Judicial Reform, it seems appropriate to evaluate success in terms of the 
democratic values that the citizen judge system brings. In addition, an examination of 
the balance between democratic justice and judicial controls will be conducted to study 
the impact of current citizen judge functions. In the course of the research, the scope of 
the roles of citizen judges will be explored by considering the question relating to 
challenges in the practice of the citizen judge system. In addition, possible suggestions 
to enhance citizen judges’ participation in the criminal trial process will be presented. 
This research will consider the relevant legislation and its use of the citizen judge system 
by focusing on citizen judges’ participation as well as the increase in democratic values 
within the criminal trial procedure itself. To sum up this study: 
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1. explores lay adjudication as a tool for providing democratic values within the 
criminal trial procedure and assesses the standards of a lay adjudication system, 
namely a lay adjudicators’ participation in practicing the system in a democratic 
society; 
2. considers theoretical perspectives of the value of a lay adjudication and develop 
an evaluative criteria for the practice of the citizen judge system, based on the 
existing lay adjudication research and Criminal Justice Assessment Toolkit in 2006 
by the UNODC150;  
3. examines the Japanese criminal trial procedure and the legal traditions that 
influence the practice of the citizen judge system, the history of the 
developments of substantive and procedural laws and contemporary challenges 
that may  impact from the introduction of the citizen judge system and therefore 
the effectiveness of the citizen judge system; and 
4. evaluates the Citizen Judge Act and the practice of the citizen judge system, 
applying the evaluative criteria in order to determine whether the introduction 
of the citizen judge system has been successful for injecting democratic values 
into the criminal trial procedure. 
Lay adjudicators’ participation is a different concept between analytical and political 
terms. Analytically speaking, those who support the idea of lay adjudication in criminal 
cases and those who oppose it come from different perspectives. Those who feel that it 
is irrational to have lay adjudicators in the criminal decision-making process may 
struggle to trust in lay adjudicators’ competence, although they may also distrust legal 
professionals’ competence. On the other hand, political speaking, it is reasonably 
acceptable that lay adjudicators’ participation is ‘democratic’ within the wider process 
of a criminal trial 151 . Supporters claim that lay adjudicators’ participation brings 
legitimacy, and they prioritise the view of oppressive state power, hence the benefits of 
citizens’ participation in the administration of justice.  
My aim in this thesis is not to find any convincing justification for lay adjudication in 
the Japanese criminal justice system. Rather, it is to explore what this concept of the 
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citizen judges’ participation might mean, and what kind of restrictions might reasonably 
be expected in the citizen judge system. It is hoped that this research will give a fresh 
insight into the citizen judge system reform. There is no simple template for the 
paradigmatic form of all jurisdictions, but this is an implied question of this research. 
Ideally, as a result of my research, I also hope to help to foster the motivation to develop 
and sustain the citizen judge system. The main thrust of this research is to examine the 
citizen judge system from the aspect of democratic concepts, taking examples from 
existing lay adjudication systems in other jurisdictions in order to explore the basic idea 
of what the ideal form of lay adjudication system might be. 
The Citizen Judge Act states that: 
Where additional investigation into the status of the law’s implementation 
is recognised as necessary three years after the law comes into effect, based 
on these results, the Government will create the necessary measures so that 
the system of citizen judges participation in criminal trials can facilitate the 
lay participation in justice to realise adequately its role as the foundation of 
our country’s judicial system152. 
The clearly necessary measures to evaluate the citizen judge system have not yet been 
presented. One of the amendments announced in June 2015 was that a case taking a 
exceptionally long time can be tried by a bench trial153. The amendment states again that 
the system shall be reviewed two years after its promulgation, which is in December 
2017. Therefore it is important to analyse the citizen judge system and establish the 
necessary parameters for these assessments. 
Evaluating the citizen judge system can shed light on lay adjudication as a tool for 
promoting democratic values in the trial procedure in democratic states and 
contributing to the theoretical understanding of it which has led to an increased respect 
and belief in the system. Therefore, in this research, I will focus on the citizen judges’ 
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function as a democratic institution with a consideration of the impact on criminal 
procedure and the effects on former citizen judges.  
 
1.4 Definitions 
Adequate definitions of terms will be required, especially in a comparative approach. 
Melossi claimed that there were common difficulties in providing a clear definition of 
terms and finding uniformity with reference to the nation, system or distinctive issues 
between countries 154 . However, only a firm theoretical basis for the whole of this 
research will permit the analysis of the citizen judge system from global perspectives. 
Moreover, a careful and sensitive selection and translation of words, in particular from 
Japanese to English, will be made.  
Lay adjudication trials involve the participation of lay adjudicators in the institution 
of the decision-making process in criminal matters as a representative panel from local 
communities155. Lay adjudicators are normally chosen from the community, and they 
listen and deliberate over the evidence and the legal and additional information with 
the support from professional judges and decide the verdict, guilty or not guilty. In some 
jurisdictions, lay adjudicators also participate in sentencing. As participatory democratic 
theorists have claimed, citizens’ participation in a small part of public life will be the start 
of promoting civic political participation 156 . The direct and indirect forms of civic 
engagement in the political institutions can be various, such as a voluntary work for local 
government, and voting as an electoral participation157.  Serving as a lay adjudicator is 
one of the direct forms of civic participation in the political institution 158 .  Lay 
adjudicators as decision-makers especially in criminal cases will produce greater impacts 
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on the verdict, the procedure, the society and the lay adjudicators themselves. The 
deliberative experience for lay adjudicators will stimulate future civic engagement 
because of the opportunities to consider public matters159. Therefore, lay adjudication 
trials are trials which include ‘an institutionalised citizen deliberation’160.  
Numerous typologies of international lay adjudication systems have been suggested, 
the content of which varies depending on the research subjects examined. Different 
researchers have focused on different legal systems and have developed their own 
particular parameters, thus adding to the confusion161. The cross-national research into 
lay adjudication systems shows different allocations of actor powers in the procedural 
rules 162 . Researchers have sought to typify different lay adjudication systems with 
reference to the attributes of these procedural rules. Richert has attempted to reduce 
the number of basic types by examining the representativeness of the West German lay 
adjudication system163. The types identified are the magistrate, jury, and mixed judge 
model. A magistrate system has lay volunteers serving as adjudicators for less serious 
criminal cases and civil cases164. The magistrates are trained, work fulltime and are 
paid165. This minimum typology was expanded by Ivković by adding the lay courts used 
in the former Yugoslavia for reconciliation to the three types166. In addition, Jackson and 
Kovalev divided two models - jury and mixed judge models - into five:  the Continental 
Jury Model, the German Collaborative Court Model, the French Collaborative Court 
Model, the Expert Assessor Collaborative Court Model, and the Pure Lay Judge Model167.  
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In addition, Kovalev presented two major modes in his comparative lay adjudication 
study focusing on the Russian and the former Republics of the Soviet Union: the jury 
model and mixed court model168. He also separated them into two different modes, as 
the common law/civil law jury model, and the collaborative/mixed court model, 
respectively, according to the legal traditions and the selection processes.  
This research aims to analyse the citizen judge system rather than typify it. In 
Kovalev’s typology, the system appears to be classified within the mixed court model; 
however, the minimum typology of the lay adjudication systems, the jury model and the 
mixed judge model, will be focused on in this research in order to give an overview of 
the existing lay adjudication systems. The jury model, which is also called the ‘Anglo-
American’ model169, has been adopted in England and Wales and the U.S170, while the 
mixed judge model, which is also called an ‘Continental-European’ model’171, has been 
adopted in France and Germany. Moreover, the purpose of the international overview 
is to analyse the Japanese system from a global perspective. The Japanese system is 
currently only applied in serious criminal cases. Therefore, the role of a magistrate will 
not be referred to in this research.  
I have employed the term democracy in this thesis in a wide sense to relate to the 
responsibilities of citizens. This is because the lay adjudication system is recognised as a 
tool to share responsibilities between the state and its citizens. Furthermore, democracy 
is recognised as a necessary part of normative content in contemporary politics. As Dzur 
states, democracy can be defined as ‘sharing power, breaking up concentrations of 
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power held by certain families or groups and more equally distributing control, authority, 
and responsibility regarding collective projects.’172 
 
1.5 Methodology 
1.5.1 Research Strategy 
I began this research project in 2009 in order to explore the issue of whether the 
introduction of the citizen judge system in Japan might be successful or not. The 
following are the four key areas of study in order to assess the main question: 
1. the targeted democratic principles by which the citizen judge system was set 
up; 
2. the degree to which citizen judges’ participation is obstructed – if at all by 
the procedural rules; 
3. the frequency of the actual use of the citizen judge systems; and 
4. the extent to which citizen judges as well as other actors in the criminal 
proceeding can be considered successful. 
The contextual concerns, challenges and constraints in the Japanese criminal justice will 
lead to the success or failure of the introduction of the new system. 
1.5.2  A Socio-Legal Approach 
The socio-legal approach is defined by Schiff as the approach which analyses ‘the 
situation by seeing the part the law plays in the creation, maintenance and/or change 
of a situation’173. This approach was chosen in order to explore the operation of the CJA 
as well as the impacts of citizen judges. The focus here will be on ‘law in action’, which 
is a requirement of a social legal approach174. There are two main reasons why this 
approach is used: the nature of criminal justice reform and lay adjudication.  As Ziegert 
claimed, ‘the operation of the rule of law cannot be measured on the terms of the legal 
operations only but must be also observed in the standards and practices that are 
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applied …’175 As I mentioned earlier, social factors are inevitable in evaluating criminal 
justice reform. Moreover, the various cultural, economic, and political influences on/by 
lay adjudicators are essential for an evaluation of the lay adjudication system.  Therefore, 
the socio-legal approach seems to be appropriate for analysing the relationships of the 
reforms in Japanese society and culture, and the citizen judge system. Munger 
presented the contextual influence of politics, economics and society on lay participants 
as decision-makers in the justice system176. 
1.5.2.1 Methods of Data Collection 
This research employs a variety of data collection. I have mainly considered the 
statistical governmental data from Japan and my interview data. Legal and social science 
methods including some sense of comparative legal method archival research, semi-
structured interviews, secondary statistical surveys, and a review of written judgements 
have been used. Moreover, other data gathering strategies such as analysis of reports 
of organisations and secondary sources provide a theoretical and initial overview of the 
issues and challenges of a lay adjudication system and the Japanese criminal procedure. 
This mixture of methodologies will permit an analysis of the legal system from different 
angles. For example, the case study approach will lead to an understanding not only of 
the system itself, but also the relationship between the system and social circumstances 
that a survey approach would not be able to do 177 . In addition, the mixture of 
methodologies will cover areas in the analysis which the single method approach could 
not. 
1.5.2.2  A Review of Literature and Documentary Data 
I undertook an extensive review of research papers and surveys conducted by the 
governments and academic researchers in the light of lay adjudication systems in 
various jurisdictions. The literature on lay adjudication is voluminous, and concerns 
comparative approaches, and it has become greater since international attention has 
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been paid to new lay adjudication systems in countries, such as Russia, Japan and Korea, 
as well as concerns about the challenging aspects of lay adjudication.  
Firstly, from an archival search of research data over the last years of comparative lay 
adjudication research and related legislation, an overview will be established in order to 
analyse the concepts, methodologies, and methods adopted. Secondly, an outline of the 
existing empirical lay adjudication research was analysed by further archival research of 
written papers in English or Japanese focusing on the main three phases of the 
procedures; the selection of lay adjudicators; decision-making procedures in courtroom 
and the deliberation room; reaching the verdicts.   
1.5.2.3  Semi-Structured Interviews 
In this research, semi-structured interviews were conducted with both legal 
professionals, citizen judges, and lawmakers. I interviewed 5 citizen judges, 3 
professional judges, 6 defence attorneys, 2 public prosecutors and 2 lawmakers with 
experience of the citizen judge system.  
All interviews were conducted in person. Table 1 confirms the dates of the interviews 
and their positions. 
 
Table 1: The List of Interviewees 
  Positions Gender Place Date Case 
1 Professional Judge Male Tokyo 13/05/2011  
2 Professional Judge Male Tokyo 14/05/2011  
3 Professional Judge Male Osaka 25/05/2011  
4 Citizen Judge Male Tokyo 6/05/2011 Homicide 
5 Citizen Judge Male Tokyo 2/05/2011 Homicide 
6 Citizen Judge 
Male 
Tokyo 13/05/2011 
Robbery 
Resulting in 
Bodily Injury 
7 Citizen Judge Female Tokyo 31/05/2011 Rape  
8 Citizen Judge 
Female 
Tokyo 01/06/2011 
Counterfeiting 
currency 
9 Public Prosecutor Male Tokyo 22/05/2011  
10 Public Prosecutor Male Osaka 10/06/2011  
11 Defence Attorney Male Tokyo 26/04/2011  
12 Defence Attorney Male Tokyo 28/04/2011  
13 Defence Attorney Male Tokyo 9/05/2011  
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14 Defence Attorney Male Tokyo 13/05/2011  
15 Defence Attorney Male Osaka 26/05/2011  
16 Defence Attorney Male Osaka 26/05/2011  
17 Lawmaker Male Tokyo 17/06/2011  
18 Lawmaker Male Tokyo 13/06/2011  
 
I sent emails and letters to the Supreme Court, the Japan Federation of Bar 
Association, members of the Judicial Reform Council, organisations and academics in 
japan to request their cooperation with my research and interviews. Unfortunately, I 
was not able to gain the support of the Supreme Court. There was not official list or any 
other way to access people who experienced citizen judge trials, lawmakers or related 
institutions without governmental support. It was difficult to reach them. However, I 
received replies from the Japan Federation of Bar Association, the Saiban-in Net, Saiban-
in Iranai Undo and members of the Judicial Reform Council, and I asked them to 
participation in interviews during my fieldwork. Moreover, I asked each interviewee to 
introduce other possible participants. This is snowball sampling, also called chain-
referral sampling, which means that a small initial sample recruits additional research 
participants, and the sample size grows like a rolling snowball178. The snowball method 
is useful in sociological research. According to Voicu and Bobonea, the method is 
practical to reach ‘vulnerable and more impenetrable social groupings’179. For example, 
a snowball sampling technique is often used in research which the subjects are a ‘hidden 
population’180, such as gangs, drug users, sex workers or AIDS sufferers181. The main 
reason for using the snowball method in this research was to explore and build an 
understanding of direct authentic voices from Japanese society. Snijders claimed that 
the method can be used to collect ‘a random initial sample’182. I also expected to develop 
further insights and discussions by listening to the voices during my fieldwork. As Cohen 
mentioned, additional advantages of snowball sampling are cost and time 
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effectiveness183. However, it cannot be denied that there are a few disadvantages of the 
mentioned as well. One possible disadvantage is uncertain bias or inferences through 
the chain of referrals. Gyarmathy et al point out that there are ‘links’ in various layers 
between samples since the referrals depend on their social networks184. This leads to 
possible non-randomness in the samples. In other words, collected samples could be 
over- or under-representative of the research subject population. In this research, I tried 
to collect data as randomly as possible. The selection of interviewees was unbiased and 
the researcher had no agenda in selecting interview participants; however, probable 
generalisability of the findings cannot be fully denied. Moreover, the researcher was 
fully aware of the small sample of data, which is different from statistical data. Research 
using small samples can illustrate accurate patterns and significant points of research 
objects as some researchers, such as Krejcie and Morgan claim185. Therefore, the research 
results can be a snapshot of the public in Japan and illustrate the reality of the current 
situation. 
One professional judge interviewed for this research was the presiding judge and the 
other two were co-professional judges. Citizen judges’ backgrounds showed a wide 
variety. The occupations were mentioned by the respondents included the self-
employed, businessmen and women, and a housewife, and the cases which they 
participated in varied, from homicide to rape cases. Two cases were appealed and three 
cases were finalised in the total of five cases in which the interviewed citizen judges 
participated. The defence attorneys who participated in this research had limited 
experience with citizen judge trials but the professional judges and public prosecutors 
had acted in several citizen judge trials.  
The interviews took approximately 90 minutes each, and all were semi-structured. 
Each interview was independently conducted in a closed space or public space, which 
was fairly quiet and private. The aims of the interviews were to examine the activeness 
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of citizen judges, their ability to understand the information provided during the court 
procedures, the impact of citizen judges on the trial process and the whole criminal 
justice procedure, and the interviewees’ satisfaction with their input and confidence in 
the citizen judge system after their experiences. Appendix 1, 2 and 3 contains the 
interview questions.  
I began each interview with a presentation of my aims and role as a researcher and 
the purpose of my research. After that, I started asking each exactly the same questions. 
However, if necessary, I added an extra questions depending on the interviewees’ 
responses. I adopted the semi-structured format because not only does it help to 
analyse answers to the same questions, which allows a comparison of their perspectives, 
but it also leads to open and flexible interview questions, which may develop and 
discover original factors about the citizen judge system186. Moreover, the open ended 
questions were asked after the list of questions, and the expressions and content of the 
follow-up question varied. I believe that both standardisation and openness were 
important because the situations will provide deep insights187 about the citizen judge 
system.  
 I tried to interview in a friendly and informal environment because most 
interviewees worried about the strict and vague confidentiality setting of the CJA, which 
is a contested feature of the lay adjudication system. The confidentiality will be 
discussed in Chapter 4 and 5, but for example, in the English jury system, this kind of 
research is a violation and contempt of court188. On the other hand, the U.S. system has 
a relatively lenient confidentiality policy189. Because of confidentiality, I faced difficulties 
of access to former citizen judges and legal professionals.  
In addition, it should be emphasised that confidential information is fundamental to 
expand the networks and to gain reliable information from the interviewees. For 
example, some interviewees emphasised that their interviews were personal, and their 
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opinions did not represent the views of the institutions to which they belonged. 
Therefore, before interviews started, the interviewees and I both signed a commitment 
form referring to the aim of research, confidentiality and I offered anonymity to the 
interviewees and their detailed information in my thesis was protected. 
Records of the interviews were made by an audio-recording device with the consent 
of the interviewees. However 5 out of the 18 refused to allow audio recording and, 
therefore I made simultaneous hand written field notes. Both types of record were 
written up in full after the interviews.  The tape and note of the interviews were stored 
on a locked shelf. 
1.5.3 Limitations 
The comparative examinations in this thesis will engage with a number of disparate 
lay adjudication systems and will suggest overarching arguments. The main limitations 
encountered during the conduct of the research was the restricted access to citizen 
judges and legal professionals who experienced citizen judge trials. This is because of 
the existence of confidentiality provisions and the lack of official support from the 
government.  In Japan research of the citizen judge system is strictly regulated by law. 
The strict confidentiality imposed on the citizen judges prevents direct access to them, 
and influenced the context of the interview questions. Lay adjudicators cannot talk 
about the contents of discussion in a deliberation room190. In addition, there is only very 
limited access to the administration of justice in Japan. Cost concerns influenced the 
duration of my time in Japan, the number of interviewees, and access to Japanese 
materials.  
The questions the participants are asked focus on their opinions from their 
experiences of a citizen judge system. As Matthews, Bridgeman and Briggs illustrated in 
their research about six English courts, the relationships between satisfaction, 
confidence and effectiveness are correlated 191 . These elements are also closely 
connected to the legitimacy of lay adjudication systems as well as criminal justice 
systems. Therefore, although this research focuses on considerations of legitimacy in a 
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citizen judge system through democratic principles, interview questions were framed to 
examine the satisfaction of interviewees in this research to measure not only their 
satisfaction but also confidence and effectiveness. Hough and Roberts suggested the 
lack of knowledge about crime and criminal justice systems and unrealistically high 
expectations for a criminal justice system as possible influences on public dissatisfaction 
in the justice system 192 . In addition, Miller and Sloan refer to the existence of 
unconfirmed factors influencing jurors’ satisfaction in their research193, while there are 
two apparent factors: ‘perceptions of trial characteristics and by the extent of 
participation in the jury system’194. Therefore, it is possible that factors that are not 
related to a citizen judge system influence participants’ satisfaction. In other words, 
interviewees in this study may be satisfied with their experience despite no impact 
on/by a citizen judge system. 
 
1.6 Organisation of the Thesis 
This thesis is organised into six chapters. In chapter two, I shall explore the 
relationship between the principles of fair trial and of democracy, and how they are 
defined in current society. Specifically, I will consider three points related to the fair trial 
principle: due process, procedural justice, and open justice. These principles are also 
interrelated with the democratic principles fundamental to lay adjudication in criminal 
procedures. The purpose of Chapter two is to establish the theoretical criteria within the 
current democratic society in order to clarify the reasons why lay adjudicators’ 
participation in criminal procedure is aspired to. Moreover, in order to able to ascertain 
whether the introduction of the citizen judge system has been successful or not, I will 
review the existing international lay adjudication research and the UNODC’s standard 
and set evaluative items for the practice of the citizen judge system following an 
examination of common concerns about lay adjudicators’ participation,  
                                                          
192 M Hough and J V. Roberts, ‘Public Confidence in Justice: An International Review’ (London; 2004). 
193  JL Miller and JJ Sloan, ‘Perceptions of Jury Duty: Satisfaction and Overall Impression’ (1987) 12 
American Journal of Criminal Justice 24–44. 
194Ibid, 24. 
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In Chapter three, I will turn to the Japanese contemporary criminal trial procedure to 
discuss the principle of the equality of arms, the jurisprudence principle (e.g. of the 
European Court of Human Rights) which is part of the right to a fair trial. My main focus 
in this chapter will be the consequences of the impact of the introduction of the citizen 
judge system. The evaluation items, which were considered in chapter two, 
acknowledges that the practice of the lay adjudication system will be affected by the 
legal cultures which greatly influence the role of actors in the criminal trial procedures. 
Therefore, evaluating the practice of the lay adjudication system requires an 
understanding of Japanese traditional attributes. They may restrict lay participations 
and emphasise elitism and professionalism in the procedure. Although the judicial 
reform of 1999 claimed to democratise the criminal justice system, traditional attributes 
may have been restored in the procedure. Whatever the intentional goal of the citizen 
judge system, this reconceptualization of lay participation is an important evolution in 
the history of the Japanese criminal procedure. It is the moment at which the equality 
of arms has emerged as the core principle of the procedure. 
In Chapter four, I examine the Citizen Judge Act using textual analysis in the first part 
to determine whether or not the citizen judge system has been successful in injecting 
democratic values into criminal procedure. In this chapter, my main focus is to 
comprehend the citizen judges’ responsibilities and duties in the criminal trial procedure. 
First I shall explore the selection process for citizen judges. Second, I shall turn to the 
roles of citizen judges in the deliberation and sentencing processes. Finally, this chapter 
turns to the responsibilities of the actors: citizen judges, professional judges, the 
prosecution, and the defendant.  
In Chapter five, I will look at the practice of the citizen judge system from 2009. This 
chapter will begin by surveying the practice in the Supreme Court. Secondly, I shall ask 
what the impact of the citizen judge system has been on the citizen judges themselves, 
legal professionals and society. Specifically, I shall look here at the growing problem of 
the self-confidence of citizen judges in terms of their competence as well as their 
representativeness. Finally, I shall turn to the analysis of written judgements regarding 
homicide cases in citizen judge trials. This chapter suggests the need for more 
transparency in the citizen judge system to allow observation, and evaluation for serious 
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research. This chapter looks at the valuable but limited exercise of the citizen judges’ 
participation and potential possibilities for the shift to more emphasis on active citizen 
judges’ participation.  
In conclusion, Chapter 6 draws together the explored issues explored and the findings 
of the study before providing recommendations for the development of citizen judges’ 
participation in future reforms. Citizen judges should actively participate in criminal 
trials and independently determine their decisions in cooperation with co-citizen judges 
and professional judges in order to promote legitimacy in the criminal justice system. 
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Chapter 2  LAY ADJUDICATION SYSTEMS AND DEMOCRACY 
 
Introduction 
The citizen judge system was designed to contribute to the development of Japanese 
criminal procedure in the twenty first century and to raise public awareness of the judiciary 
system by introducing lay adjudicators’ participation and more adversarial principles. The 
drafting of the Citizen Judge Act 2002 (CJA) was influenced by Western systems, such as those 
of the England and Wales, Germany, France and the U.S., rather than the Japanese Jury Act 
of 19281. Moreover, the introduction of the citizen judge system has been considered as the 
first step to increase lay participation in the criminal justice system owing to the idea that 
‘Japanese citizens feel that the judiciary system is of little relevance to their lives, however, 
this has to change and the citizens have to take their share of responsibility for the functions 
of the judiciary’2.  
To discover whether the introduction of the citizen judge system has been successful or 
not, which is the central concern of this thesis, this chapter examines the theoretical 
perspectives of lay adjudication for promoting democratic values in criminal proceedings, 
which encourage lay participation. Moreover, relationships between lay adjudication, 
democratic values, and criminal proceedings are discussed. It is organised into two sections. 
Section 2.1 seeks to determine why lay adjudication is necessary or desirable in criminal 
cases in the light of concepts of democracy. A set of important questions may be raised here 
about the relationship between the concepts of democracy and lay adjudication: why do we 
need lay participation in the criminal procedure? What do we expect from lay participants as 
outcomes? In examining the principles underpinning lay adjudication, this section considers 
the theoretical backgrounds to lay adjudication in criminal cases to study the relationship 
between the concepts of democracy, a fair trial, and legitimacy. In addition, a comprehensive 
                                                          
1The Jury Act seemed to be considered as an inappropriate system rather than an exemplary system. The 
Japanese government organised the observation travel tour about the four legal systems. This will examine in 
Chapter 3. 
2K Sato, M Inoue, and T Morio, The Judicial System Reform [Shiho Seido Kaikaku] (Yuhikaku; Tokyo 2002), 332-
3. 
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review of both favourable and critical aspects of lay adjudication systems will be presented 
by showing what factors should be considered in its evaluation.   
Section 2.2 is concerned with the key issues of lay adjudication research in order to point 
out the common challenges which researchers and governments have considered. This 
section reviews the literature of international lay adjudication research especially in 
comparative studies, as well as the UN standards before proposing a useful way of evaluating 
the citizen judge system.  
 
2.1 Principles of a Fair Trial and Democracy in Criminal Cases  
The theoretical perspectives of lay adjudication will help to determine the standards by 
which to assess whether a lay adjudication system is successful or not. As Denzin suggests, 
the great importance of a consistent theory, closely related to methodology 3, cannot be 
emphasised enough, in particular, in sociological research in order to comprehend events and 
predict future events4. Rosenfeld also stresses the importance of criminal justice research 
with reference to the underdeveloped theory behind other policy research because of the 
emphasis on the relationship between policy and practice5. Criminal justice research often 
appears to be merely descriptive and practical. The functional institutional analyses of society 
have been developed on the basis of the ideas such as Durkheim’s social structures, Ehrlich’s 
social controls, and Parsons’ social systems with focusing on the mutual interferences 
between the law and society6. Although Turner points out Durkheim’s tendency to focus on 
societal disintegration and Parsons’7functionalism, whereby he perceives society as a system 
consisting of interconnected parts leading to the conception of consider criminal justice ‘as a 
distributive system in which various inputs are processed and in which outputs could be 
measured and compared.’8 
                                                          
3He shows the arguments which should be more valued, theory or methodology. See K Denzin, The Research 
Act in Sociology: A Theoretical Introduction to Sociological Methods (London; Butterworths 1970), 7. 
4JH Turner, The Structure of Sociological Theory (Homewood, IL; The Dorsey Press 1974), 2. 
5R Rosenfeld, ‘Connecting the Dots: Crime Rates and Criminal Justice Evaluation Research’ (2006) 2 Journal of 
Experimental Criminology 309–319, 310. 
6D Schiff, ‘Socio-Legal Theory: Social Structure and Law’ (1976) 39 The Modern Law Review 287–310, 292. 
7J Turner, ‘A Macro-Level Functional Theory of Societal Disintegration’ (1996) 16 International Journal of 
Sociology and Social Policy 5–36, 5-6. 
8R Vogler, A World View of Criminal Justice (Aldershot; Ashgate 2005), 6. 
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Distributive justice means fairly sharing both benefits and burdens by society. According 
to Rawls’ idea of behind the veil of ignorance, lay people, who do not know about the 
outcomes in evaluating social policies or resource allocations, can be fair9, in addition, ‘[b]asic 
fairness among people is given by their being represented equally’ in the democratic society10. 
The concepts of fairness in criminal trials should be a key, immovable foundation and should 
not be imperceptible to the accused. In addition, fairness is important not only from the 
perspective of the defendant but also of the society or other people involved. Rawls presents 
the concepts of ‘justice as fairness’ with the basic idea that citizens are free and equal11. The 
concepts are ‘[e]ach person has an equal right to a fully adequate scheme of equal basic rights 
and liberties …’12 His concepts of fairness and justice is based on the liberal principle of 
democracy13, which values citizens’ freedom and equality, and encourages the introduction 
of the democratic concepts into the criminal justice system and along with respect for lay 
adjudicators as potentially viable promoters of fairness and justice.  
2.1.1 Principles of a Fair Trial and Other Principles  
Criminal justice policy is related to the ‘practice of political life’, which clarifies different 
levels of relationship in the political arena, such as ‘the capacity of a state to regulate the 
behaviour of its citizens’ and the aims and restrictions of governmental institutions14.The 
evidence would suggest that the motivation for democratising the criminal justice system by 
introducing a lay adjudication system is often related to the political shift towards democracy, 
as historical examples show, such as, the French Revolution and the widespread lay 
adjudication systems within European countries in the seventeenth century 15. Studies of 
transitions from authoritarianism to democracy in the democratisation of governmental 
institutions and practices illustrate the significant shifts towards the emphasis on lay 
                                                          
9J Rawls, A Theory of Justice (Oxford; Oxford University Press 1999), 118.  
10J Rawls, The Law of Peoples (Harvard University Press; Cambridge 1999), 115. 
11W Sadurski, ‘Law’s Legitimacy and “Democracy-Plus”’ (2003) 26 Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 377–409, 
402. 
12J Rawls, ‘Justice as Fairness: Political Not Metaphysical’ 14 Philosophy & Public Affairs 223–251, 227. 
13M Clayton, Justice and Legitimacy in Upbringing (Oxford; Oxford University Press 2006), 14. 
14A Parkin, ‘Liberal Democracy and the Politics of Criminal Justice in Australia’ (1998) 44 Australian Journal of 
Politics and History 445–469, 445. 
15JH Langbein, ‘The English Criminal Trial Jury on the Eve of the French Revolution’ in Antonio Padoa Schioppa 
(ed), The Trial Jury in England, France and Germany (Berlin; Duncker & Humblot 1987) 13-39. 
40 
 
participation in criminal justice16 .This also leads to shifts in the concept of legitimacy in 
criminal justice, potentially brought about by the introduction of a lay adjudication system17. 
Legitimacy refers to ‘a property of an authority or institution that leads people to feel that 
that authority or institution is entitled to be deferred to and obeyed.’18 There are two senses 
of legitimacy: descriptive and normative, as Meyer point out 19 . The approval of people 
belonging to the same group is believed to lead to legitimacy of norms and institutional 
arrangements in the dominant descriptive sense, while in the normative sense certain 
specified conditions are believed to lead to legitimacy20. It may be regarded a way to justify 
political control, for example. Thompson claims that ‘the legitimacy of the rule of law provides 
a significant political weapon’ owing to the influences of legitimacy such as the setting of 
arbitrary discretion and legal values 21 . Legitimacy in criminal justice has a core role in 
‘cooperative social relations’ to define what ‘wrong’ is22. 
Following an examination of legitimacy and criminal justice, Mark Moore noted the 
interdependent relationship between legitimacy, moral credibility, technical efficiency, 
fairness, and procedural restrictions23. Moore concluded that there is a need ‘[t]o make the 
criminal justice system more efficient and effective and make it more fair and just.’24 There is 
a wealth of evidence available to substantiate the claim of need for criminal justice reform to 
target the maintenance of both fairness and also seek efficiency 25 . However, fairness in 
                                                          
16Taman.  
17Ibid, 35. 
18J Sunshine and TR Tyler, ‘The Role of Procedural Justice and Legitimacy in Shaping Public Support for Policing 
The Role of Procedural Justice and Legitimacy in Shaping Public Support for Policing’ (2003) 37 Law and 
Society Review 513–548, 514. 
19L Meyer, ‘Introduction: Legitimacy, Justice and Public International Law, Three Perspectives on the Debate’, 
Legitimacy, Justice and Public International Law (Cambridge; Cambridge University Press 2009), 2. 
20In a normative sense, the dominant power of executive power-holders lead to legitimacy. See  A Bottoms 
and J Tankebe, ‘Criminology: Beyond Procedural Justice: A Dialogic Approach To Legitimacy in Criminal 
Justice’ (2012) 102 Journal of Criminal Law & Criminology 119–170Bottoms and Tankebe.  
21EP Thompson, Whigs and Hunters: The Origin of Black Art (London; Allen Lane 1975), 258-9. 
22Bottoms and Tankebe, supra note 20, 151-2. 
23MH Moore, ‘Notable Speech: Legitimizing Criminal Justice Policies and Practices’ (The Perspectives on Crime 
and Justice Series, 1997) <https://www2.fbi.gov/publications/leb/1997/oct973.htm> accessed 10 August 
2015. 
24Ibid. 
25They appear to be long-term and ultimate targets for many legal systems in history as well as present. See 
Ministory of Justice [England and Wales], ‘Transforming the Criminal Justice System’ (2014) 
<https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/330690/cjs-strategy-
action-plan.pdf> accessed 23 August 2015; The Rt Hon Sir Brian Leveson, ‘Review of Efficiency in Criminal 
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criminal justice must be a higher priority than efficiency. International treaties26 and domestic 
legislature27  enshrine the right to a fair trial and its requirement are stated therein. For 
example, the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) states:  
In the determination of his civil rights and obligations or of any criminal charge 
against him, everyone is entitled to a fair and public hearing within a reasonable 
time by an independent and impartial tribunal established by law. Judgment shall 
be pronounced publicly but the press and public may be excluded from all or part 
of the trial in the interest of morals, public order or national security in a 
democratic society …28 
In addition, the EHCR article 6, section 3 states, in relation to the minimum rights of the 
accused, a fair trial should guarantee the following factors: equality of arms of the actors in 
the trial through the appropriate conditions, such as prompt and understandable information 
and enough access and preparation to for the defence29. In other words, the ideal form of a 
fair trial is that of a judgement which is reached by unbiased and unprejudiced persons on 
the basis of reliable evidence equitably presented in open court30. There is considerable 
discussion about whether lay adjudication trials fulfil the requirements31, moreover, the case 
law of the European Court of Human Rights, such as in Taxquet v Belgium32, provided heated 
discussions about domestic lay adjudication trial procedures regarding the relationship 
between the right to a fair trial and a lay adjudicators’ decision33. The requirements of a fair 
trial are linked to a range of beliefs, for example, the belief in accountability and legitimacy in 
legal procedures with free access to the courts by the public34. Moreover, legitimacy is closely 
                                                          
Proceedings’ (2015) <https://www.judiciary.gov.uk/wp-content/uploads/2015/01/review-of-efficiency-in-
criminal-proceedings-20151.pdf> accessed 23 August 2015. 
26For example, the Article 6 of the European Convention on Human Rights; Article 10 of the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights; and Article 14 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. 
27The Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution; and Section 11 of the Canadian Charter of Rights 
and Freedoms. 
28The European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) 1950, art. 6, sec. 1.  
29Ibid, sec. 3. 
30L F Powell, ‘The Right to a Fair Trial’ (1965) 51 American Bar Association Journal 534-538, 534. 
31M Coen, ‘“With Cat-Like Tread”: Jury Trial and the European Court of Human Rights’ (2014) 14 Human Rights 
Law Review 107–131. 
32Taxquet v Belgium Application No 926/05, Judgment, 16 November 2010. 
33M Hunt, Using Human Rights Law in English Courts (Oxford; Hart Publishing 1997), 198. 
34K Biber, ‘Inside Jill Meagher’s Handbag: Looking at Open Justice’ (2014) 39 Alternative Law Journal 73-77, 73. 
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linked to procedural fairness. Therefore, unbiased and unprejudiced public participation 
could underpin legitimacy in legal procedures and lead to a fair trial. 
2.1.1.1 Procedural Fairness and Procedural Justice 
The evaluation of legitimacy can be based on procedural fairness35. The current belief in 
procedural fairness relies on the idea that ‘whether a procedure is fair depends in large part 
on whether the participants feel satisfied with its fairness or believe it to be fair’36. In other 
words, in terms of the self-interest of individuals, the outcomes and actual content of policies, 
the fairness of procedure and the implementation of policies can be evaluated37. This can be 
criticised because of the subjective psychological perspective of people’s performance. 
Gibson suggests that if a procedure is perceived to be fair, the decisions are more acceptable38. 
Procedural justice is also whereby the litigants’ satisfaction is strongly enhanced by the 
fairness of legal procedures39. Moreover, people are entitled to ‘legitimate expectations’40 
under established institutional rules 41 , as Rawls points out. Procedural justice is the 
understanding that the fair treatment of citizens overlaps with human rights concerns, as 
Goldstein points out: 
If a procedural system is to be fair and just, it must give each of the participants 
to a dispute the opportunity to sustain his [or her] position. It must not create 
conditions which add to any essential inequality of position between the parties 
but rather must assure [sic] that such inequality will be minimized as much as 
human ingenuity can do so42. 
                                                          
35Sunshine and Tyler, 18, 535. 
36RG Bone, ‘Agreeing to Fair Process: The Problem with Contractarian Theories of Procedural Fairness’ (2003) 
83 Boston University Law Review 485–552, 506. 
37GÓ Erlingsson, J Linde and R Öhrvall, ‘Not so Fair after All? Perceptions of Procedural Fairness and 
Satisfaction with Democracy in the Nordic Welfare States’ (2014) 37 International Journal of Public 
Administration 106–119, 107. 
38JL Gibson, ‘Understandings of Justice: Institutional Legitimacy, Procedural Justice, and Political Tolerance’ 
(1989) 23 Law & Society Review 469–496, 472-3. 
39Thibaut and Walker, Procedural Justice: A Psychological Analysis. 
40Rawls, supra note 9, 72-4. 
41Ibid, 77-9. 
42AS Goldstein, ‘The State and the Accused: Balance of Advantage in Criminal Procedure’ (1960) 69 The Yale 
Law Journal 1149-99, 1192. 
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In short, procedural justice concerns human rights values and the impacts of citizens’ 
evaluations of justice used by the legal authorities and institutions, as Tyler has indicated43. In 
addition, evaluation can be by the criterion proposed by Thibaut and Walker: the fairness of 
individual treatment by the legal authorities and institutions44. This shows the importance of 
the relationship between the state and citizens in the judicial decision-making process. 
Procedural justice and distributive justice, which require a sense of fairness, play an influential 
role in the level of satisfaction of citizens (including litigants) with the authorities45. Moreover 
Reynolds and Shelley point out that procedural justice includes open access to the authorities, 
equal representation and unbiased constraints on the legislative and decision making 
process46. Open access to the legal authorities, which is part of procedural justice, seems to 
be derived from a belief in open justice. 
2.1.1.2 Open Justice 
Open justice is the requirement of a fair trial. Open justice requires the courts to be open 
to the public. The openness and transparency to the public as well as each party’s interests 
promote fairness, according to Southgate and Grosvenor47. For instance, the classical belief in 
open justice in England can be found in the provisions of relevant institutions allowing public 
access to trials and the right of public access to court files48. In this respect, open justice 
requires wide permissible ranges of openness and transparency in courts, including full access 
to the courts by the public, and the filming and broadcasting of cases, as well as the 
transparency of criminal proceedings themselves. The modern applications, as well as the 
arguments about these principles, can be found in the visual and aural elements of the 
broadcasting of legal proceedings49. On the other hand, some room for secrecy will also be 
valued in the interests of fairness. Secrecy is allowed in a fair trial, for example, by Article 14 
                                                          
43TR Tyler, ‘What Is Procedural Justice?: Criteria Used by Citizens to Assess the Fairness of Legal Procedures’ 
(1988) 22 Law and Society Review 103–136. 
44J Thibaut and others, ‘Procedural Justice as Fairness’ (1973) 26 Stanford Law Review 1271-1290; J Thibaut 
and L Walker, ‘A Theory of Procedure’ (1978) 66 California Law Review 541–566. 
45J Casper and TS Tyler, ‘Procedural Justice in Felony Cases’ (1988) 22 Law and Society Review 483–507. 
46DR Reynolds and FM Shelley, ‘Procedural Justice and Local Democracy’ (1985) 4 Political Geography 
Quarterly 267-288, 285. 
47P Southgate and T Grosvenor, ‘Confidence in the Criminal Justice System - A Qualitative Study’ (London; 
2000). 
48J Jaconelli, Open Justice: A Critique of the Public Trial (Oxford University Press 2002), 1-3. 
49E Thompson, ‘Does the Open Justice Principle Require Cameras to Be Permitted in the Courtroom and the 
Broadcasting of Legal Proceedings?’ (2011) 3 Journal of Media Law 211–236. 
44 
 
of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 1966 which declares that secrecy is 
possible when necessary to protect ‘morality, public order or national security’ and privacy 
issues50. Moreover, if there was no limit to public assessment of the process of arriving at 
verdicts, including the evidence and deliberations, this could create confusion about the 
general propriety of criminal verdicts. 
2.1.1.3 Due Process 
Jones points out significant aspects of a fair trial which are necessary to protect the rights 
of the accused51. A due process system that values human rights includes the rights of the 
accused52. In this respect and due process is a safeguard for defendants against unlawful 
convictions or the prejudicial exercise of judiciary discretion 53 . Procedural due process 
requires fair and impartial adjudication. In addition, according to Serio’s study, due process is 
the way to ensure justice in civil liberties54 from the principle of the right to a fair trial. Zander 
and Henderson suggests that lay adjudicators appear to find the legitimacy of the criminal 
justice system in the adherence to due process55. For example, a fair trial consists of due 
process and its further assessment by the jury in the U.S. courts’ recognition56. In this sense, 
the Lisenba case 57 showed that due process rights equal the right to a fair trial for the 
protection of innocent persons. Thus, the principle of due process is a part of the concept of 
a fair trial.  
The interdependent relationship between democracy, legitimacy and fairness is also 
derived from interconnected principles. The following section will explore the concept of lay 
adjudication in this context, focusing on the principles of democracy. 
                                                          
50UN General Assembly, International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 16 December 1966, United 
Nations, Treaty Series, vol. 999, p. 171, available at: 
http://www.refworld.org/docid/3ae6b3aa0.html [accessed 19 August 2015], Section 1. 
51I Jones, ‘Still Just Rhetoric? Judicial Discretion and Due Process’ (2011) 32 Liverpool Law Review 251–273. 
52HL Packer, ‘Two Models of the Criminal Process’ (1964) 113 University of Pennsylvania Law Review 1, 13-4. 
53Jones, supra note 51. 
54H-E Sung, ‘Democracy and Criminal Justice in Cross-National Perspective: From Crime Control to Due Process’ 
(2006) 605 The ANNALS of the American Academy of Political and Social Science 311, 311. 
55M Zander and P Henderson, ‘The Royal Commission on Criminal Justice: Crown Court Study’ (London; HMSO 
1993). 
56SC Serio, ‘A Process Right Due? Examining Whether a Capital Defendant Has a Due Process Right to a Jury 
Selection Expert’ (2004) 53 American University Law Review 1143-1186, 1159 footnote 100; DJ Zimmerman, 
‘Civil Contemnors, Due Process, and the Right to a Jury Trial’ (2003) 3 Wyoming Law Review 205–232. 
57Lisenba v. People of the State of California, 314 U.S. 219 (1941).  
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2.1.2 Principles of Democracy  
The introduction of a lay adjudication system has been considered by many as a symbolic 
democratising tool underpinning the legitimacy of the criminal justice system58. There are a 
variety of reasons why lay adjudication is considered to legitimate the verdict and the criminal 
justice system and why support for a lay adjudication system can be justified in terms of 
democratic values. Therefore, the Japanese judicial reformers may well have expected the 
same influences on the Japanese criminal justice reforms from the introduction of the citizen 
judge system. It is helpful to examine the theoretical perspectives relating to the democratic 
principles introduced into the criminal justice system.  
There is no clearly accepted definition of the concept of democracy59 because it implies 
complex measures not only for various kinds of collectives but also of values and 
rights2. Lauth presents a minimal definition of democracy as:  
a form of domination based on the rule of law, which makes possible, for all of the 
citizens, self-determination in accordance with the notion of the sovereignty of the 
people, … 60 
In addition, he claims this should be achieved by ‘free and thus competitive and fair 
procedures’ where there is lay participation in political decision-making61. In other words, the 
normative democratic values are citizens’ freedom, equality, and rights62 in a self-governing 
society in which the collective of citizens’ interests are the main influence, and moreover, 
these features are protected by legitimate procedures63.   
                                                          
58H Fukurai, K-W Chan and S Miyazawa, ‘Introduction to the Special Issue: The Future of Lay Adjudication and 
Theorizing Today’s Resurgence of Civic, Legal Participatory Systems in East and Central Asia’ (2010) 38 
International Journal of Law, Crime and Justice 141–148. 
59Democracy has ‘always questionable identity’ in R Foqué, ‘Criminal Justice in a Democracy: Towards a 
Relational Conception of Criminal Law and Punishment’ (2008) 2 Criminal Law and Philosophy 207–227, 211. 
60H Lauth, ‘Informal Institutions and Democracy’ (2000) 7 Democratization 21–50, 23. 
61Ibid. 
62D Held, ‘What Should Democracy Mean Today?’, The Polity Reader in Social Theory (Cambridge; Polity Press 
1994). 
63S Huntington, 1991, The Third Wave: Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century (University of Oklahoma 
Press ;Norman); N Bobbio, ‘The Future of Democracy’, The Polity Reader in Social Theory (Cambridge; Polity 
Press 1994). 
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According to Habermas’ discourse theory, equal autonomy should be satisfied through the 
democratic procedures of the legislation.64 He also claims that modern legal systems are 
construed based on the principle of individual rights with the presumption that human rights 
legally enable the citizen’s practice of self-determination, moreover, he believes the citizens 
are conferred with basic rights, including the right to act in order to ensure legal protection 
and the right to equal opportunities to participate in the process of forming an opinion65.  
Equality and freedom have an ultimately interdependent relationship within liberalism, 
moreover, libertarians will ‘demand equality with respect to an entire class of rights and 
liberties.’66 From this aspect, each citizen should have the opportunity to develop and register 
their preferences and also have an impact on political preferences from the concept that 
democracy becomes valued as a result of the liberty freedom of expression or even political 
equality67. Moreover, as a classical socialist, Morris has indicated that society without public 
consensus, which acts as a tool of action, cannot be a true society, which is also supported by 
the normative ideal of democracy as collective self-determination 68 . In short, the core 
interrelated fundamental concepts of citizens’ freedom, equality and rights in contemporary 
democratic societies make citizens, as a collective body, share authoritative power with the 
governing political authority.  
Legitimacy may be regarded as a reflection of ‘the appropriate balance between the power 
holders and its recipients’69. On this ground, from the democratic perspective, criminal justice 
should actively shape the relationship between the state and its citizens, both instrumentally 
by enforcing rules and roles, and expressively by applying them70. In the lay adjudication 
                                                          
64J Habermas, Between Facts and Norms: Contributions to a Discourse Theory of Law and Philosophy 
(Cambridge; Polity Press 1996). 
65 J Habermas, Jugen Habermas on Politics and Society (S Seidman ed, Boston; Beacon Press 1989); M 
Rosenfeld, ‘Can Rights, Democracy, and Justice Be Reconciled through Discourse Theory-Reflections on 
Habermas’s Proceduralist Paradigm of Law’ (1995) 17 Cardozo L. Rev. 791–824. 
66R Levitas, 2004, ‘Beyond Bourgeois Right: Freedom, Equality and Utopia in Marx and Morris’ 9 The European 
Legacy 605–618, 614. 
67T De Luca, 2007, ‘Free Speech, Political Equality, and Campaign Finance Reform: A Paradox for Democracy?’ 
29 New Political Science 145–166, 162. 
68A Norrie, E Darian-Smith and P Fitzpatrick, ‘From Law to Popular Justice: Beyond Antinomialism’ (1996) 5 
Social and Legal Studies 383–404. 
69R Henham, ‘Penal Ideology, Sentencing and the Legitimacy of Trial Justice’ (2011) 57 Crime, Law and Social 
Change 77–98, 78 footnote 2. 
70VM Weaver, JS Hacker and C Wildeman, ‘Detaining Democracy? Criminal Justice and American Civic Life’ 
(2013) 651 The ANNALS of the American Academy of Political and Social Science 6–21, 10. 
47 
 
system, the citizens have the right to engage in the criminal justice process with regard to 
legitimating both the verdict and the criminal justice system. 
2.1.3 Democratic Principles and a Lay Adjudication System  
The duty of lay adjudicators is to be present in the courtroom and to express their opinions 
by attending the criminal procedures as a part of a political institution. The belief in a lay 
adjudication in criminal cases is anchored not only in the interconnected principles of the right 
to a fair trial, but also and mainly by democratic principles. The benefits expected by the 
function of lay adjudication include a safeguard against corruption, and a tool for public 
scrutiny and the promotion of citizens’ trust in the authorities. Foqué shows that the principle 
of lay adjudication and democracy have a ‘co-original or equiprimordial’ backbone. His 
historical analysis of the ancient Athenians’ concept of democracy, and its development 
shows the co-existence of principles of democracy and rule of law71 . In addition, in the 
classical definition of democracy, decision-making based on direct participation brings 
consensus, according to Schmitter and Karl72. The importance of public consensus as a tool of 
action cannot be overemphasised in a democratic society. Morris points out that a true 
society cannot be realised without public consensus 73 . In short, the core interrelated 
fundamental concepts of citizens’ freedom, equality and civil rights enable citizens, as a 
collective body, to advocate their preferences and share authoritative power with the political 
authority. 
With respect to democratic principles, therefore, lay people should directly participate in 
the criminal justice system. Lay adjudication is often considered to be a protection against 
state power or corrupt officials through the ability to review the application of repressive laws 
by means of lay adjudicators’ common sense and community values, and direct participation 
in the administration of justice 74 . In a political social study, Yarez defines participatory 
democracy as institutional social reforms by means of another system of political 
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participation, in which representative groups’ preferences are presented75. In this respect, lay 
adjudication is regarded as a form of participatory democracy expressing the ‘voice of the 
people’76 in the decision-making process of the state, and enforcing popular sovereignty. 
2.1.3.1 Participatory Democracy 
Participatory democracy involves two main factors: a responsible function to show citizens’ 
self-interests, and the concatenation between citizens in a community77. In this sense, as 
Darbyshire explains, a lay adjudication system is a ‘symbol of participatory democracy’78. The 
simple forms of political participation by citizens are voting and attending public hearings and 
public group activities. These acts promote citizens’ political involvement, and educate them 
as well as administrators. As Weber argues, direct democratic participation brings more 
human values into political life79. Moreover, Wilson points out that citizen participation in the 
political process creates a fundamental principle leading to their deliberative integration in 
political arenas as well as in the judiciary80. For example, Dzur emphasised the need for lay 
adjudication in criminal justice in his study of participatory democracy in the American jury 
system as an institution of government81. From his ‘integrationists’ viewpoint, the courtroom 
is the place where discourse and socio-political values are established, and lay participation 
in the criminal justice system humanises the highly professionalised and remote politicians 
and officials by its ‘rational disorganisation’ attributes82. In addition, in a wider sense of the 
right to political participation, lay adjudication is recognised as promoting civil and political 
rights through direct participation in the government and application of the law83. Therefore, 
a lay adjudication panel is regarded as a judicial and political institution. Dzur also contends 
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that the close connection between political theories and current criminal justice policies is a 
long historical discourse for more civic participation on the grounds that democratic criminal 
justice is more legitimate84. Moreover, legitimacy leads to ‘public stability’85. In this sense, a 
lay adjudication panel is considered to be part of government. Devlin describes a lay 
adjudicator panel (the jury) as a ‘little parliament’86, in the sense of law enforcement rather 
than the enactment of law. Thus a lay adjudicator panel is a democratic governmental 
institution. 
2.1.3.2 Representative Democracy 
In contemporary thought, the concept of participatory democracy has developed on the 
basis of two other concepts of democracy: representative and deliberative democracy. As 
Henry points out, participatory democracy is regarded ‘as having inherent value, which 
complements that of representative democracy’87. Representative democracy is based on the 
idea that the rule of law should be governed88 by all of the people in the legal domain89. This 
is the idea that protects the individuals - including minority rights and freedoms – against the 
will of the majority90. From this perspective, lay adjudication could be considered as the 
function of protecting the rights and freedoms of citizens, including those of minorities, 
although it is evident that the inclusion of minorities in a lay adjudicator panel has been a 
central issue of the system in most countries. In addition to minorities, ethnic and linguistic 
diversion has led to a lack of homogeneity in the society91. This has gathered attention since 
1970s in the U.S. 92 , and much research about the representation of minorities in a lay 
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adjudication panel has been conducted in England93, and in the U.S.94 Gender discrimination 
in the process of selecting lay adjudicators95 and the effects of lay adjudicators’ gender96, age97, 
geographic location98, economic status99 and level of legal knowledge100 have been found to 
influence the sentence. 
An increase in representative democracy in the criminal justice system has led to the 
plurality of assignments and issues influenced by diverse interests presented by each 
concerned party, such as the state (authoritative institutions: police, the prosecution, the 
professional judges), the defence, the victim, and the public. Hence, a representative 
democracy requires the equal participation of its citizens and respect for the opinions of all 
members of the community. The extent of the institutions of representative democracies can 
be the measure of the quality of a democracy101. 
2.1.3.3 Deliberative Democracy 
Lastly, the principle of deliberative democracy, greatly developed by Jügen Habermas102, is 
formulated as the procedures which stimulate rational and moral issues as a consequence of 
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‘reflection, argumentation, public reasoning and reaching consensus.’103 This concept stresses 
‘discussion, reflection, and consideration’104, which is the evaluation of procedures by means 
of including everyone in reasoned discussions and other-regarding attitudes105. This idea 
supports the belief that legitimacy in law and politics is established through both formal and 
informal public discussion106. In this respect, the meaning of legitimate law in the deliberative 
democratic principle is provided by a fundamentally participatory democracy. As Benhabib 
argues, deliberative democracy is necessary to gain legitimacy from collective decision-
making processes as the result of rational, fair, and collective deliberation between free and 
equal individuals107. Hence, the concepts of participative, representative, and deliberative 
democracy, which underpin the principle of a fair trial, also bring one of the most considerable 
benefits of lay adjudication, which is the legitimacy of the verdict, laws, and legal system108. 
The practice of these principles, which are integrated with each other in a fair trial in a 
democratic society will be seen to balance other principles in criminal justice. The 
international consensus on the issue of how to balance the right to a fair trial - in particular, 
for the accused - and democratic values for the participation and representativeness of the 
community, and appropriate deliberation is contested. Should the accused from a racial 
minority be tried with a lay adjudication panel which includes persons from the racial 
minority? Or should the panel be composed of lay adjudicators randomly selected from the 
community, even though the panel might not contain anyone from the accused’s 
background? The examination of the balance, such as the ‘balancing test’ between costs and 
benefits and the ‘balancing-of-interest’ approach between liberty and order suggested by 
Meares and Harcourt illustrates a clear and explanative analysis of the issues involved in 
criminal procedures109. Moreover, Kumm argues that balancing principles is an appropriate 
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method for examining the relationship between the government and the law110. Spigelman 
analyses the balance between freedom of speech and the right to a fair trial by broadcast 
media 111 . Thus examining the relationship between the principles of criminal justice is 
important to analyse the degree and level of democratic value within the procedure. 
2.1.4 Theoretical Perspectives on Arguments for and against Lay Adjudication  
Owing to the interconnectedness of such principles, there has been long-standing 
admiration for lay adjudication systems, in particular, in Western European countries and the 
U.S. since the 19thcentury112. This has expanded to other parts of the world, such as Eastern 
Europe, Latin America, and the Asia Pacific Countries113, although there were controversial 
arguments against lay adjudication systems and in some legal systems they were abolished 
or reformed in history114.  Legitimacy is entrenched in two elements in particular: first, lay 
adjudication is considered to be the way to find the consensus among the community; and 
second, it benefits from lay adjudicators’ diverse knowledge and experience. These two 
elements derived from democratic values seem to support a lay adjudication system; on the 
other hand, other elements of a lay adjudication system derived from other values may not 
support a lay adjudication system. For example, the stress on consistency, coherence and 
predictability throughout decision making process in the criminal courts in doctrinal formality 
will not be compatible with the democratic values. Arguments for and against lay adjudication 
depend on the balance between the subjects focused on principles. 
                                                          
110M Kumm, ‘The Jurisprudence of Constitutional Conflict: Constitutional Supremacy in Europe Before and 
After the Constitutional Treaty’ (2005) 11 European Law Journal 262–307. 
111J Spigelman, ‘The Principle of Open Justice: A Comparative Perspective’ 29 University of New South Wales 
Law Journal 147–166, 158-61. 
112Huntington, supra note 63. 
113See Vidmar, World Jury System. 
114 For example, in the German (in 1924), French, and Indian systems, they abolished the jury model of lay 
adjudication systems. Moreover, in the 1970s reforms of lay adjudication systems were conducted. For 
example, there were introductions of one day trial jury duty (in 1974), scientific juror selections, unanimous 
votes (in 1978) in the U.S., and discussions for written instructions by judges for juries were started in 1970,  
in England,  See, W Perron, ‘Lay Participation in Germany’ (2001) 72 Revue internationale de droit pénal 181–
195; F Gorphe, ‘Reforms of the Jury-System in Europe: France and Other Continental Countries’ (1936) 27 
Journal of Criminal Law and Criminology 155–168; K Ramnath, ‘The Colonial Difference between Law and 
Fact: Notes on the Criminal Jury in India’ (2013) 50 Indian Economic & Social History Review 341–363; A 
Cleary, ‘Scientific Jury Selection: History, Practice, and Controversy’ (2005) 28 Concept 1–17; P Darbyshire, 
‘Jury Reform in England and Wales - Unfinished Business’ (Taipei, Taiwan; Unpublished 2014). 
53 
 
The first element of lay adjudication is the direct influence of the consensus of the 
community in criminal justice procedures. Direct lay participation will increase public support 
for the criminal procedure115. A lay adjudicator is expected to bring common sense and diverse 
knowledge and community values into criminal procedures and the application of the rule of 
law116. A lay adjudicator panel is normally composed of more people than on a bench panel. 
The greater number of people in an adjudicator panel may provide broader perspectives in 
their discussions. Lay adjudicators may understand the situation and social background of the 
defendant and case better than professional judges, because the latter tend to be of a 
different social class from that of lay adjudicators. In this respect, lay adjudicators can be 
considered good fact-finders. In addition, it is better for a judgement related to ‘moral 
blameworthiness’ in a criminal sanction, which is considered as malum in se117, to be the 
consensus of the community. The establishment and practice of the standard by which to 
judge ‘right or wrong’ by consensus is essential in order to gain not only public support for 
the criminal justice system but also for its effectiveness in practice118. It has been argued that 
lay participation is ‘a necessary condition for a legitimate conviction in any democratic 
state’119. This principle is derived from the democratic values of lay adjudication: participation 
and representativeness, as mentioned above. In this fashion, lay adjudication is a means of 
direct participation by the community, which is one of the key democratic values. 
The second element of lay adjudication is the education of the public. Alexis de Tocqueville 
pointed this out in relation to early nineteenth century American juries.  
Juries … instil some of the habits of the judicial mind into every citizen, and just those habits 
are the very best way of preparing people to be free. 
The jury is both the most efficient way of establishing the people’s rule and the most efficient 
way of teaching them how to rule120. 
                                                          
115P Roberts & AA. Zuckerman, Criminal Evidence (Oxford University Press; Oxford 2004), 64. 
116N Vidmar, supra note 113, 1. 
117J Gobert, Justice, Democracy and the Jury (Aldershot; Aldershot 1997), 2. 
118Roberts and Zuckerman,supra note 115, 64. 
119T Hörnle, ‘Democratic Accountability and Lay Participation in Criminal Trials’ in Antoney Duff and others 
(eds), The Trial on Trial, Volume2, Judgment and Calling to Account (Hart Publishing; Oxford 2006), 150. 
120A de Tocqueville, Democracy in America (JP Mayer and Max Learner eds, Doubleday; New York 1969), 254. 
54 
 
 In short, lay adjudication is considered as the best way to educate citizens about the 
administration of justice, including its procedures and laws. This is also an opportunity to learn 
how to understand complicated evidence and laws121, discuss and express opinions with other 
co-lay adjudicators in a group. 122  Therefore, lay adjudication is a way of educating lay 
participants not only in legal-related skills, such as understanding evidence and the law as 
well as the procedures, but also in non-legal related skills, such as the capacity to read and 
understand complicated written documents, to listen to oral presentations, and the skills to 
participate in group discussions. These educational benefit wills develop the sense of playing 
a part in a self-governing society.123 
The major factor for lay adjudication is legitimacy. Mark E. Warren, a participatory 
democracy theorist, has claimed that the favourable outcomes of citizen participation in 
institutions are more tolerance towards differences, more sensitivity in cooperation, more 
engagement with morality and judgements, and more quests for the citizens’ political 
preferences 124 . In this respect, legitimacy is the key component of lay adjudication. Lay 
adjudicators are able to play a role to save the community from state oppression by means 
of voting for an acquittal or nullification if they do not approve the application of a law or 
recognise a repressive government’s power in an investigative or prosecution procedure. As 
Rawls argues, the use of the rule of law to ensure individual liberty and protect it against 
administrative coercive power is a key concept of liberal thought 125 . The use of lay 
adjudicators brings legitimacy to verdicts 126  and the criminal justice system 127 . However, 
nullification by lay adjudicators can raise the question of their legitimacy because of doubts 
about the lay adjudicators’ competence in understanding and applying the law for three 
reasons. Firstly, lay adjudicators are likely to be influenced by either sympathy for or bias or 
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prejudice against the accused128. Secondly, representativeness in a lay adjudication panel is a 
serious issue129, although Thomas illustrates the representativeness of the jury according to 
their ethnic background in the UK130. To sum up, the key benefit of lay adjudication can be 
considered as relating to the legitimacy of the verdicts and the criminal justice system as a 
whole and enhancing democratic principles. Nevertheless there are concerns about lay 
adjudication that can raise doubts about whether democratic principles are truly practised. 
There are also other concerns about lay adjudication related to the competence of lay 
adjudicators to understand the law and evidence. Although the lay adjudicators’ lack of a legal 
background is regarded as advantageous, stemming from their different characteristics to 
those of professional judges, there are also concerns about the lay adjudicators’ abilities as 
decision-makers. Much of the literature discusses lay adjudicators’ competence131. There are 
arguments against lay adjudication, in particular from empirical research. For example, Penny 
Darbyshire tends to be sceptical of lay adjudication (the English jury system) throughout her 
research. She argues that ‘the symbolic function of the jury far outweighs its use’ because the 
jury has been already replaced by the magistracy132, and she raises doubts as to the jury’s 
function as a safeguard for citizens’ civil liberties because of procedural inadequacy133. In 
addition, her collaborative research with Maughan and Stewart reveals thirty two issues 
concerning the jury system including the lack of representation of some groups of women 
and minorities and some types of occupations; public resistance to serving as a juror; and 
concerns about the jurors’ competency to judge the truthfulness of a witness and to 
understand and remember information including the evidence and the law134. There are also 
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cost and efficiency-concern. A lay adjudication system is often time-consuming and 
expensive135. 
The strong need for democratic values in criminal justice, as well as the drawbacks which 
raise questions about lay adjudicators’ attention(such as the doubts about the lay 
adjudicators’ activeness and competence) often lead to a lay adjudication system being 
regarded as having ‘symbolic’ status rather than practical value136. Conversely, the theoretical 
backgrounds to the lay adjudication is supported by their active participation, which is based 
on democratic principle.  
The arguments for and against lay adjudication can be complex. However, my point here 
is the fundamental point that lay adjudicators’ participation in criminal cases is the foundation 
for making the criminal justice system a democratic institution. The perspective of the value 
of lay adjudication being its participation in the legal process to an evaluation of whether a 
lay adjudication system functions appropriately or not, although the appropriateness varies 
depending on the legal systems and the criminal justice policies. However, the 
appropriateness can be studied in the relationships between lay adjudicators’ participation 
and legal professionals in criminal procedures with an understanding of both the favourable 
and controversial factors of a lay adjudication. In addition, the examination of a lay 
adjudicators’ responsiveness and competence helps to evaluate the degree of lay 
adjudicators’ participation.  
 
2.2 Evaluations of Lay Adjudication Systems  
2.2.1 Lay Adjudication System Research  
The belief that lay adjudication promotes democratic values in a democratic society 
appears to be undeniable; however, the practice of lay adjudication systems and their 
functions have been the subjects of considerable academic debates started after the 
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introduction of lay adjudication into different legal systems concerning the complexity of 
trials137, the plurality of social classes138, and the spread of information due to the internet139. 
Lay adjudication research appears to be conducted from four major perspectives, divided 
into four types of analysis. First, a procedural-focused analysis, focuses on the specific stages 
of the procedures, such as the selection of lay adjudicators140; second, a personnel-focused 
analysis looks at the roles of the personnel involved in a lay adjudication trial procedure, such 
as the role of lay adjudicators141 and of professional judges142; thirdly, the concern-focused 
analysis focuses on issues such as the competence of lay adjudicators 143 and the 
representativeness of certain minorities in a lay adjudicator panel144; and lastly, the reform-
focused analysis, addresses comparisons between the mixed judge and jury models145. These 
different approaches reflect the researchers’ interests and the aims of the research as well as 
financial and geographical restrictions.  The researchers’ interests are often related to 
pointing out or rejecting criticisms of the system, and/or suggesting reforms or support for 
the system.  
The Auld Report by Sir Robin Auld in 2001 examined the criminal courts of England and 
Wales. He gauged jury responsiveness and competence on the basis of the ‘partnership’ 
between professional judges and the lay adjudicators (jury) in the English/Welsh jury system 
with consideration of the various problematic factors throughout the jury procedure, from 
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selecting the jury to reaching a verdict. He believes that the ‘law should be declared, by status 
if need be, that juries have no right to acquit in defiance of the law or disregard of the 
evidence’,146 while he recognises the ‘value role’ of the jury in bringing a reflection of the 
community into the administration of justice147. The absolute power the state should have 
over the jurors, in his belief, can be found in his recommendation for an ‘enquiry by 
professional judges and/or the Court of Appeal (Criminal Division) into alleged impropriety by 
a jury’148. Archival Research, such as that conducted by the Royal Commission on Capital 
Punishment (1949-53), used multiple approaches: theoretical, historical, and statistical149, 
from Home Office statistics because of their research interest and importance150. Much of the 
academic literature following Auld’s report has been concerned with the challenges and 
targets for reform specifically as well as a thorough understanding of the overall criminal 
procedure and the jury system. To some extent, disagreement over greater judicial control 
and the maintenance of strict secrecy, including the restrictions over research, reflect the 
conflicting perspectives of the efficiency of the lay adjudication process151. Auld’s procedural 
analysis of the jury system emphasised democratic principles. In order to retain these 
principles, he comments that ‘jury trial is a hallowed institution and a citizen’s right in all 
serious cases which necessarily include serious and complex frauds’152. He raises specific 
concerns in four stages; pre-trial procedure; the selection of the lay adjudicators; decision-
making process in the courtroom and the deliberation room; and after the trial, which are 
paid attention in other legal systems.  
In 2010, Cheryl Thomas offered a perspective on the fairness of a jury panel in the English 
jury system based on multi-method research, a nationwide large scale project, evaluating 478 
jurors in 41 juries, 551,669 charges between 2006 and 2008, and 668 jurors in 62 cases. Multi-
method research was used to simulate the jury process, but with real juries, in large-scale 
quantitative research using actual jury verdicts, and post-trial surveys153. Each method was 
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used to find answers to different but related questions. The simulation studies examined 
whether jurors’ racially discriminated against defendants as well as the jurors’ abilities to 
understand judicial instructions. The quantitative research studied the consistency of the 
jurors’ verdicts, while the post-trial survey elaborated the relationship between publicity 
about the trial and the jurors. The three different methods led the author to examine the 
fairness of a jury trial in terms of the jury’s deliberation from three related aspects: the 
internal influence of other jury members, the outcome, and the external influences from the 
media. By examining the jurors’ efficiency and ability to understand the evidence and law 
from the judges’ instructions, the racial influence on verdicts, and the substantial impact from 
recalling media publicity and the impact of internet information on jurors, she claimed there 
was fairness in jury trials. 
Since the international movement towards the introduction of lay adjudication systems 
started in the late twentieth century, comparing lay adjudication system research has been 
carried out extensively with the increasing popularity of comparative criminal justice studies. 
The introduction of the new lay adjudication system in Russia154 and Spain155 stimulated the 
comparative lay adjudication studies of European countries. For example, Jack Jackson and 
Nikolai Kovalev carried out an extensive comparative lay adjudication study in Lay 
adjudication and Human Rights in Europe in 2006 156  using a theoretical approach. They 
examined 46 different lay adjudication systems, within the focus on their civil law jurisdiction 
based on the international standard of human rights. They analysed the degrees of 
professional judges’ involvement and/ lay adjudicators’ independence, the methods used to 
select lay adjudicators, and experts’ involvement in the system. Moreover, they studied the 
implications of the system by challenging issues in the lay adjudication procedures - the 
selection, decision-making and appeal processes. The concern-focused approach on 
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international human rights standards demonstrates the flexibility of lay adjudication system 
research within certain theoretical settings shared by the contemporary international society.  
Ivkovic presented the three different characteristics between the mixed judge and jury 
models in Lay Participation in Criminal Trials: The Case of Croatia. A fundamental feature of 
the existing jury model, which tends to have a common law origin, is the independence of the 
decision-making process157, while an essential feature of the mixed judge model, which tends 
to have a civil law tradition, is the joint decision-making between lay adjudicators and 
professional judges158. In this respect, the question may arise: Is it possible that the joint 
decision-making process make a lay adjudicator panel function as a democratic institution? 
The considerable differences between the two models are those which divided the common 
law system and the civil law system, notably an adversarial procedure and an inquisitorial 
procedure, and guidance regarding justiciable law 159 . These differences may lead to an 
incapacity to mix the two models effectively in various elements of the lay adjudication 
systems. For example, Thaman has pointed out the difficulty of adopting ‘self-legitimating 
popular juries’ into the Belgium and the Continental European continent systems which have 
a civil law tradition, because of the nature of professional judges’ roles and formal rules of 
evidence160. On the other hand, in his analysis of the Rechtsstaat, Hertogh argued for the 
integration of the two approaches in order to evaluate the relationship between the principle 
of formal equality and legal consciousness 161 . Thaman pointed out, in his study of the 
nineteenth century’s introduction of the jury model into the Continental European systems, 
three incompatible principles of the civil law traditions: the duty of the State (public 
prosecutor and professional judges) to find the truth, the legal reasoning of the verdicts, and 
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the principle of mandatory prosecution162. He also claimed that there were six adversarial 
principles developed by lay adjudicator trials, which are the presumption of innocence, the 
privilege against self-incrimination, the equality of arms, the right to a public and oral trial, 
the accusatory principle, and the professional judges’ independence from the executive or 
investigative agency163. Moreover, he emphasised four principles in the trial: ‘the principles 
of orality, immediacy, presumption of innocence and the evidentiary standard of intime 
conviction’, which are expected to be developed by the introduction of the citizen judge 
system164. In addition O’Reiley, in his study of the transition of the English system, contrasted 
the separate features as legal traditions concerned with judicial activity, priority of written 
evidence, secretive proceedings, and institutional trust in state officials165. Hence, it is likely 
that there are some inevitable incompatible adversarial principles in introducing a lay 
adjudication system into the civil law tradition system.   
Democracy in the Courts 166  by Marjike Malsch in 2009 also made a considerable 
contribution to the research, by studying comparative lay participation in court procedures 
from procedural observation, and interview research with legal professionals from the 
democratic perspective in five different European legal systems: the Netherlands, Denmark, 
Germany, England and Wales, and Belgium. In her research, the implications of lay 
participation in domestic principles, namely participation, representativeness, and 
deliberation were the main focus, rather than issues in common in the respective countries’ 
criminal procedures, which Jackson and Kovalev concentrated on. As a result, the ways and 
levels of lay people’s involvement throughout the legal procedure were examined. For 
instance, the analysis of England and Wales in the study explored the roles of the courts 
including the examination of the building and courtroom architectures, and the advantages 
and disadvantages of lay participation, in both the Magistrates’ Courts and the Jury trial 
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Courts167. Malsch concluded there were diverse advantages regarding the lay participation 
mentioned in the five legal systems mentioned above. For example, England and Wales 
emphasis community involvement, avoidance of routine, the education of the public, the 
numerous advantages of a lay panel, and the openness and comprehensibility of the criminal 
justice system, while the Netherlands stressed filling gaps in the panel, different perspectives, 
expertise, input from outside, and avoidance of routine168. Malsch presents in conclusion 
different disadvantages of lay participation such as time-consumption and lack of 
representativeness in England and Wales, and less input, lack of knowledge, and the 
impractical characteristics of lay people involvement in the Netherlands 169 . Malsch’s 
approaches in this study demonstrates how the democratic principles in the court procedures 
of the various countries practices have different values. 
Much of the literature in English regarding the historical background of existing systems 
and descriptions of them in comparative studies has been traditionally widely available, in 
particular, the English jury system and other systems 170. Comparative studies have been 
actively conducted using the same model, such as between the English and American 
systems171 and the systems of former British colonies172. Additionally, many studies of the 
French and German lay adjudication system reported in English have been also undertaken173. 
Comparative lay adjudication studies seem to recognise that the lay adjudicator procedure 
can be separated into four stages: pre-trial procedure; the selection of the lay adjudicators; 
decision-making process in the courtroom and the deliberation room; and after the trial. The 
current major concern seem to be the attentiveness and competence of lay adjudicators. To 
sum up, multi-method research from various approaches will provide more comprehensive 
and in-depth analysis of the lay adjudication system. Moreover, one of key points in lay 
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adjudication system research is to set a clear focus for the research and consider the 
challenges and targets by considering different values depending on criminal procedures as 
well as on the whole criminal procedure.  
2.2.2 Evaluations of Lay Adjudication Procedures: A Literature Review and Research 
Methodologies 
An evaluation of the lay adjudicators’ attentiveness and competence is a key topic in the 
extensive literature. This area of study is dominated by simulated mock trials in philosophical 
and particular behavioural studies. For example, the classical study of the American jury by 
Harry Kalven and Hans Zeisel shows high levels of agreement: three-quarters of the time, 
professional judges agreed with the jurors’ verdict in their observations of mock trials174. It is 
hard to research the attentiveness and competence of lay adjudicators in decision-making 
processes because of the changing parameters through which to evaluate their performance. 
The common parameters evaluating their level of attentiveness are firstly how many times 
they talked or questioned witnesses and/or co-lay adjudicators and professional judges at the 
hearing or in the deliberation room175, and/or how they participated during the hearing and 
deliberation in the courtroom and in the deliberation room. The latter method is also used in 
evaluate their competence.  
Arguments have arisen about questioning by adjudicators, especially of witnesses. The 
three major criticisms against the questioning of witnesses are that the questions may violate 
the adversarial nature of the criminal procedure which is valued in a lay adjudication 
procedure with an active role of lay adjudicators; the questioning can lead to presenting 
improper, biased, inadmissible evidence to lay adjudicators; the questioning can be 
considered as supporting the prosecution in prevailing over ‘the reasonable doubt burden of 
proof in criminal trials’, thus threatening due process rights176. In addition, lay adjudicators’ 
questioning can be totally meaningless in contested arguments and time-consuming in the 
                                                          
174H Kalven and H Zeisel, The American Jury (Chicago; University of Chicago Press 1966). 
175NS Marder, ‘Answering Jurors’ Questions: Next Steps in Illinois’ (2009) 41 Loyola of Los Angeles 
International and Comparative Law Review 727–752; B Cappello and J Strenio, ‘Juror Questioning: The Verdict 
Is in’ (2000) 36 Trial 44–46. 
176United States v. Johnson in D Senger, ‘The Japanese Quasi-Jury and the American Jury: A Comparative 
Assessment of Juror Questioning and Sentencing Procedures and Cultural Elements in Lay Judicial 
Participation’ (2011) 2 University of Illionis Law Review 741–774, 759. 
64 
 
procedure177. Thus, submitting written questions to professional judges can be used and 
judges can act as doorkeepers to make sure relevant questions are asked. However, lay 
adjudicators’ questioning can be vital to clear their doubts or confusion and for their 
understanding of the situation. In addition, questioning encourages lay adjudicators to 
engage with the proceedings. This also leads to their satisfactions, which is related to the 
legitimacy of the verdicts and the criminal justice system. These vital benefits suggest that 
questioning should not be restricted at any part of the proceedings178. 
Most research regarding the practice of a lay adjudication system has been conducted on the 
assumption that lay adjudicators’ actively wish to participate, although reluctance to be a lay 
adjudicator has been considered179. Evaluating their participation through the frequency with 
which lay adjudicators say something may not necessarily reflect their attentiveness because 
of the expected functions of a lay adjudicator panel as a decision-maker. An example of this 
would be a lay adjudicator who did not frequently question witnesses or legal professionals, 
especially in the courtroom or even in the deliberation room, but who asked questions that 
were relevant and constructively discussed issues, deliberating with full-understanding of the 
evidence and law. On the other hand, another lay adjudicator might speak more frequently 
to witnesses or legal professionals but about irrelevant or inadmissible issues for deliberation, 
showing inadequate understanding of the evidence and law. It is obvious that the first lay 
adjudicator’s contribution is desirable, whereas that of the second one is not. Thus, frequency 
is not an adequate measure for evaluating their attentiveness. In other words, the evaluation 
of the lay adjudicators’ attentiveness to the issues under consideration should be an 
examination of how the lay adjudicators’ exercise their role and their competence in doing 
so. For example, behavioural research on the communication between lay co-adjudicators 
and legal professionals should reveal lay adjudicators’ attitudes to their role180. However, lay 
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adjudicators’ attentiveness is often excluded as a research subject in the course of the 
practice of lay adjudication181. 
In the evaluation of lay adjudicators’ competence, Baldwin and McConville, for instance, 
conducted research in the UK by asking trial participants, including lay adjudicators, 
professional judges, prosecutors and defence attorneys for feedback on the trial. An example 
of their actual questions is: ‘Did the participants think, for instance, that the jury had returned 
a verdict in accordance with the weight of evidence?’182 As they also asked whether all the 
participants agreed with the verdict reached by the jury 183 , another parameter is more 
commonly used in evaluating their competence which is professional judges’ standards. In 
this sense, if the lay adjudicators’ verdict agrees with that of the professional judges’, it means 
the lay adjudicators’ performance is appropriate. Methods of this kind have been traditionally 
popular. However, if lay adjudicators are expected to function as professional judges, the 
question arises as to why lay adjudicators are necessary in criminal procedure. If their verdict 
is different from the one expected from a professional judge, does that mean lay people do 
not function appropriately as adjudicators? Although it is important to observe them carefully 
from different perspectives, such as lay adjudicators’ satisfaction with or confidence in their 
work in order to evaluate their democratic role, however, their satisfaction can be derived 
from recognition by the legal professionals and public – as giving the appropriate verdict. In 
this respect, the agreement of legal professionals with the verdicts of lay adjudicators is 
important but not an essential requirement, in particular, from the procedural fairness 
perspective. 
Other questions to be asked are: What factors influence lay adjudicators in the decision-
making process? How do lay adjudicators discuss in the deliberation room? The analysis to 
answer these questions tend to be of the psychological type, in order to observe the practice 
of the targeted lay adjudication system or to develop legal tactics for legal professionals184. 
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2.2.2.1 Understanding of the Facts and Evidence 
The major area of empirical research is lay adjudicators’ understanding of evidence. This research 
shows that lay adjudicators do not find it difficult to understand the evidence. Home Office research 
in Australia revealed that only 4% of jurors ‘reported the trial evidence was not presented in a clear 
and easily coherent manner’185. This area of research was popular in England and Wales in the 
1980s and 1990s, when there were arguments as to whether complex fraud cases should be 
exempt from trial by jury. The research was often conducted through post-trial interviews 
or/and simulation studies using psychological analysis of the lay adjudicators’ understanding 
and its relationship to the way the evidence was presented. It is evident that lay adjudicators 
find it easier to understand the evidence with visual aids, as some research has shown. Honess 
conducted a simulation trial research relating to a complicated fraud trial in England: the 
Maxwell case. In the research 50 mock jurors were interviewed after watching a video of the 
evidence presented over 6 hours, and obtaining the documentary evidence186. Honess made 
two suggestions from the results: that evidence such as a summary of the key points should 
be presented with the help of visual aids; and that a ‘story-like’ structure should be used187. 
His results have shown the high level of competence of lay adjudicators in understanding the 
evidence. Roskill’s study examined the jurors’ ability to understand complex evidence in a 
simulation study by testing the judges’ instructions with, providing summaries, rearranging 
vital points and the chronology of events in the information188. Following this study, Levi 
highlighted the importance of the use of a list of keywords, such as legal terminology, in the 
instructions, taking into consideration the different social classes jurors belong to and their 
possible lack of familiarity with some of the key-word concepts189. 
2.2.2.2 Understanding Law 
The results of empirical research into lay adjudicators’ understanding of the law including legal 
terminology differ depending on whether they understand the relevant laws in the case or not. Lay 
adjudicators found difficulty understanding the laws as well as the language used at the trial and in 
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the judicial instructions. Results from governmental research conducted by the Home Office in 
Australia190, using post-trial questionnaires or interview research along with research done in 
England and Wales191show that jurors did not have difficulty understanding the law.  However, 
there were exceptions where jurors were confused about legal terminology and needed 
clarification192. Lay adjudicators often did not have difficulty understanding the concepts in 
legal terminology such as ‘beyond reasonable doubt’193, ‘consent’, and ‘intent’194, ‘insanity’195, 
or ‘aggravating’ and ‘mitigating’196. It is important for professional judges to give proper and 
efficient instruction to lay adjudicators in order to enable them to fulfil their democratic 
function197. Clear descriptions of legal terminology appear to be national projects in countries 
which have a lay adjudication system; for instance the Plain English campaign in the UK198, or 
the Legal Terms Glossary in the U.S.199 
From a behavioural perspectives, lay adjudication research regarding the instructions for 
lay adjudicators, in particular the American jury system, appears to focus on how to help lay 
adjudicators to understand the evidence, laws and arguments. Elwork, Sales and Alfini claim 
improvements are necessary and written instructions for the jury to help them understand 
the law and deliberate appropriately on the evidence. They conducted empirical research 
focusing on psycholinguistic factors: vocabulary, grammar, and organisation in American jury 
instructions200. Steele and Thornburg studied the relationship between the instructions to the 
jury and verdicts in actual trials and simulated tests to compare the verbal and written 
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instructions. Thus, they found that written instructions increased jurors’ understanding201. 
Research into the difficulty with oral instructions for lay adjudicators has largely been 
conducted about actual trials by post-trial questionnaire research 202 . The Honourable B. 
Michael Bann suggested clearer and shorter instructions were preferable; the first and final 
timing of the instructions of when the instructions were given was important; written 
instructions were important; and helpful responses to the lay adjudicators’ questions during 
their deliberations were useful203. The influence of extra-legal factors on the verdicts given by 
lay adjudicators were also one of the concerns regarding lay adjudicators’ competence. 
However, empirical research has tended to show that lay adjudicators are not 
disproportionately influenced by their emotions or other legally irrelevant considerations204. 
When they understand the evidence, the law and the arguments, it is assumed that lay 
adjudicators experience satisfaction and confidence in their work and in the criminal justice 
system. The relationship between jurors’ perceptions, understanding, confidence and 
satisfaction in relation to the English six courts system was studied by interview research205. 
In the findings, jurors’ confidence was influenced by their treatment and their understanding 
of the procedures and their previous experience 206 ; some jurors were confused by the 
evidence, law and legal terminology207; jurors’ confidence was dependent on ‘the fairness in 
the process, the adherence to due process and the efficiency and professionalism of the court 
staff’208; and whether jurors were satisfied with the information provided209. 
Interview research can provide in-depth descriptions of lay adjudicators’ experiences, 
although there are drawbacks to interviews, such as the distortion of memory and the 
influence of personal bias210. The other negative points of interview research are that it is 
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time-consuming211, and the results can be variable because ‘people tend to lie about their 
behaviour’212. However, this kind of research helps to discover what actually happened in a 
lay adjudication trial and the interviewer is able to look for correlations between case factors 
and the verdict213. 
2.2.3 Evaluations of Lay Adjudication Procedures: Proposed Criteria 
Evaluations of lay adjudication system in terms of the challenges faced by lay adjudicators’ 
participation have revealed mixed results and various factors influences them. Inspired from 
the four research mentioned above, namely the Auld Report, the Thomas’ study, Jackson and 
Kovalev’s research, and Malsch’s work referred to in section 2.2.1. Based on their findings I 
intend to propose specific criteria for evaluating the citizen judge system in this research. In 
addition, the criminal justice evaluation standard suggested by United Nations Office on Drugs 
and Crime as suggested in the Criminal Justice Assessment Toolkit in 2006214was also studied. 
The structure of the toolkit covers policing, access to justice, custodial and non-custodial 
measures, and cross-cutting issues in order to integrate UN standards and clarify the practical 
targets of criminal justice reform. In the access to justice section 9.3: lay assessors propose 
the questions used to evaluate the lay adjudication system215. 
What emerges from evaluative studies of the lay adjudication system is the emphasis on 
democratic values. Success or failure is connected to practical concerns about the lay 
adjudicators’ participation, their responsibilities and duties during the procedures, how far 
they are representative of the community, and their abilities to serve as decision-makers in 
order to operate the procedures according to the system. Therefore, the evaluation of a lay 
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adjudication system should be receptive to the wider context of legal traditions, political, and 
social concerns. Taking this into consideration, I suggest there is a fundamental question to 
be addressed. To what extent the legislation related to a lay adjudication trial procedure 
imposes a restriction on lay adjudicators’ participation? In other words, does it achieve an 
equitable balance between the concepts of democracy, a fair trial, and legitimacy? 
In considering various international adjudication studies and UNODC standards, I decided 
that the most suitable evaluation items would entail examining four key areas in order to 
assess whether or not the introduction of the citizen judge system had been successful. These 
were: 
1. the targeted democratic principles by which the citizen judge system was set up; 
2. the degree to which citizen judges’ participation is obstructed - if at all - by the 
procedural rules; 
3. the frequency of the actual use of the citizen judge system; and 
4. the extent to which citizen judges as well as other actors in the criminal justice 
proceedings satisfy the citizen judge system. 
The issue of the ‘practice’ of a citizen judge system is connected to the manner in which 
the system is exercised. The choice of appropriate performance indicators for assessing the 
exercise of the system will depend on the subjective views of the actors; the citizen judges, 
the prosecution, the defendant, the professional judges, victims, or even all the citizens 
involved in the community. Objective performance indicators such as the numbers of 
prospective citizen judges who appear when summoned, the number of citizen judge trials, 
the ratio of citizen judges who come from certain minority backgrounds, and acquittal rate 
can be important for assessing the manner in which lay adjudicators’ participation operates216.  
These quantitative variables are informative; however, they are dependent on large-sale 
projects which are often conducted by governments.  A key factor in assessing the practice of 
a lay adjudication system seems to be gauging the manner in which the lay adjudicators’ 
participate to the maximum, from the participative democratic perspective, and whether they 
gain satisfaction from their work from the procedural fairness perspective. In evaluating the 
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fairness of outcomes according to participants, their satisfaction is closely related 217 . 
Moorhead et al noted that satisfaction with the justice system influences the perceived 
legitimacy of the system owing to the effect on the views of the administrative institutions218. 
The legitimacy of criminal justice depend on their satisfaction.  
The legitimacy of the criminal justice system is more valued and considered meaningful 
and appropriate by citizens, if lay people are involved in the criminal justice procedure. Tyler 
suggests that citizens’ satisfaction with the outcomes and evaluations of procedural justice 
come from their experiences219. The more satisfied lay adjudicators are with their treatment 
by the professional judges and the court staff, the more likely it is that lay adjudicators are 
satisfied with the lay adjudication system overall 220 . This resonates with the democratic 
arguments that the success of a lay adjudication system is tied up in the extent to which the 
community deems it worthy of its practice for educating the public. This also connects with 
the work of Fukurai and Krooth on ‘the willingness to serve on lay adjudicators’ in the U.S. 
and Japan221. The study argues that the sense of civic duty or obligation to serve as a lay 
adjudicator is no longer significant; however, the lay adjudicators’ satisfaction with their 
experience enhances their willingness for future service222. 
This strand of the proposed criteria for a lay adjudication system advocates 
democratisation in the Japanese criminal procedure. In line with democratic principles on the 
value of lay adjudication in the criminal procedure, the legitimacy of the criminal justice 
system, which is justified through the citizen users, will have an improved prospect of being 
successful if it is considered satisfactory and the justice system. The criminal justice system 
includes the police, prosecutors, and professional judges. The more satisfied lay adjudicators 
are in the lay adjudication system, the more satisfied legal professionals will be. It will be 
important to gauge - as far as possible -the extent to which citizen judges are satisfied with 
their work throughout the citizen judge trial procedure. It is likely that this will be largely 
conditioned by the degree to which they are compatible with the criminal procedure 
                                                          
217R Moorhead, M Sefton and L Scanlan, ‘What Drives Public and Participant Satisfaction with Courts and 
Tribunals’ (London; 2008), 18. 
218Ibid, 1. 
219Tyler, supra note 43. 
220Matthews, Bridgeman and Briggs, supra note 143. 
221Fukurai and Krooth, supra note 9. 
222Ibid, 204, 213-4. 
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restrictions as regards the legal requirement to provide a fair trial in the Japanese criminal 
justice system. The more lay adjudicators involved in the procedure, the more likely they may 
have a sense of achievement about their work. This resonates with the findings of both Lewis 
223 and Kahn’s 224 studies that advocate a close approximation between lay adjudicators’ 
satisfaction and that of legal authorities. It is essential to consider the citizen judge system 
closely within the context of the citizen judges’ satisfaction. 
Ensuring their satisfaction may not provide sufficient classical democratic values, which 
are also important factors in evaluating whether the citizen judge system is successful or not. 
It is also necessary to consider the objectives of and the extent to which the system has 
brought changes. The objectives may be discerned from the principles of a fair trial within a 
country’s legal traditions. If the administration of justice chooses to rely on a citizen judge 
system as a mechanism for democratising the criminal justice system, it is reasonable to 
assume that there are specific challenges which it is believed the new system can influence. 
An assessment of these identifiable objectives and the extent to which the new system can 
influence them allows the consideration of legal traditions with which the actors in the trial 
are faced.  
These proposed criteria suggests that a lay adjudication is evaluated within its socio-legal 
context. They acknowledge that Japanese legal history, traditions, and social structure will 
inform the extent to which the introduction of the citizen judge system may be regarded as 
meaningful and appropriate and that democratisation of the criminal trial proceedings can 
potentially influence its objectives, in particular, as the introduction is recognised as the start 
of democratisation by the authorities. Lay adjudicators’ participation will influence legal 
professionals, legal institutions, and the public. Legal professionals are directly influenced by 
the introduction of the citizen judge system in terms of their roles and the ways they work. 
For example, lay adjudicators will evaluate both the prosecution’s and defendants’ evidence 
as well as their work225. Professional judges will play a role in instructing lay adjudicators by 
                                                          
223C Lewis, ‘Crime and Justice Statistics Collected by International Agencies’ (2011) 18 European Journal on 
Criminal Policy and Research 5–21, 9. 
224E Kahn, ‘Restore the Jury-or Reform-Reform-Aren’t Things Bad Enough Already-III’ (1992) 109 South African 
Law Journal 307–18, 311-2. 
225WC Thompson, ‘Are Juries Competent to Evaluate Statistical Evidence?’ (1989) 52 Law and Contemporary 
Problems 9–41. 
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explaining and defining information including legal terminology226. Employers will accept their 
employees need a leave of absence from work to fulfil their duty of being a lay adjudicator. 
In addition, the expected influence will revise lay peoples’ attitudes to political activities. As 
Schiff claims, there are three approaches to understanding the law within a society; the 
relationship between specific interests in society and the law; the expected efficacy of the 
regulations; and the law in action research, which can target specific categories in detail, as 
Stone suggested227. It will not be possible to cover all possible categories; therefore, this study 
will focus on the legitimacy which lay adjudicators’ bring based on their democratic function.  
The introduction of the citizen judge system was expected to promote social changes 
related to not only the legal authorities, including the courts, 228 but to also be consciousness-
raising for citizens and influence society to accept, understand, and operate using these 
democratic concepts. This prospect, envisaged by the Judicial Reform Council, has had a 
sceptical reception from the citizens. Changes are more likely to occur after the introduction 
of lay participation. The perception that it is being imposed by the government can increase 
opposition from citizens. Coercion by the law-making authorities and the scepticism of 
citizens may lead to their opposition against the government, rather than a consensus for 
promoting the rule of law with lay participation and a sense of self-governing. In this respect, 
a lay adjudication system may highlight and increase a sense of distrust in the authorities. 
Miller suggests that the development of legal systems can be multi-faced, and offers five 
typologies of ‘legal transplant’229 , which Japan used repeatedly as a tool for the judicial 
reform230. 
The restrictions to lay adjudicators’ participation in the procedures according to the 
legislature have implications for their expected responsibilities and duties. The desire to 
                                                          
226M Fujita and S Hotta, ‘The Impact of Differential Information between Lay Participants and Professional 
Judges on Deliberative Decision-Making’ (2010) 38 International Journal of Law, Crime and Justice 216–235. 
227DN Schiff, ‘Socio-Legal Theory : Social Structure and Law’ (1976) 39 The Modern Law Review 287–310, 295-
6. 
228Criminal justice reform has to be evaluated from the various aspects in the rules and institutions which will 
get an impact by the reform. For example, Macfadyen suggested the form of the model court in Scotland in 
terms of judicial case management to enhance efficiency. See RHL Macfadyen, ‘The Model Court of the 
Future’, The 19th International Conference of the International Society for the Reform of Criminal Law 
(Edinburgh, Scotland; 2005). 
229JM Miller, ‘Explain the Transplant Process A Typology of Legal Transplants : Using Sociology , Legal History 
and Argentine Examples to Explain the Transplant Process’ (2010) 51 839–885, 842. 
230This will be studied in Chapter 3. 
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introduce a lay adjudication system can promote the democratisation of the criminal justice 
system but can also risk triggering feelings of oppression in citizens. Without taking 
consideration of these consequences, a lay adjudication system may not actually be put into 
practice as intended. These issues also demand analysis in the context of my proposed 
evaluative criteria.  
This analysis comes from an original test designed to clarify the balance between various 
democratic principles as the result of the introduction of a lay adjudication system in 
democratic countries which aim to enhance the democratic values within their criminal 
procedures as means of developing an ideal lay adjudication system within a legitimacy of the 
criminal justice system espoused by contemporary democratic society.  
The success of the introduction of the citizen judge system will be gauged by taking an overall 
perspective. The proposed criteria in this thesis will be divided into two major parts: 
procedural testing and practical testing in terms of lay adjudicators’ participation. Moreover, 
in order to evaluate the level of participation, their satisfaction with their participation, and 
their competence will be also evaluated with consideration of the historical developments 
and the challenges of the existing Japanese criminal procedure. For example, a Prosecutorial 
Review Commission (PRC) [Kensatsu Shinsakai] existed before a citizen judge as other forms 
of lay participation in the Japanese criminal justice system to review prosecutors’ work. The 
PRC consists of 11 lay people who are randomly chosen from electronic registers, and serving 
duration is six months231. This is another form of lay adjudication in the Japanese criminal 
justice system. The role of the committee is to challenge prosecutorial discretion, which 
appears to be a cause of related issues such as high conviction rates232. 
 
 
Conclusion  
 This chapter has given an overview of the theoretical relationship between democratic 
principles and lay adjudication in criminal cases. Its focus has been the legitimacy of the 
                                                          
231Art. 4 and 14 of Prosecution Review Committee Act (act no. 147 of 1948). 
232The characteristics and challenges will be discussed in Chapter 3. 
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procedures involved, areas where democratic values can be brought or enhanced by lay 
adjudication. The basis of the number and variety of principles within concepts of democracy 
underline are the requirement a fair trial after the sensible balance of the evidence by peers. 
Moreover, the overwhelming emphasis on lay participation in the political institutions of 
democratic societies demonstrates the popularity of lay adjudication.  
 By analysing the arguments for and against lay adjudication in criminal cases, this chapter 
has identified two sides to the argument; two camps of opinion. There is a distinctive line 
between the belief in democratic values, but distrust of lay adjudicators.  Supporters of lay 
adjudication in criminal cases expect lay adjudicators to actively participate and trust in lay 
adjudicators’ competence, while their opponents distrust lay adjudicators’ competence. But 
in the practice of a lay adjudication system, the distrust should not be the basis for evaluation. 
This does mean that the expectation of lay adjudicators is that they function actively to fulfil 
their duties, and are able to understand the law and evidence, although instructions should 
be provided to support their understanding and competence. On the other hand, it also 
appears that the degrees or levels of lay adjudicators’ participation are restricted at each 
stage of the trial procedure in order to ensure a fair trial. 
A lay adjudication system is not the only way of establishing the legitimacy of the 
procedures. In addition, there is the question of public 'conscience' in the current pluralistic 
society. The doubts about the representativeness of a lay adjudicator panel is a common way 
of presenting arguments in opposition to a lay adjudication system.  
The contrasting idea to lay adjudicators’ participation is that ideal democratic values and 
distrust in lay adjudicators put a firm barrier between active and non-active participation. In 
this sense, lay adjudicators’ participation and democratic values seem to have been 
associated for almost as long as lay adjudicators have been part of the legal process’ and their 
competence trusted. But it is very difficult to respond to the claim that this balance is fragile 
and a precarious base for the political status of democracy.  
Lay adjudication studies and the proposed standards imply that it is important to consider 
a lay adjudication system in the light of lay adjudicators’ participation in the four major stages 
of the lay adjudication procedure: pre-trial procedure; the selection of the lay adjudicators; 
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decision-making process in the courtroom and the deliberation room; and after the trial. In 
order to examine the degree of lay adjudicators’ participation, the representativeness of a lay 
adjudicator panel, and their competence are necessarily concerned, moreover, the 
consideration of the representativeness in a lay adjudication panel and lay adjudicators’ 
satisfaction will show the degree and the level of the lay adjudication system.
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CHAPTER 3  JAPANESE CRIMINAL PROCEDURE AND AN 
INTRODUCTION TO A LAY ADJUDICATION SYSTEM  
 
Introduction 
I suggested in Chapter 2 that, while a lay adjudication system underpins the 
democratic values which bring legitimacy to the criminal justice system, it is debatable 
whether the success or failure of the introduction of the lay adjudication system can be 
assessed solely from the procedural and practice aspects, and the perceived balance 
between the principle related concepts of democracy, fair trial and legitimacy. However, 
some measure of success can be obtained by reference to what might restrict a lay 
adjudicators’ participation, the representativeness of a lay adjudicator panel, and the 
active participation of lay adjudicators based on lay adjudicators’ performance. These 
variables in turn will be affected by substantive legal and social issues. As a consequence, 
understanding the criminal justice system into which the lay adjudication system is 
introduced and is enforced is indispensable to evaluating the lay adjudication system. 
Moreover, this leads to an understanding of the targets of introducing the lay 
adjudication system and its practice in the criminal justice system.  This chapter aims to 
examine the social and procedural challenges resulting from implementing the citizen 
judge system in the Japanese criminal justice. This chapter is organised in three sections. 
Section 3.1 explains the characteristics of Japanese society, which may cause difficulties 
in the development of the principle of democracy. Section 3.2 explains the historical 
developments of criminal procedure in Japan by tracing the external foreign pressures 
and influences particularly by Germany and the U.S. Section 3.3 provides a summary of 
the Japanese criminal justice procedure and the roles of the major actors, public 
prosecutors, professional judges, defence attorneys and defendants. This chapter aims 
to clarify the attributes of the Japanese criminal procedure and examine the social and 
procedural characteristics, which have been expected by implementing the citizen judge 
system in the Japanese criminal justice system. 
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3.1  Japanese Society 
Japan consists of 6,852 islands including four main islands on the Pacific coast of East 
Asia1. It is divided into 47 prefectures which have a municipal organisation2. Japanese 
society appears to be racially, culturally, linguistically, and religiously homogenous. 
Japan is geographically isolated, and this leads to the belief that there is a purity and 
uniformity of ethnicity, culture, language and religion3. Many scholars have argued that 
homogeneity is a myth, for example, Ryang points out the diversity of minority groups 
including an indigenous race, the Ainu, and the multicultural Japanese governmental 
policy which supports minority languages and cultures 4 . The JRC recognised the 
necessity for diverse legal professionals in both the civil and criminal justice systems5. 
According to a statistical survey, 98.5% of the population is ethnic Japanese6. The official 
language is Japanese. There are many dialects and eight dialects in the Okinawa 
prefecture were classified as languages in danger of extinction by UNESCO7. However, 
the number of dialects has decreased over the last 40 years and the public Japanese 
language, called ‘common Japanese’ [Hyojun Go], is recognised nationally8. Therefore, 
in general, Japan appears to be a homogenous country. 
The national traits of the Japanese people are often referred to as giving priority to 
the group rather than any individual member and to be obedient to authority9. However, 
Fujita claims that these are not important factors when arguing about the success of the 
                                                          
1Statistics Japan, ‘Japanese Land’[Japanese] <http://www.stat.go.jp/data/chouki/01.htm> accessed 8 
September 2015. 
2 Local Autonomy Act, act no. 67 of 1947, art. 2 states the local governments.  
3B Brody, Opening the Door: Immigration, Ethnicity, and Globalization in Japan (New York; Routledge 
2002), 28-32. 
4S Ryang, Japan and National Anthropology: A Critique (New York; Routledge 2005),ch.2. See, M Weiner, 
Japan’s Minorities: The Illusion of Homogeneity (London; Routledge 2008). 
5 The Judicial Reform Council (JRC), ‘Recommendations of the Justice System Reform Council - For a 
Justice System to Support Japan in the 21st Century’ (2001) 
<http://www.kantei.go.jp/foreign/policy/sihou/singikai/990612_e.html> accessed 14 August 2015, ch. 
II, part 1. and 2.  
6Public Survey about Foreign Population in Japan, 2014,< http://www.e-
stat.go.jp/SG1/estat/List.do?lid=000001133760> accessed 14 August 2015.  
7UNESCO, ‘Atlas of the World’s Languages in Danger’ <http://www.unesco.org/languages-
atlas/index.php> accessed 8 September 2015. 
8M Yoneda, ‘Language Q&A’ (National Institute for Japanese Language and Linguistic, 2004) 
<http://www.ninjal.ac.jp/publication/catalogue/kokken_mado/20/06/> accessed 8 September 2015. 
9M Fujita, ‘The Analysis of the Citizen Judge System from Historical Perspectives [Nihon Ni Okeru Baishin 
Seido No Rekishi Karamita Saibanin Seido]’ in YOkada, M Fujita and M Naka (eds), The Citizen Judge 
System and Legal Psychology (Tokyo; Gyosei 2009), 31. 
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citizen judge system, according to his study, which suggests that those traits do not 
influence the verdicts10. The immature Japanese social, political, and legal consciousness 
epitomises collectivism and authoritarianism, and was one of the major concerns before 
the introduction of the citizen judge system11. Moreover, the sense of elitism brings 
doubts about the citizen judges’ attention to their function.  
Elitism in Japanese society as well as the judiciary is often related to arguments about 
the hierarchical and professionalised characteristics 12  of the Japanese judiciary. The 
Japanese government structures, including the judiciary, are powerful bureaucracies 
which recruit graduates from the top universities and the Japanese business sphere is 
also dominated by those graduates. Moreover, the strong power links between the 
government, business and universities, is called ‘an iron triangle’13, according to Feeley, 
in the light of their great influence on Japanese society, culture and the economy14. Lee 
points out the nature of elitism in Japan, which permeates throughout the political 
decision-making structure, which resonates with Helmann’s theoretical hypothesis 
about its functioning as a democratic opposition 15. Judicial authority being restricted to 
a particular social elite is one of the undesirable tendencies of a professional judiciary,16 
without open and competitive recruitment 17. Rule by an elite has repeatedly triggered 
debates in Japan with reference to corruption scandals18. This led to allegations that 
                                                          
10Ibid, 32. 
11I Weber, ‘New Japanese Jury System: Empowering the Public, Preservation Continental Justice, The’ 
[2009] East Asia Law Review, 125–176, 157-60. 
12M Feeley, ‘The Bench, The Bar, and the State: Judicial Independence in Japan and the United States’ in 
M Feeley and S Miyazawa (eds), The Japanese Adversary System in Context (New York; Palgrave 
Macmillan 2002) 67-88, 80. 
13 Ibid, 82. 
14 This is not only for Japan, and other societies also have the same attributes. See WC Samuels, The 
Economy as a System of Power (New Brunswick, NJ; Transaction Books 1979). 
15T Lee, ‘Review: Japan: Conservative Politics’ (1971) 33 The Review of Politics 593–596, 595. 
16Other undesirable tendencies are: dependence of the judiciary on the executives and public opinion; 
the routines and case hardening by judges; over-bureaucracy of the judiciary; a judicial formalism. See, 
K Ida, ‘USJP Occational PFaper: Introducing Citizen Participation in Japanese Courts: Interaction with 
Society and Democracy from the Perspective of the American Jury System’ (Cambridge; 2006), 13. 
17SF Mandiberg, ‘Why Sentencing by a Judge Satisfies the Right to Jury Trial: A Comparative Law Look at 
Blakely and Booker’ (2009) 40 McGeorge Law Review 107–148, 143-4. 
18J McCurry, ‘Scandal-Hit Japan PM Preparing for Snap Election’ (Guardian, 2014) 
<http://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/nov/13/japan-shinzo-abe-election-tax?CMP=twt_gu> 
accessed 11 September 2015. 
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Japan has a ‘dysfunctional democracy’19. On the other hand, Goto points out the strong 
characteristic of professionalism in the Japanese modern criminal justice system, which 
puts it above respect for public opinion and encourages the maintenance of reasonable 
justice and the autonomy of the law 20. Japanese society tends to favour professionalism 
rather than inexperienced and lay work. As Kiss explained Japanese society is 
characterised as ‘hierarchical’ and Japanese people prefer to being convinced by ‘those 
above the people’, not by ‘their fellows’. Thus he concluded that Japanese people prefer 
a trial by a professional judge rather than by lay people21. Noda stated that there is a gap 
between the legal structure and the actual lives of people22, as people consider the law 
as ‘undesirable’ or even ‘detestable’ 23. Moreover, the professionalism of the judiciary is 
regarded as one of the factors contributing to why Japan has maintained relatively low 
crime rates24 . These low rates are linked to the ‘uniformity and consistency in the 
judiciary’ 25. 
The dependence and emphasis on elitism and professionalism in the Japanese 
judiciary has been criticised from a democratic perspective. The perfectibility of human 
nature in Confucian belief, leads to high expectations from the legal profession 26 . 
However, there is a decrease in trust and public confidence in public institutions27. The 
lack of communication between the judiciary and the public, which could lead to a more 
binding awareness of public responsibilities, has been considered a problem28. In order 
to find the solutions to these concerns, the democratisation of the criminal procedure 
                                                          
19K Hirata, ‘Civil Society and Japan’s Dysfunctional Democracy’ (2004) 20 Journal of Developing Societies 
107–124, 107. 
20A Goto, ‘Citizen Participation in Criminal Trials in Japan’ (2014) 42 International Journal of Law, Crime 
and Justice 117–129. 
21LW Kiss, ‘Reviving the Criminal Jury in Japan’ (1999) 62 Law and Contemporary Problems 261–283, 
269. 
22Y Noda, Introduction to Japanese Law (Tokyo; University of Tokyo Press 1976), 8. 
23Ibid, 159-60. 
24N Komiya, ‘A Cultural Study of the Low Crime Rate in Japan’ (1999) 39 British Journal of Criminology 
369–390, 370. 
25H Shigemura, ‘Independence of Judicial Power and Problem Concerning Judicial System Reform in Our 
Country’ (2010) 3 Research Reports in Kinki University Technical College 81–96, 86. 
26P Roberts, ‘On Method: The Ascent of Comparative Criminal Justice’ (2002) 22 Oxford Journal of Legal 
Studies 539–561, 551. 
27T Inoguchi, Values and Life Stules in Urban Asia (Tokyo; University of Tokyo Press 2005), 34. 
28JRC, supra note 5, ch.I, part 3, 3. 
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by lay participation was considered to be essential in Japan to enhance transparency 
and public confidence in the criminal justice system29.  
It is important to review the notion of democracy in Japan. The use of the word 
‘democracy’ is confusing in Japan, in particular, in the Japanese translation of the 
meaning. As Yamamoto and Komuro have demonstrated, there is a mismatch between 
the concepts of democracy in Japan and in Western countries30. The Japanese concept 
emphasises a balance between conflicting subjects, which are not certain, while in the 
Western concept, the subjects are certain31. For example, authority and responsibility 
are clearly articulated32. In their religious study, Yamamoto and Komuro claimed that 
the emphasis is on ‘anima’ [kuki] in Japanese society, but there is no concept of 
theocracy33. Although theocracy is perceived as a threat to democratic international 
political and legal order, as Fortman explains that, changes from theocracy to democracy, 
through the legitimation, of authority have been taken place34. The lack of both concepts 
of theocracy and democracy in the Japanese society may make it difficult to develop the 
concept of democracy. 
On 30 November 1945 Matsumoto Jichiro, the first vice chairman of the House of 
Councillors, said ‘the basic principle of democracy is the establishment of human rights’ 
and stressed the significance of equality before the law35. Local governments function 
as a mechanism for direct, immediate, and representative democracy in Japan36. Direct 
activism in local government can be seen to some extent in Japanese society; however, 
it seems to be a ‘soft authoritarian’ society which has ‘the subtle form of 
authoritarianism through which it operates even in ostensibly democratic’ concepts37. 
                                                          
29Z Corey and VP Hans, ‘Japan’s New Lay Judge System: Deliberative Democracy in Action’ (2010) 12 
Asian-Pacific Law & Policy Journal 72–94, 87. 
30H Yamamoto and N Komuro, Sociology of Japanese Religion [Nihonkyo No Shakaigaku] (Tokyo; 
Kodansha 1981). 
31Ibid. 
32Ibid. 
33Ibid. 
34BDG Fortman, ‘Theocracy, Democracy and Secularization: Is There Room for Compromise?’ (2008) 2 
Sociological Analysis 57–68. 
35Cited by I Neary, ‘Matsumoto Jiichiro and the Making of Democracy in Postwar Japan’ (2007) 19 Japan 
Forum 217–238, 217. 
36Y Takao, ‘Participatory Democracy in Japan’s Decentalization Drive’ (1998) 38 Asian Survey 950–967. 
37J Clammer, ‘Globalisation and Citizenship in Japan’ in Wayne Hudson and Steven Slaughter (eds), 
Globalisation and Citizenship (Oxon; Routledge 2007), 36. 
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Borton expected the development of democracy in Japan after the Second World War 
to be driven by the focus on citizens’ rights because of opposition against the occupying 
force38. However, the result was the domination of a homogenous-elitist group within 
the modernisation model for procedural and technical developments. The stalling of this 
situation resulted in the necessity for civic participatory democracy, namely deliberative 
democracy39. Neary suggests the three central elements of peace, human rights and 
popular sovereignty are necessary to develop democracy in Japan40. In this respect, it is 
reasonable to enhance lay adjudicator participation in the criminal procedure to 
democratise the system in Japan. 
 
3.2 Historical Developments of Japanese Laws and the Jury System  
According to some commentators, Japanese developments in the late nineteenth 
and early twentieth century exemplified the Watsonian theory of legal transplantation41. 
Because of its background as a ‘recipient’42 or an adopter of foreign laws, the Japanese 
legal system is considered a ‘hybrid’43 or mixed44 legal system.  Consequently, the first 
stage of the Judicial Reform in 1999 did not get beyond establishing an abstract target; 
‘the judicial system for the twentieth first century’45. The mixture of both a civil law and 
a common law tradition is the result of efforts to create a modernised legal system. 
Moreover, the significance of the modernised system in Japanese indigenous culture has 
affected the practice of the criminal justice system. This has resulted in an adherence to 
the principle of the rule of law46, democracy derived from stressing the public interests 
                                                          
38H Borton, ‘Past Limitations and the Future of Democracy in Japan’ (1955) 70 Political Science Quarterly 
410–420, 420. 
39Y Ishikawa, ‘Calls for Deliberative Democracy in Japan’ (2002) 5 Rhetoric and Public Affairs 331–345, 
340. 
40I Neary, ‘Matsumoto Jiichirō and the Making of Democracy in Postwar Japan’ (2007) 19 Japan Forum 
217–238, 236-7. 
41See M Dean, ‘Legal Transplants and Jury Trial in Japan’ (2011) 31 Legal Studies 570–590. 
42Ibid, 573. 
43MJ Wilson, ‘Prime Time for Japan to Take Another Step Forward in Lay Participation: Exploring 
Expansion to Civil Trials’ (2013) 46 Akron Law Review 641–674, 648. 
44See A Katsuta, ‘Japan: A Grey Legal Culture’ in Esin Örücü, Elspeth Attwooll and Sean Coyle (eds), 
Studies in Legal Systems: Mixed and Mixing (The Hague; Kluwer Law International 1996). 
45Law Concerning Establishment of Judicial Reform Council [Shiho Seido Kaikaku Shingikai Secchi Ho], 
Act No. 68 of 1999, para. 1. 
46K Sato and A Yoshimitsu, ‘A Review of the Judicial Reform [Shiho Kaikaku Shingikai Wo Furikaeru]’ 
(2001) 1208 Jurist 10–24, 17-8. 
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[Kokyo no Kukan]47, and, globalisation, which was the aim of the Judicial Reform in 1999. 
Two distinctive legal traditions have shaped current Japanese criminal procedures: civil 
law and common law traditions, which influenced the Japanese legal system because of 
its unique historical developments. This section will trace the historical developments in 
the light of two historical crossroads for the Japanese legal system. 
3.2.1  Historical Developments 
There were two turning points in the developments of the Japanese legal system 
before 1999. There are represented by the judicial reform from the end of the 
eighteenth century to the early nineteen century, and the post-war reforms after the 
Second World War. The Japanese civil law tradition developed from a need to modernise 
the legal system after the collapse of the Tokugawa Shogunate Regime and the birth of 
the Meiji Regime at the end of the eighteenth century in order to amend the unfair 
treaties concluded with American and European countries 48 . The coordination of a 
modern code of law and the judicial system was essential in Japan’s progress to 
becoming a sovereign nation with equal rights within the international community. This 
judicial reform was conducted by introducing the Continental European civil law 
tradition which blended French and Prussian codified laws, drafted under mainly French 
Scholar, Boissonade’s supervision49. In addition, there was a significant German impact 
on various parts of Japan, in ‘science, government, law, education, and military 
organisation’ exerted by the Iwakura mission from 1871-187350. Noda points out that 
‘1881 can be characterized as a watershed at which the waning influence of French law 
                                                          
47I translated the word Kokyo no Kukan into public interests; however, the word is used as an inclusive 
expression which can include a nuance for enhancing the Japanese citizens’ conscious towards their 
responsibilities and duties in a self-governing society. See, Ibid, 19. 
48The Japanese government signed the unfair treaties, derived from the Treaty of Nanking [Nankin 
Joyaku] and its affiliated treaty, with Britain (Nichiei Dōmei in 1854), the U.S. (Kanagawa Jōyaku in 
1854), Russia (Nichiro Tsuko Joyaku in 1855), France (Nichifutsu Shuko Tsusho Joyaku in 1858), the 
Netherlands (Nichiran Shusho Tsusho Joyaku in 1858), Prussian, (Nichifu Shusho Tsusho Joyaku in 1860), 
and Italy (Nichii Shusho Tsusho Joyaku in 1866). Regarding the transition in the period, see T Aruga, 
‘The Declaration of Independence in Japan: Translation and Transplantation, 1854-1997’ (1999) 85 The 
Journal of American History 1409–1431; Japan Centre for Asian Historical Records, ‘Timeline Search 
[Nenpyo Kensaku]’ (Treaties and Legislation in Modern Japanese History) 
<http://www.jacar.go.jp/goshomei/> accessed 25 February 2016. 
49GE Boissonade, ‘Opinions about the Jury System and Answers to the Questions in the Congress’, Legal 
Arguments: about the jury system (Tokyo; Mukenshoya 1927), 37. 
50R-H Wippick, ‘Infected with German Measles: Meiji Japan under German Cultural Influence’ (1995) 20 
History of European Ideas 399–403, 400. 
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was imperceptibly superseded by German law.’51 For example, during the reform, the 
Meiji Constitution 52 , Civil Law 53 , Civil Procedure Law 54 , the Commercial Law 55 , the 
Criminal Law56, Code of Criminal Procedure [Chizaiho]57, and the Attorney Act58 were 
established by German influence. They became the fundamental basis of the Japanese 
legal system. 
The other turning point was the democratisation of the political, governmental and 
legal systems of Japan after the Second World War. Across the political spectrum, from 
authoritarianism to democracy, the nature of the various systems was transformed. 
Under the supervision of the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers (SCAP), a wide 
range of reforms were introduced, but a lay adjudication system was not contemplated59. 
The SCAP’s occupational objectives were three: ‘Japan’s demilitarization and 
democratization; the purging of war criminals; and Japan’s economic resuscitation’60. As 
a result, there was not only governmental reconstruction, but also reform of the 
educational system and agricultural land reform. Because these reforms reconstructed 
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the social and governmental structures as well as the ideologies contained in the 1947 
Constitution, Japan has been viewed subsequently as a liberal democratic country61. 
The 1947 Constitution consists of 99 articles, 10 of which provide regulations relating 
to criminal justice procedure. For instance, that ‘sovereign power resides with the 
people’, and the ‘[g]overnment is a sacred trust of the people, the authority for which is 
derived from the people, and the powers of which are exercised by the representatives 
of the people, and the benefits of which are enjoyed by the people.’62The Constitution 
is called the ‘Post-war Constitution’ 63  and the ‘Peace Constitution’ 64  from its three 
fundamental principles: the sovereignty of the people, respect for fundamental human 
rights, and pacifism.  
 Moreover, the 1947 Constitution was followed by amendments to the Criminal Law65 
and the Code of Criminal Procedure (CCP)66.  Regarding the Japanese developments of 
the CCP, the major amendments were made in 1890, 1922, and 1948. The amendment 
of 1922 was influenced by the German Code of Criminal Procedure, but drafted by 
Japanese scholars67, and the amendment led to the introduction of the jury system. The 
considerable influence of German Law on the Japanese Code of Criminal Procedure in 
1922 was present also in the content of the law, as well as in the concepts of litigation 
and conditions of lawful prosecution, such as prosecutorial legal principles. Moreover, 
it is considered that the inquisitorial principle [Tojisha Shugi] and the principle of 
substantial truth [Jittaiteki Shinjitsu Shugi]68, are derived from German influences69. 
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The profound German influences on the Japanese legal systems were the result of 
mutual political interests and cooperation. The German influences started in 1870s, as 
a result of the German minister’s efforts to send German physicians and scholars into 
the Meiji government because of his interest in Japanese concepts of modernisation70. 
Japan also regarded German policy as an example because of the German military 
victory over France as well as the existence of the German federal system71. The long 
historical influences from the German system still have deep roots in the current CCP, 
although it was amended in 1947 because of American pressure. This is because the 
amendment was based on the previous code in 1890. Therefore, current Japanese 
criminal procedure retains a German influence in spite of strong general American 
influences in the Japanese legal system72. 
As a result, these two major principles, the inquisitorial principle and the principle of 
substantial truth, have been the theoretical foundations of Japanese criminal procedure 
up to the current period73. The Inquisitorial procedure has remained, in particular, at the 
investigation phase in, the initial powers of the police and the public prosecutors74. In 
addition, Matsuo has suggested that the characteristic of Japanese criminal procedures 
are of a careful and detailed judicial administration [Seimitsu Shiho] based on the belief 
in the principle of substantive truth achieved by an elaborate investigation75. 
In the post-war reform, the CCP was amended under American influences and four 
major principles and rights were introduced. The principle of the warrant is that no one 
shall be apprehended without a warrant issued by a competent judicial officer which 
specifies the offence with which the person is charged, unless he is apprehended for the 
offence being committed76.  Others are a guarantee of the right to silence77, the support 
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of a court-appointed defence attorney 78 , and the protection of many fundamental 
procedural rights of suspects and defendants. In addition, the introduction of adversarial 
proceedings, and the neutrality of the court were important reforms79. See points out 
that the Japanese ‘[c]riminal procedure was changed from an inquisitorial towards an 
accusatory system with the Anglo-American emphasis on the right of the accused.’ 80  
The 1948 CCP 81  is organised into seven parts containing 507 articles in total. The 
principles of the application of the law are: the principle of adjudication based on 
evidence82; in dubio pro reo83; the prohibition of hearsay evidence84; and probative value 
of the credibility of confession85. However, the fundamental concept underlying these 
principles is the careful and detailed judicial administration.  
 
3.3 Criminal Justice Procedure in Japan 
This section provides an overview of the current situation of crime statistics and the 
criminal justice procedure in Japan. As Stiunz has argued, there is a crucial dependent 
relationship between criminal procedure rules and the entire criminal justice system86. 
He explains that the rules should be examined by how they work in the ‘dynamic’ whole 
system 87 . Within the criminal justice system, there are a number of challenges in 
operating the criminal justice system in Japan that may affect the application and 
reception of a citizen judge system in force. Thus, this section captures the picture of 
the Japanese criminal justice system in the light of the considerable challenges, 
particularly the lack of protection of the suspect’s/defendant’s rights. What procedures 
does the Japanese criminal justice system pursue in its investigations and decision-
making? The above will be examined in relation to the types of crimes reported and 
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brought to the Japanese criminal justice system and reported in the domestic and 
international crime statistics published by the Ministry of Justice in Japan and the United 
Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC). After that, the flow of the Japanese 
criminal justice procedure and the involved actors will be studied.  
3.3.1 Crimes and Crime Statistics  
Although Japan has a long history of authorising local communities to supervise their 
own safety 88 , this does not override government responsibilities. There were 
disruptions89 and collapse of local communities in 1990s90. As a result, the Japanese 
government adopted an active role in the administration of justice for the whole country. 
There is a clear separation of legislative, executive, and judicial functions of the 
government in Japan, as the 1947 Constitution states. Only the Parliament holds the 
legislative function91. The executive function is performed by the Cabinet,92 and the 
judicial function is performed by the Supreme Court and the inferior courts 93 . The 
Constitution declares that the Executive must not establish extraordinary tribunals and 
that all judges shall be independent in the exercise of their conscience and only the 
Constitution and the laws shall bind the judges94. 
Crimes in Japan can be divided into two; Keihohan which comes under the 1907 
Criminal Law95, and Tokubetsuhohan which is dealt with the special criminal laws, such 
as the 1964 Road Traffic Law96, the 1951 Stimulant Control Law97, the 1953 Narcotics and 
Psychotropic Control Law98, the 1956 Anti-Prostitution Law99, the 1947 Antimonopoly 
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Act100, the 1948 Financial Instruments and Exchange Act101, and so on. The 1948 Code of 
Criminal Procedure (CCP) and the 1948 Rule of Criminal Procedure (RCP)102 lay down the 
principle of legality – nullum crimen, nulla poena sine lege-103 . The criminal justice 
procedure depends on the nature of the suspected offences and the relevant 
punishments. The CCP and the RCP distinguish three forms of criminal process: the 
regular criminal process, the summary criminal process [Ryakushiki Tetsuzuki]104, and 
the juvenile criminal process [Shonen Shinpan]. The summary criminal process is used 
when the prescribed sanction is either a fine or up to ¥1,000,000 (approximately 
£7232)105. The juvenile criminal process applies to offenders who are aged younger than 
20, and the juvenile cases go to the Family Courts 106 . If the offender, who has 
deliberately committed homicide, is over 16 years old, the case is sent to the public 
prosecutor107. This section will focus on the regular criminal process because the cases 
dealt with by the citizen judge system only involve the regular criminal process108.  
The White Paper on Crime [Hanzai Hakusho]109, is annually collected and reported by 
the Ministry of Justice, while reported crime statistics are collected by the National 
Police Agency [NPA] [Keisatsu Cho]. The 2015 White Paper on Crime reflects the 
fluctuations in offending in recent Japanese history110. The number of recognised crimes 
increased to approximately 1,600,000 in 1947 and 1948 from 1,400,000 in 1946, but it 
decreased over the next four years 111 . Since then, the number has generally kept 
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increasing and it peaked in 2002 at 3,693,928112. Thefts and traffic offences dominated 
87% of total number of recognised crimes in 2002113. Subsequently, the number of 
recognised crimes has decreased until 2014. The total number of recognised crime in 
Japan in 2014 was 1,762,912, and it has decreased since 2002114. The number of each 
type offence in January and February has decreased between 2012 and 2016, apart from 
intellectual property offences 115 . The major offences are dangerous driving, thefts, 
frauds, criminal assaults, and embezzlement in 2014116. 
The number of reported crimes started to decrease since 2002. Moreover, the 
incarceration rate has declined since 2007117. The prison population in 2006 had the 
highest record since 1956 with 81,255 inmates, but the number of the 2014 prison 
population was 60,486118. The number of newly accepted cases by public prosecutors 
was 1,238,057119, and 1,243,019 cases120 were completed by criminal processes in 2014. 
The regular criminal process had 90,840 cases, and 286,699 cases went to the summary 
criminal process121. In short, there are declining statistics in relation to the number of 
recognised crimes and the prison populations, and the smaller ratio of prison sentences. 
However, the crime-arrest ratio was at its lowest in 2001, and after that went up. 
Nevertheless, the ratio was far lower than before 1980122. The ratio used to be about 
70% in 1950, but it was 52.3% for criminal law offences and 30.6% for offences against 
special laws123. Although these figures may not directly reflect the criminal situation in 
Japan, they can produce a sense of distrust in the administration of justice, especially in 
the police.   
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In short, the Japanese governmental statistics show an overall recent downward 
trend in reported crimes and prison population, and the police clearance rate has also 
declined, although the statistics also illustrates increases in the past. It is important to 
note however, that the crime rates in Japan have been low and steady124 compared to 
other countries.   
It is often said ‘globally’125 that crime level in Japan has remained low126. According to 
statistic by the UNODC, the homicide rate of Japan was lower than 1 per 100,000 
population in 2011127, and it has decreased since 1955, when it was 2.4128. The area that 
has the highest homicide rate is the Americas at 29.3, and South Africa also has one of 
the highest homicide rates in the world129. For example, the rate of homicides in the U.S. 
(New York), the U.K. (England and Wales), Germany, and France is 6.3, 1.3, 1.0, and 1.8, 
respectively130. However, the statistic brings into questions the validity of valuating the 
criminal level in countries because of the various related factors and methodologies 
which influence the statistics131. It is obvious that there are considerable differences in 
the number of recognised crimes between the countries. For example, Chapter 4 of the 
2015 White Paper on Crime in Japan shows incompatible statistics for the number of 
recognised crimes, crime rates, and the clear-up rate in Japan, France, Germany, the 
U.K., and the U.S between 2009 and 2013132. The number of recognised crimes in 2013 
were 1,314,483 in Japan, 3,480,978 in France, 5,961,662 in Germany, 3,718,043 in the 
U.K. (England and Wales), and 9,795,658 in the U.S., while the clear-up rates were 30.0% 
in Japan, 54.5% in Germany, and 23.1% in the U.S.133 Although comparisons of statistics, 
in particular, taken by different methodological criteria between countries are 
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questionable, international crime research will be fruitful in understanding the 
background and influences that produce these statistics. 
In Japan, the rise of public concern about criminal justice does not always correlate 
with an increase in the crime rate. In other words, although these categories of offences 
are those which concern the public, they are not necessarily those with the highest crime 
rates134. The low and decreasing criminal rate does not attract public attention because 
of an extensive focus on specific crimes by the media. For instance, there is growing 
public concern about crimes carried out by elderly suspects135 and targeted at elderly 
people, because of the advent of the aging society136. Steele points out a continuing 
increase in the number of offences committed by those aged more than 65 years old 
between 1992 and 2011 in Japan137. In fact, the number was 18.8% of arrested criminal 
offenders, and it was the second largest number following by offenders aged younger 
than 20 years old in 2014 138 . Moreover, media coverage of drug-related crimes 
committed by famous or foreign people tend to cause the public concern139. An increase 
has been seen in drug-related offences involving criminal gangs and foreign criminal 
organisations140; minor drug-related offences, usually by small-scale dealers and addicts; 
and minor offences such as thefts141, many which are drug-related and violent juvenile 
crimes142.  The number of stimulant drug cases decreased, but the number of cannabis 
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drug cases increased from 2013 and 2014143. Japanese social and economic stability and 
the country’s hierarchical and collective culture tend to be considered as the reasons for 
the relatively low crime rate. For example, the UNODC report raised five reasons for the 
low homicide rate in Japan: a low gun ownership in the population, a high clearance rate 
by the police force, the rejection of violence because of the Second World War 
experience, economic affluence, and the cultural stigma towards crimes in Japanese 
society144. An analysis of low violent crime rate in Japan by Roberts and Lafree reveals a 
Japanese social control mechanism arising from effective social organisation and 
lowered economic stress between 1955 and 2000145. They also show the importance of 
the unique Japanese culture which is the intimate bonding between individuals and 
respect for group values146. Moreover, Komiya recognises more oppressive rules, such 
as ‘strong informal social control’ as well as an original culture, which leads to strong 
self-control, imposed on Japanese citizens through crime control, in a way which is very 
different to the situation in other Western countries147. Furthermore, it is generally 
considered that the obedience of Japanese citizens to the criminal justice mechanism is 
derived from reverence for central administration148. Japan has rarely suffered ethnic or 
tribal affiliations or conflict149. Northrop argued that rebellion is triggered in response to 
established normative legal norms150. However, as a result of the lack of conflicts there 
are strong hierarchical structural social organisations in Japan. A Japanese criminal 
justice system is under the strong control of a central administration.   
In contrast, as Upham has pointed out, the existence of polarisation between the 
central administration and local administrations in Japan cannot be denied because of 
‘the frequency of injunctions against local governments’ by the national government151. 
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Moreover, he claimed that there were strong political and bureaucratic influences on 
the Japanese judiciary with the recognition of possible corruptible individual judges at 
the local courts and local governments’ involvement in the practice of the judiciary 
system152. It is noteworthy to mention conflicts between American military bases in 
Japan and the local communities. There are seven major military bases in Japan including 
Okinawa prefecture, in the south island of Japan, because of the 1960 Treaty of Mutual 
Cooperation and Security between the U.S. and Japan153. There are seven ongoing civil 
and administrative cases related to noise problems caused by the take-off and landing 
of Air Self-Defence Forces’ and American Military jets154. Various related complications, 
not only the noise problems, but also crimes155 and accidents156, have occurred. There 
has been intractable struggles involving municipal governments and citizens in 
provisional areas against the coercive oppressions of the central administrations. 
Hoshino has examined the sense of denial of the Japanese government regarding these 
problems in Okinawa and the voice of local communities in Okinawa157. Nevertheless, 
there is a propensity in Japan for provincial governments and citizens to comply with the 
power of central government.  
Komiya categorised four elements as reasons: environmental (demographic and 
geographic), progress (economic and educational), justice (legal and administrative) and 
cultural factors158. As mentioned above, there are no race-related conflicts owing to 
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Japan’s environmental characteristics, high literacy rates and low unemployment rates 
due to its economic stability, and there is serious concern about shame about crime in 
communities159 resulting in a low crime rate. Haley also claimed that the low rate in 
Japan seems to be primarily caused by the Japanese ‘traditional values’ that are based 
on the Confucianism heritage, and ‘social controls’ leading to strong judicial control160. 
He also discussed issues related to strong control, in particular ‘conservative’ judges’ 
decisions focusing on supporting the rule of law161. This means professional judges tend 
to adhere to precedent rather than community consensus; on the other hand, 
professional judges play ‘a central role in the formation and development of law’162. 
Moreover, Haley’s extensive research illustrated political controls over the judiciary and 
collectivism existing throughout Japanese legal as well as societal culture163. Further, 
these elements also lead to the emphasis on crime prevention and restorative justice, 
revealed in the approaches of police, prosecutors, and judges164. The reasons for the 
low crime rate appear to show doubts about the independence of the judiciary, which 
is against the principles of a fair trial and democracy. 
 
3.3.2 Japanese Criminal Justice  
Foote claims that the Japanese criminal justice system is ‘the due-process model’165. 
The Japanese criminal justice system consists of major three phases: criminal 
investigation, trial, and execution of the decision. Firstly, an arrest warrant is issued and 
the suspect is arrested166. The police and public prosecutor interrogate the suspect to 
collect evidence. After the public prosecutor indicts the suspect, the secondly, the 
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criminal trial procedure starts by sending the case file to the court167. The verdict is 
determined at the court, and lastly, the verdict is executed 168. As a Flowchart of a 
Japanese Crime (see Appendix 4), illustrates, there are ten steps from beginning to end 
in the Japanese criminal justice procedure. The following part of this section will 
examine the criminal justice procedure with its actors and organisations and consider 
its challenges. 
Luna defined that an adversarial approach towards criminal procedure as involving 
recognised opponents, a public prosecutor on behalf of the state against the defendant, 
and maybe a public defender or private criminal defence attorney before a presumably 
impartial decision maker in the guise of a judge or jury169. The equal responsibility for 
the investigation and selection and presentation of the evidence is placed on the two 
opposing parties170. In addition, the principles of orality and immediacy tend to be 
emphasised in the trial procedure171. Therefore, the judge tends to play a passive or 
reactive role as a ‘judicial umpire’ in order to reach decisions through the adversarial 
contest between the two parties172. On the other hand, in an inquisitorial approach, 
there is a separation of responsibilities between the pre-trial and trial procedures. The 
investigation responsibility lies on the police and prosecution, and in the trial procedure 
the responsibilities shift to the judge173. Adjudication in an inquisitorial approach tends 
to be based upon a definitive judicial inquiry revealing the truth and achieving accurate 
verdicts. No system has a definitively adversarial or inquisitorial approach because of 
the mixtures and deviations in the historical development of different legal systems174. 
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3.2.2.1  Criminal Investigations 
The four investigation authorities discover and register a criminal offence through 
investigations175, when they consider whether there is reasonable suspicion that crime 
was/has been committed176. The authorities are the police177, special judicial officers178, 
public prosecutors179, and public prosecutors’ assistant officers180. They can find out 
about alleged crime through information from the public, such as reports from victims181 
or witnesses182, and voluntary surrenders183. 
The Japanese National Police Agency (NPA) [Keisatsu Ch] was established in 1954 
according to Police Law 184 , and it is administered by the National Public Safety 
Commission of the Cabinet Office. The Metropolitan Political Department [Keishi Cho] is 
one of the police forces responsible for Tokyo. The NPA consists of 8 bureaux including 
the Commission-General and Imperial Guard Headquarters, and a Regional Bureau185. 
While the function of the first two organisations is planning and research on the police 
system 186 , the Regional Bureau contains prefectural police organisations, which 
undertake actual police duties, such as criminal investigations187. They are there to 
protect individual lives, persons, and property, carry out crime prevention, arrest 
suspects, maintain traffic safety and maintain public safety and order, according to the 
Police Act188. 
At the criminal investigative phase, the police and prosecutors have the right to carry 
out compulsory investigations [Kyo sosa] 189 , which could restrict the liberty of the 
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individual. Criminal Investigation in the Japanese criminal justice system can be divided 
into two parts: compulsory investigations and investigations with voluntary cooperation. 
Compulsory investigation, including arrest, search, and inspection, can be conducted 
against the subjects’ consents to the investigations190. The other can be conducted with 
the subjects’ consent to the investigations. There are arguments about the compulsory 
investigations because of the prohibitions on deprivation of life or liberty191 and the 
violation of suspects’ rights by the police and a prosecutor 192 . In order to prevent 
violation, Article 197(1) states that compulsory investigation without appropriate 
criminal proceedings is a violation of law [Kyosei shobun hoooo1tei shugi]. Professional 
judges have a right to investigate the reasons and necessity for compulsory investigation, 
and if it is inappropriate, professional judges can dismiss the request for an arrest 
warrant193. 
In addition, the lack of protection of the suspects’ rights during criminal investigations 
in order to obtain confessions as evidence is a serious violation of citizens’ individual 
rights and damages the concept of democracy. For the pre-indictment investigation, the 
police can request a person’s voluntary attendance at the police station for compulsory 
questioning. The police must decide whether to release or refer a suspect to the 
prosecutors within 48 hours after his/her arrest and they may be interrogated without 
the presence of a defence attorney. The defendant may not be allowed to refuse to be 
interrogated in practice because Article 198 (1) of the CCP allows a public prosecutor, 
public prosecutor’s assistant officer or judicial police official to ask any suspect to appear 
in their office and they can interrogate him/her if they consider it necessary. Moreover, 
prosecutors have an additional 24 hours to decide whether to release the suspect or 
seek a warrant for his/her detention. Therefore, the suspect can be detained for 72 
hours in total without charge or trial and without access to a defence attorney. 
Moreover, the police can request a 10 day- extension request up to two times if the 
police recognises that 72 hour custody is not enough. In addition, prosecutors can apply 
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to the court for pre-trial detention. The initial detention warrant authorises detention 
for 10 days and the person can be detained for 23 days in total from the time of arrest. 
As Shinomiya contends, suspects are in a ‘hostage’ position because of the reluctance 
to grant bail or disclose prosecution evidence194. 
Evidence is admissible under the rule of evidence195, and it must be relevant to the 
charge or defence. Confessions have been the most common and dominant evidence in 
Japanese law enforcement practice 196  not only in criminal but also in civil cases. 
Therefore, police and public prosecutors focus on obtaining confessions in secretive 
investigation, and rely on this doubtful secretive procedure where the human rights of 
the defendant may be violated. This may happen because of the relative strength of the 
police in investigation and of public prosecutors in indictments as well as the over-
acceptance of confessions by professional judges197. 
The possible solution for this secretive environment could be the introduction of 
video- and audio-recording of full investigation interviews in order to enhance 
transparency in the procedure. The video and audio recording of investigation 
interviews was introduced for the citizen judge cases in May 2016 198 . The new 
technology will bring four main advantages: to prevent coercive confessions; to 
guarantee access to the materials by defence attorney; to provide reliable interrogation 
materials rather than handwritten ones; to review the materials for research use199. 
When the investigation is completed, the police pass the case file to the Public 
Prosecutor’s Office200. The prosecutor has full discretionary power in regard to bringing 
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the indictment201. The prosecutor makes the indictment and sends it to the trial court202. 
The prosecutor has to follow the form determined by the law and to describe the basis 
for reasonable suspicion and evidence against the accused 203 . If necessary, the 
prosecutor will contact the police to collect the missing pieces and obtain sufficient 
information to make a decision on whether or not there is an adequate basis for 
indictment204.  If there is no sufficient ground for suspicion, if the accused’s guilt is of a 
minor nature, or there is no public interest in prosecution, the prosecutor drops the 
case205. By request of the public prosecutor, the case can go to two other different 
criminal procedures, apart from the regular criminal procedure, depending on the 
prescribed penalty. These are a summary order procedure [Ryakushiki tetsuzuki]206, or a 
speedy trial procedure [Sokketsu saiban]207. 
3.2.2.2  Criminal Trials 
Once the indictment has been declared valid, the court, which is assigned to try the 
case, will determine the date for the beginning of the trial and summon the defendant, 
witnesses, and victims,208 in spite of contested or uncontested case. Criminal cases will 
get their initial hearing at any of the courts depending on the offence.  
The current Japanese regular criminal trial procedures are organised into five stages. 
Firstly, the trial procedure starts with an opening procedure which contains four 
processes; personal identification questions 209 , a reading of the indictment 210  an 
announcement of the accused’s rights, and a statement opportunity for the defendant211. 
Secondly, the public prosecutor and defence attorney present evidence on the grounds 
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of the principle that ‘a suspect’s guilt must be proved beyond reasonable doubt’212, 
followed by the third procedure, whereby the prosecutor states the punishments 
he/she thinks appropriate, and the defence attorney presents a final argument. The 
defendant is given the opportunity to make a final statement to give his/her point of 
view. Fourthly, the judges deliberate on the evidence presented during the hearing and 
reach a verdict. Lastly, the professional judges make a written judgment of their views 
and any penalty and the judgment will be accepted by the court.  
The public prosecutor or the defendant/defence attorney may appeal 213  by 
submission of application for appeal to the District Court within 14 days after the 
judgement was declared214. In addition, the statement of reasons for appeal must be 
submitted215. Article 384 of CCP restricts an appeal only to the existence of at least one 
of the grounds in the provisions of Article 377 through 382 and Article 383 of CCP. For 
example if there was a violation of laws and regulations in the court proceedings and it 
is clear that this violation has affected the judgment, or facts which appear in the case 
records and evidence examined by the appeal court216. If an appeal is not made by the 
public prosecutor or the defence, the decision is finalised.  
3.2.2.3  Executions 
There are a range of penalties in the Japanese criminal justice system. The five major 
penalties are the death penalty, imprisonment with labour, imprisonment without 
labour, penal detention, and fines 217. The execution of penalties is directed by a public 
prosecutor218. However, a death penalty is executed by the order of the Minister of 
Justice219 under the observations of a public prosecutor, a public prosecutor’s assistant 
officer, and the head of a penal institution220. According to the 2015 White Paper on 
Crime, the number of death penalty sentences decreased from 13 to 2 from 2005 to 
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2014, and during this period, the number of life imprisonments also decreased from 119 
to 23. The number of inmates in prisons increased from 1993 and 2002, but decreased 
from 2005 to 2014221. The prison rate in 2014 was 67.1 in 2014222. The rate of inmates 
released on expiration of their prison term was 43.5%, or 10,726, in 2014223. Probation 
is one of the alternative criminal sanctions, if a defendant satisfies the conditions224. In 
addition, suspension of execution of the sentence can be applied for a period of not less 
than one year but not for more than five years, if a defendant satisfies the conditions 225. 
For instance, this occurs when a person has been sentenced to imprisonment with or 
without labour for not more than three years or a fine of not more than 500,000yen, if 
a person was not previously sentenced to imprisonment without labour or a severe 
punishment 226 . The number of persons released from prisons in 2014 was 25,905 
including 298 who died in prisons, 43.5% was the percentage of people who fulfilled 
his/her prison service, and 56.5% for those who were released on parole227. 
The Correction Bureau and the Rehabilitation Bureau are dependent on the Ministry 
of Justice. There are eight Regional Correction Headquarters which supervise the 
correctional institutions including penal institutions, such as prisons, juvenile prisons, 
and detention houses, and juvenile correctional institutions, such as juvenile training 
schools and classification homes228. It is necessary to guarantee that these institutions 
provide appropriate living conditions and hygienic and health management for 
inmates229. By the reforms of the 1908 Prison Law230 in 2006 and 2007, the treatment of 
inmates were improved, guaranteeing such inmates’ right to meet with visitors, acts 
related to religions, and access to books and magazines231.  
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3.3.3 Actors in a Criminal Trial Procedure: Public Prosecutors, Professional Judges, 
Defence Attorneys, Defendants 
The major actors in the criminal trial procedure in Japan are public prosecutors, 
judges, defence attorneys, and defendants. The relationship between the two legal 
enforcements; the public prosecutor office and the courts tend to be regarded as very 
intimate because of their close and secretive working routine concerning criminal 
procedure232. All legal professionals, public prosecutors, judges, and defence attorneys 
must be law school graduates following the judicial reform in 1999 and must pass the 
bar exam233. The number of public prosecutors, professional judges, and attorneys in 
2014 was 1,877, 2,944, and 35,045, and the percentages of women were 23.1%, 21.4%, 
and 18.1%234. The figures shows a male-dominated tendency in the legal professionals. 
3.3.3.1 Prosecutors 
Prosecutors have a broad fact-finding authority in the Japanese system. They have 
the sole power to initiate and suspend prosecutions. In addition, the prosecutor 
complies the evidence dossier and the professional judge relies heavily on the dossier 
throughout the trial. The Japanese prosecutors have a perfect track record of 
convictions for all cases brought to trial, and this leads to careful screening of cases by 
the prosecutors 235 . The Public Prosecutor’s Office is an attached organisation, 
administered by the Ministry of Justice. The Office consists of the Supreme Public 
Prosecutors’ Office, 8 High Public Prosecutors’ Offices with 6 branches, 50 District Public 
Prosecutors’ Offices with 203 branches, and 438 Local District Public Prosecutors’ 
Office236 . They aim at maintaining national security and their motto is impartiality, 
fairness, and respect for human rights237. The public prosecutors and public prosecutors’ 
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assistant officers carry out investigations, determine whether suspects should be 
indicted or not in criminal cases, supervise law enforcement, and have the 
representative authority to represent the public interest in relation to a variety of laws238.   
3.3.3.1.1 A Prosecutorial Review Commission [Kensatsu Shinsakai] 
A Prosecutorial Review Commission (PRC)239, composed of eleven members who 
were selected from the electoral register, had been the existing form of lay participation 
in Japanese criminal justice.  This was introduced in the post-war reforms as a ‘Japanese 
version of the American grand jury with the specific function of reviewing and assessing 
the propriety of prosecutors’ indictment decisions.’240 The Commission was to examine 
the prosecutors’ decisions to order an arraignment or not and the development of the 
prosecution proceedings241. The Commission was regarded as having a unique role to 
possibly counteract and control the power of the prosecutors. Moreover, unlike criminal 
trials, the procedure does not apply the concept of the careful and detailed judiciary 
administration242.  
The improvements to the review/moderation of the Prosecution system were 
proposed to be legally binding in the 1999 Judicial Reform 243. Fukurai emphasises the 
importance of this being legally binding because lay participation will provide a moral 
element including ‘their sense of justice, fairness, and accountability’ in the deliberation 
of criminal cases even against Japanese powerful companies, elites or where people 
related to the government are often involved244. In cases where the PRC determines that 
indictment was the correct and fair course of action, the prosecutors must reconsider if 
they decided not to indict. After that, if they still decide not to prosecute within three 
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months, then the PRC will reconsider the case245. Defence attorneys must be involved 
in the reconsideration of the indictment decision 246 . If the PRC still considers that 
indictment was the appropriate and fair decision, then the public prosecutor is obliged 
to attend the PRC conference and present the argument for his or her opinion. If more 
than eight members vote to prosecute247, the case will proceed248. The major argument 
about this system is the publicity about the investigating process of the PRC249. There is 
no way to examine the process because during the investigating procedure, - the 
confidentiality of the case before indictment or if there is to be no indictment – has to 
be protected. 
The PRC’s mandate is to check the broad range of prosecutorial discretion, while 
another way to check it is through the superior prosecutors’ supervision. The powerful 
exercise of prosecutorial discretion in Japan, underlined by the importance of a 
defendant’s confession and expressions of remorse 250 , is criticised by many 
researchers 251 , including Foote 252 , because of the possible abuse of prosecutorial 
discretion. In addition to indictment, prosecutors are entitled to recommend 
sentences253 and suspend prosecution, as article 248 of the CCP states that ‘prosecution 
need not be institute owing to the character, age, environment, gravity of the offence, 
circumstances or situation after the offence’. The great acceptance of a defendant’s 
confession obtained at the investigation stage by professional judges is often mentioned 
by researchers as a problematic relationship between professional judges and 
prosecutors. Moreover, the excessive dependence on prosecutors tends to be proved 
by high conviction rates. Two reasons the conviction rate is high are suggested by 
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Ramseyer and Rasmusen: professional judges’ avoidance of acquittal because of 
negative impacts on their career, and prosecutorial discretion for case selection 
supported by high prosecution budgets254. The PRC can therefore be seen as part of the 
increase in lay adjudication, embodying the lay elements of democracy in the Japanese 
criminal justice system like citizen judges and executing their legally-binding decision. 
3.3.3.2 Professional Judges  
There are four kinds of inferior courts: the Summary Courts, the Family Courts, the 
District Courts, and the High Courts255. The Summary Courts handle civil cases involving 
claims which do not exceed ¥140,000 (£1014.49) 256  and criminal cases related to 
offences punishable by fines or lighter penalties, and civil conciliation257. There are 438 
locations nationwide. The Family Courts, situated in 50 locations nationwide, handle 
family and juvenile cases, and some civil cases related to personal status, such as divorce 
actions, and perpetuation258 are handled in the Family Courts259. The District Court, 
which holds citizen judge trials, handles at first instance most types of civil and criminal 
cases. They are situated in 50 locations nationwide with branch offices in 203 locations. 
The High Courts handle appeals filed against judgments rendered by the District Courts, 
Family Courts, or Summary Courts. The Supreme Court is the highest and final court that 
handles appeals filed against judgements rendered by the High Courts. The 1947 
Constitution defines the independence of the judiciary of the Supreme Court and the 
inferior courts260, which was not provided for in the Meiji Constitution261, and it also 
prohibits any attempts at influence from the executive branch on the final judicial 
power262. 
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Professional judges are actively involved in investigating the facts of the case, which 
is characteristic of the inquisitorial approach. Professional judges of the District Courts 
are appointed by the Supreme Court263, and they are not removed except by public 
impeachment unless judicially declared mentally or physically incompetent to perform 
official duties 264 . Executive organisations or agencies cannot dismiss professional 
judges265. A district court handles cases through a single judge266, except for some cases, 
such as crimes punishable with the death penalty, or life imprisonment with or without 
labour for not less than one year267. Judges have the duty to interpret the law, and the 
probative value of evidence is left fully to their free discretion268. The decisions of higher 
courts have a certain influence on the inferior courts although they are not bound by 
any higher courts’ decision.  
 
3.3.3.3 Defence Attorneys 
Defence attorneys, described as lawyers [Bengoshi] are allowed to provide legal 
counselling and represent clients in the legal processes. There are no clear delineated 
qualifications between criminal defence attorneys and civil case attorneys in Japan. The 
suspect/defendant may appoint a defence attorney at any time269, and the attorney shall 
be appointed from qualified attorneys270. They must register their name in the roll of 
attorneys held by the Japan Federation Bar Association, after passing the bar exam271. 
Their duties are to engage in acts relating to lawsuits, and objections, requests for re-
examination, appeals, and other petitions against administrative agencies and other 
general legal services upon the request of a defendant,272 in order to achieve social 
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justice by protecting fundamental human rights 273 . Therefore, a defence attorney 
represents the defendant in their defence against a public prosecutor’s allegation. 
The importance of the independence of the judiciary led to the protection of the role 
of defence attorneys in criminal trials and created a ‘tripartite adversarial system’274. In 
fact, judicial independence was a major concern of post-war judicial reform275. However, 
according to Ramseyer et al’s comparative study of the U.S. and Japan, the Japanese 
lower-court judges are under the control of politicians, the Supreme Court and the 
Secretariat, because of their great influence on judges’ careers276. On the other hand, 
Haley claims that the Japanese judiciary are independent of political interference rather 
than economic and social influence277. In short, because there is one dominant party in 
the politics, Japanese professional judges’ lack independence,278 and in this respect, the 
absence of competing political parties means that the judiciary institutions are mainly 
under the control of the government. The famous Sunagawa case in 1959279 revealed 
the extent of governmental control over the Supreme Court. Its Chief Justice gave an 
acquittal in the trial concerning whether the planned expansion of the U.S. military’s 
Sunagawa air base was a violation of the Constitution or not. The U.S. National Archives 
and Records Administration revealed that the U.S. government put pressure on the 
Chief Justice. In addition to this, the active influence of the Prime Minister on the 
appointment of the Supreme Court Chief Justice implies government control over trial 
judgments, for example, as in the National Agriculture and Forestry Labour Union 
Performance of Police Functions Act Case 280 . The Chief Justice reached a verdict in 
accordance with government policy. Upham insists that ‘Japanese judges are not 
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independent and never have been’281 because of the tightly disciplined and bureaucratic 
nature of the Japanese judiciary. In addition, the relationship between prosecutors and 
professional judges is close because they train together after passing the bar exam282 as 
well as sharing the common institutional orientations which, for example, strongly 
discourage the acquittal of defendants283. Japanese professional judges are considered 
as a ‘highly-educated, well-trained elite group’ having great competence and a positive 
attitude, and this implies that they are great fact-finders 284 . However this view is 
criticised by some supporters of a lay adjudication system who consider the judges to 
be biased and incompetent285. Meanwhile, Ito refers to the unique Japanese elitism in 
the Supreme Court as a ‘benign elite’286 to explain the ‘judicial contributions to the 
efficacious, self-restrained, conservative elite governance’287. 
3.3.3.4 Defendants 
The lack of protection of the rights of defendants in the Japanese criminal procedure 
is a serious problem. As is internationally recognised, the defence usually suffers from a 
strong bias towards prosecution,288 although the legislation in Japan proclaims equality 
of power for the prosecution and the defence as well as protection of the defendant’s 
rights. A speedy and fair trial is also guaranteed and the trial is based on the obligation 
of the CCP find the truth. 289  In addition, the fundamental human rights set by 
international standards, declared in international treaties, such as the right to counsel290, 
the right to silence291, and the presumption of innocence292 are required in the Japanese 
criminal procedure. 
                                                          
281Upham, supra note 151, 422. 
282Court Act, Act no. 59 of 1947, Chapter 4, Section 3. In the process after passing the bar exam, all 
candidates for professional judges, pubic prosecutors, and defence attorneys are trained together. 
283S Miyazawa, ‘Introduction: An Unbalanced Adversary System - Issues, Policies, and Practices in Japan, 
in Context and in Comparative Perspective’, The Japanese Adversary System in Context (NY; Palgrave 
Macmillan 2002), 3. 
284R Lempert, ‘A Jury For Japan ?’ (1992) 40 The American Journal of Comparative Law 37–71, 48. 
285KM Clermont and T Eisenberg, ‘Trial by Jury or Judge: Transcending Empiricism’ (1992) 77 Cornell L. 
Rev. 1124–1177, 1172. 
286H Ito, The Supreme Court and Benign Elite Democracy in Japan (Surrey; Ashgate 2010). 
287Ibid, 16. 
288De Haes and Gijsels v. Belgium 1997, (7/1996/686/809), para. 53.  
289CCP, art. 1. 
290Ibid, art. 36. 
291Ibid, art. 198(2). 
292Ibid, art. 336. 
110 
 
However, the defendant in Japanese criminal proceedings seems to suffer serious 
threats to his or her human rights. Fukurai and Kurosawa point out that the conviction 
rate was over 99% and there are serious human rights issues in the light of forced 
confessions, their acceptance as evidence, and limited access to a defence attorney293. 
Although the defendant has the right to remain silent, in the majority of cases, the right 
is often in danger of violation294. The defendant often provides a statement without use 
of this right295.  
In addition, the rare use of the bail system for the accused and the 
defendant’s/defence attorney’s limited rights to access evidence which is not presented 
at trial by the prosecutor, indicates the restrictions of the defence position in Japanese 
criminal proceedings296. Bail, rather than pre-trial custody, rates continued to decrease 
between 1998 and 2004, and by more than 20% in 2011297, while the English rate was 
47% in 2006 and 54% in 2010298. The decrease was said to be due to an increase in the 
amount of bail money 299. It is the responsibility of the public prosecutor to provide an 
opportunity for the defence to inspect the evidence and to adhere to the defendant or 
defence attorney’s rights 300 . However, the responsibility of the public prosecutor 
regarding disclosure of evidence is not written down in Japanese law. Therefore, it is at 
the discretion of the prosecution 301 . The Japanese Supreme Court denied such 
responsibility in 1959, although it accepted that the defendant or defence attorney was 
entitled to make a claim to the court for the disclosure of evidence if the case fitted four 
conditions.302  The conditions are that: the case had not reached a verdict, there was no 
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tangible reason for the claim, disclosure is especially important for the defence strategy, 
and there is no risk of the evidence being destroyed or of a witnesses being 
intimidated303. Only if at least one condition is met, the defence is eligible to claim a 
disclosure of evidence.  
The principle of the equality of arms before the court, which ‘means that the same 
procedural rights are to be provided to all the parties unless distinctions are based on 
law and can be justified on objective and reasonable grounds, not entailing actual 
disadvantage or other unfairness to the defendant.’304 This is missing in the Japanese 
criminal justice system because of the emphasis on the careful and detailed judiciary 
administration, which underlies Japanese mixed legal traditions. There are obvious gaps 
between Western inspired and Japanese ingenious law and legal procedure. Both co-
exist in the Japanese criminal justice system. Western inspired human rights guarantees 
were introduced in the Japanese criminal justice system because of the establishment 
of the 1946 Constitution drafted under the observation of General 
Headquarters/Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers (GHQ). By contrast, some 
parts of laws and legal procedures are not pertinent to the Western inspired concepts. 
For example, 1908 prison law305 had been practiced until the replacement of a new law 
in 2005306. The 1908 Prison Law used to be the oldest statute in the world and is 
controversial from a human rights’ point of view, such as ‘substitute prison system 
(Daiyo Kangoku), physical prison conditions and rules, minor solitary confinement, 
protection cells’ as Vize pointed out307. Furthermore, overreliance on confessions gained 
in the investigation phase in the Japanese criminal justice system is controversial308. 
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Article 319 of the CCP and Article 38(2) of the 1947 Constitution emphasise the 
‘voluntariness’ of confession is required309 from a human rights perspective [Jinken yogo 
setsu]. Moreover, it is a common belief that the admissibility of confessions should be 
evaluated by the voluntariness and legitimate procedure of obtaining a confession, as 
Sekiguchi suggested310. Forced confessions in the investigation phase were historically 
valid. Although forced confessions violate the Constitution and the CCP, its practice is 
still noted311.   
Regarding the reliability of confessions, it is interesting to point out the different 
interview styles police officers use as interrogation methods. As Wachi and Watanabe 
et al claimed 312 , Japanese police officers tend to use a ‘Relationship-focused 
interviewing style’, which means that interviewers develop relationships with 
interviewees (suspects) to create respect, trust and confessions by ‘talking about their 
personal experiences, allowing [interviewees] to understand [interviewers’] 
professionalism and their sincere desire to understand and seek the truth’313. This seems 
to be a unique feature that used different cultural psychology from the West. While 
Westerners emphasised ‘the independent view of self’ in society, Japanese people 
(Eastern Asians) valued ‘an interdependent view of self’314. This Japanese characteristic 
illustrates the intimate personal connection between interviewers and interviewees to 
obtain confessions. However, it seems to be hard to believe that If strong personal 
connection exists, the validity of confessions will be upheld. 
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 Thaman points out that the six adversarial principles align with the international 
human rights standard, including the equality of arms. These are the presumption of 
innocence, the privilege not to self-incriminate, the right to a public and oral trial, the 
accusatory principle, and independence of the judge from the executive (investigative 
agency)315. The introduction of the citizen judge system was expected to enhance these 
adversarial principles in the Japanese criminal procedures - which were already 
supposed to be present theoretically in the 1947 Constitution - and eventually achieve 
the model criminal justice system which the JRC proposed. 
This section highlights that laws and actors in Japanese criminal justice are inspired 
by Western countries, in particular Germany and the US, and share concepts of human 
rights and democracy, referred to in the 1907 Constitutions and the CCP. However, the 
Japanese criminal justice system retains specific features that conflict with the concepts. 
Haley’s and Foote’s studies criticised the over-emphases on confessions,316 the presence 
of the suspect’s/defendant’s repentance317, and a broad prosecutorial discretion318 and 
adherence to due process norms of fairness leading to powerful bureaucratic controls319. 
These elements have been inherited through the historical developments of Japanese 
laws and legal systems and connected with Japanese legal and societal cultures, such as 
collectivism and authoritarianism320, so it is apparent that the citizen judge system 
underpins the concepts of democracy rather than the Japanese indigenous cultures. 
However, a lay adjudication system constitutionally and statutorily fits the Japanese 
criminal justice system. Moreover, to develop the indigenous legal and societal cultures 
meeting the concepts of democracy, lay adjudication that will promote legal and social 
changes321 appears to be significant and effective.  
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3.4  The Establishment of the Judicial Reform Council (JRC) 
As noted Chapter 1, the JRC was set up during the period in office of the 84th Prime 
Minister, Keizo Obuchi, in order to ‘consider fundamental measures necessary for 
judicial reform and judicial infrastructure arrangement by defining the role of the 
judicature in Japan in the twenty-first century’322. The Japan-U.S. Structural Impediments 
Initiative (SII) triggered a review of the Japanese economic system following the 
beginning of the reform programme: Six Sweeping Changes [Rokudai Kaikaku] ranged 
over six subjects. These were: administrative reform, fiscal restructuring, social security 
reform, economic structural reform, financial system reform, and educational reform323. 
The judicial reforms were influenced by the theme of the Six Sweeping Changes 
grounded in three fundamental principles: liberty, fairness, and globalisation 324 . 
Members of the JRC were selected from diverse backgrounds, both academics and 
practitioners, and this demonstrated the government’s intention to reflect public 
opinion in the reform325. The JRC announced that the public should build a free and fair 
society with mutual cooperation and autonomous responsibility through simple, 
efficient, and transparent government procedures to accomplish important 
administrative functions effectively 326 . Moreover, on this basis, the public could be 
empowered to contribute to the development of an international society327. As a result, 
they recommended four focuses for the judicial reforms: the reform of the legal training 
system328; the establishment of the Japanese Legal Support Centre329, the reform of legal 
proceedings; and the reform of the Lawyers Act330. 
The JRC sought to provide a reconstructed legal framework for Japan in the context 
of the globalised future which would require all Three Pillars of the Judicial System 
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Reform. Firstly, the construction of a justice system responding to public expectations 
(coordination of its institutional base) was required; secondly, a legal profession 
supporting the justice system (the expansion of the human base); and lastly the 
establishment of the popular base (lay participation in the judicial system)331. The CCC, 
consisting of eleven legal professionals and academics, sat between 2002 and 2004 in 
parallel with the JRC to engage in making a plan and drafting the Citizen Judge Act. The 
intended target of the citizen judge system was introduced but it would have to be 
compatible with the existing criminal procedures and seek a form of lay adjudication 
system compatible with the Japanese traditions. In order to understand how the citizen 
judge system is to work in practice, it is essential to examine the Japanese legal 
traditions enshrined within the criminal procedures. 
 
3.5 Aims and Desired Impact of Introduction of the Citizen Judge System 
3.5.1  The Aims of the 1999 Judicial Reform 
Reviews of the Japanese criminal justice system were undertaken by the JRC to 
determine the Recommendations of the Justice System Reform Council in 2001 332 . 
Chapter 6 of the recommendation clarifies the key points what should be targeted to 
reform the shape of an ideal justice system for future Japanese society. The aims have 
been: 
a) to be a more usable, understandable, reliable, and accessible system with 
fairer, more proper and more prompt proceedings; 
b) to develop a legal professional training and recruiting system to support 
legal professionals to gain the rich legal, ethical, and cultural knowledge 
necessary to play active roles in various areas of society; 
c) to provide education for people about the justice system by means of public 
participation in legal proceedings and support for the system333. 
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With these ambitious fundamental aims, a wide range of reforms to the justice system 
took place.  
3.5.2  Targeted Features 
A shifting emphasis from the inquisitorial principles to adversarial principles is one of 
the main targets and impacts hoped for by the introduction of the citizen judge system. 
As mentioned above, in the course of the historical developments, the Japanese criminal 
procedures already had the mixture of these two principles before the 1999 Reform, 
similar to many other existing countries’ procedures334. However, Foote claims that 
more strong adversarial approaches by the defence attorneys are necessary335. In order 
to respond to that, moreover, to achieve the aims of the 1999 Reform, a review of the 
basic principle of substantive truth, is necessary.  
3.5.2.1 The Inquisitorial and Adversarial Principles 
The inquisitorial principle [Shokken Shugi] is predominantly practiced in Japanese 
criminal proceedings, although it adopted adversarial principles through its historical 
development 336 . The remaining inquisitorial principle, including the principle of 
substantive truth, and the necessity of legal reasoning for judgements, and judicial 
reviews, leads to high levels of professionalism in the proceedings337. 
Throughout the criminal justice procedure in Japan, public prosecutors and 
professional judges play a central role because of the importance of inquisitorial 
principles, while the equality of actors, in particular the prosecution and the defence, is 
valued in the adversarial methodology. The prosecution in Japan has a high level of 
discretion over decisions throughout the criminal proceedings, from prosecution to the 
presentation of evidence in a trial. Johnson points out the Japanese prosecutors’ main 
interest in seven factors: searching for the truth, deciding an appropriate charge, 
encouraging remorse in offenders, rehabilitating offenders, protecting the public, 
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maintaining consistency, and respecting the suspects’ rights338. Landsman and Zhang 
suggest that the development of the Japanese criminal process in adjudication shows 
the dominance of ‘judge-directed inquisitorial courts’339, for example, the existence of a 
preliminary judgement investigation in the pre-war period340. Moreover, the critical 
importance of the role of searching for the truth by professional judges in the current 
Japanese criminal trial procedure is pointed out by Flaherty341.  
Victims are entitled to participate in more serious criminal trials and ask questions of 
witnesses and defendants because of an increase in the protection of victim’s rights 
after great public attention to murders committed by juvenile defendants 342 . This 
introduction of victim participation tends to be on inquisitorial principles343, and in fact, 
according to Miyazawa, the direct motivation for introducing victim participation in the 
Japanese system came from studies of the French and German systems which are 
influenced by inquisitoriality344. Therefore, there is strong adherence to the inquisitorial 
principle in the existing criminal procedure, even after the reform of 1999. Both the 
introduction of victim participation in 2008345 by the amendment of the CCP in 2007 and 
the citizen judges’ participation from 2009346 in serious criminal cases, seem to illustrate 
the indecisive targets of the reform of 1999. The newly introduced systems have led to 
difficulties in evaluating the impact of each system, and increased possible concerns 
about the citizen judges system. For example, Shirakawa and Karasawa point out the 
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influence of the victim participation on the decisions made by citizen judges. They used 
a simulation study, and concluded that victim participation could lead to a more severe 
penalty in light of the victims’ emotions expressed during the hearing, and concluded 
that victim participation did not influence the level of the sentence, but people opposed 
to victim participation tend to give a more lenient sentence because citizen judges 
realised about the influence of victim participation and try not to be influenced347. 
3.5.2.2 A Meticulous Judicial Administration 
The inquisitorial approach to criminal justice in Japan derives from the careful and 
detailed judicial administration that enables professional judges to pursue the truth in 
their adjudications. However, this also leads to their bias towards the prosecution, 
demonstrating an emphasis on a dossier of evidence, including testimony statements 
made at the investigation phase.  
Professional judges have the right to check the appropriateness of the conduct of the 
investigation 348  and have the responsibility for executing appropriate, smooth and 
prompt criminal procedures349. The evaluation of the probative value of evidence is fully 
dependent on the professional judges350. This can be problematic in the light of the 
protection of the basic rights of the defendants where evidence is obtained through 
unreasonable searches and seizures. Article 319 of the CCP prohibits confession under 
compulsion, torture, and threats after unduly prolonged detention or when there is 
doubt about them being voluntary351. Supreme Court decisions have ruled out the use 
of confessions as evidence obtained under certain situations, such as where the suspect 
is handcuffed 352 or those obtained by promising the suspension of an indictment353. 
Apart from confession, there is no rule about evidence obtained through unreasonable 
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seizures. Therefore, great discretion is given to professional judges on deciding the 
admissibility of evidence. 
The courts have the right to direct and control trial proceedings [Soshō Siki Ken], and 
because of the necessity for swift action, the presiding judge has that right during the 
trial 354 . According to the fundamental principles of a meticulous and judicial 
administration, professional judges do not seem to play a neutral role. Article 312(2)355 
gives professional judges the right to order the public prosecutor to change a count or 
applicable panel, and Article 298356 declares that the professional judge is allowed to 
examine evidence ex officio. It recognises inquisitorial principles in order to seek the 
substantive truth with the imbalanced discretion exercised by professional judges. 
On the other hand, Lay adjudicators play an important role in sustaining the 
adversarial principle in criminal proceedings, although lay adjudication is not 
‘essential’357 for an adversarial trial. The lay adjudication system is not a requirement 
but it can be a catalyst for the development of the culture of criminal justice358. Greer 
presents the four consequences of introducing the Northern Irish Diplock court system: 
an increase in conviction rates; an increase in the inquisitorial style of professional 
judges; an acceptance of vague evidential standards and the meaningless of warnings 
and instructions by judges regarding the credibility of testimony 359. However, while their 
prevalence underlies their significance as tools for promoting the fair trial principle, it 
does not fully explain the balance between the fair trial principle and democracy360. The 
consideration of the fair trial principle appears to lead to the popularity of adversarial 
principles, which have influenced the criminal justice reforms of inquisitorial systems, 
but adversarial systems have also been influenced by inquisitorial ‘truth-finding’ 
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instruments as Jörg et al point out in their study regarding the consideration of the 
ECHR361.  
Adversarial proceedings in the Japanese criminal justice system are guaranteed by 
the Constitution of 3rd of May 1947, introducing three principles were introduced in the 
post-war reforms of the due process of law, the guarantee of the suspect’s/defendant’s 
right to silence, and the presumption of innocence. Firstly, it introduced the principle of 
due process of law. Article 31 of the Constitution guarantees the due process of law 
saying that ‘[n]o person shall be deprived of life or liberty nor shall any other criminal 
penalty be imposed, except according to procedure established by law. Moreover, 
Article 256 of the CCP states that ‘prosecution shall be instituted by submitting the 
charge sheet to the court’362, and ‘[n]o documents or other article which may cause the 
judge to be prejudiced are to be attached or referred to in the charge sheet.’363The 
second principle is for the suspect and defendant to be, guaranteed the right to silence 
and thirdly, the presumption of innocence was introduced. Article 38 of the Constitution 
says ‘[n]o person shall be compelled to testify against himself’, moreover, the CCP also 
declares the accused’s right to remain silent and not to answer particular questions364. 
The presumption of innocence is also guaranteed in the CCP365, which reflected Article 
14(2) of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights which Japan ratified in 
1978. The suspect/defendant is guaranteed their fundamental right to defence as one 
of the parties in criminal proceedings by the introduction of these three principles in the 
post-war reform. The reform introduced the Constitution, and the amendment of the 
CCP provides the fair trial principle, including the three principles as well as the support 
of a court-appointed defence attorney, and the protection of the suspects’ and 
defendants’ many fundamental procedural rights, which are the international standards 
within the Japanese criminal procedure.  
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On the other hand, Suzuki claims that the adversarial system is not equal to the 
principle of due process366 on the basis of disagreement with Matsuo’s theory that there 
are two regimes: a ‘mere adversarial principle’[Tannaru Tōjisha Shugi] and a true 
adversarial principle [Shin no Tōjisha Shugi]367. The mere adversarial principle is a belief 
that litigation should consist of the claims and proof offered by each party - the 
prosecution and the defendant - and the mere adversarial principle is a belief in the due 
process of law 368 . Suzuki claims that the first principle should be considered with 
reference to the concept of the criminal procedure and the other should be considered 
contractually; moreover, he believes that adherence to the adversarial system is 
unnecessary and the importance is to maintain fundamental human rights in the 
procedure369. 
The Japanese model of criminal procedure is a predominantly inquisitorial mode, 
then, with adversarial influences. This mixture derives from its historical development 
and Japanese societal culture. The Japanese system has an inherent paternalism, which 
contrasts with the American adversarial system. Foote talks of ‘benevolent paternalism’, 
illustrating the state’s wide discretion concerning access to information 370, and the 
challenges of strengthening the adversarial approach, and dealing with the restricted 
transparency of the investigation process, and Japanese social collectivist culture 371. 
Judicial reformers have had to confront the challenges of how to align the two different 
legal traditions with the need to create a modernised criminal procedure. This has been 
a difficult process for Japan - undertaking to adopt the lay adjudication system and 
produce successful results.   
The Japanese criminal process was structured with a unique composition of both 
inquisitorial and adversarial principles leading to dependence on judicial power and 
lacking transparency and protection for the suspects/defendants. Moreover democratic 
principles are guaranteed in theory in the legislation, namely the 1947 Constitution, 
                                                          
366S Suzuki, The Fundamental Structure of Criminal Procedure (Tokyo; Seibun Dou 1996), 12. 
367K Matsuo, ‘Fundamental Theory of the Criminal Procedure Law [Keiji Sosho Ho No Kisoriron]’, State 
and Citizen [Kokka to Sitizen] (Tokyo; Yuhikaku 1986), 337. 
368 Ibid. 
369 Suzuki, supra note 366.  
370Foote, supra note 165. 
371 Ibid. 
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where there is the assertion of democracy in Japan. In accordance with the Constitution 
and CCP, adversarial principles such as the independence of the judiciary, an equal 
balance of power between the prosecution and the defendant, have been enjoyed in 
criminal procedures, along with the strong inquisitorial principles of a meticulous and 
methodical administration supported by Japanese social attributes. There is a high 
dependence on the dossier complied from the crime investigation process, and the long 
duration of trials. The average duration of a trial was 9.5 months in 2006 in contested 
cases including pre-trial arrangement meetings372. It seems to be necessary to get rid of 
such problematic situations so that more adversarial principles - orality and immediacy- 
could be injected.  
3.5.3  The Progress of the 1999 Judicial Reform 
The JRC’s recommendation established essential guidance on the five points in the 
criminal justice system373. These are the improvement and speeding up of criminal trials, 
the establishment of a public defence system for suspects and defendants; the role of 
public prosecution; investigations and trial proceedings; and the rehabilitation of 
offenders and protection of victims. Criminal justice reforms were premised on the 
introduction of lay adjudicator participation, and therefore, the introduction of a pre-
trial arrangements procedure, an opening hearing on consecutive days, the introduction 
of principles of orality and immediacy, and the support to achieve them for the courts 
and legal professionals. In short they were the fundamental structures used for the draft 
of the Citizen Judge Act. The principle of orality means that evidence in court should be 
presented in the form of oral testimony rather than a written dossier. In response to the 
deliberations of the pre-trial investigation, the examination of the investigation 
documents, especially the statement documents, would often take hours in the hearing 
and it was rare for a criminal trial to be held on consecutive days before the introduction 
of the citizen judge system. The developments of the principles of orality and immediacy 
will be closely examined in the following chapters. 
                                                          
372 The Supreme Court, ‘A Report on the Criminal Trial Cases, Material 3 [Chihosaibansho Ni Okeru 
Keijisoshojiken Daiisshin No Shinri Jokyo, Siryo 3]’ (Tokyo; 2006) 
<http://www.courts.go.jp/saikosai/vcms_lf/80910004.pdf>, table 10. 
373 JRC, supra note 5, Ch. II, part 2, sec. 1. 
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3.5.3.1 Court-Appointed Defence Attorney System [Kokusen Bengonin Seido]  
The JRC emphasised the importance of protecting the rights of suspects and 
defendants to ensure a fair criminal justice system374. Before the reform, Japan had a 
Court-Appointed Defence Attorney System which is the system where the defendant 
has right to request a defence attorney375; however, after the reform, the suspect had 
the same right by an amendment of the CCP in 2004 376 . To assist this reform, the 
Japanese Judicial support centre [HoTerasu] was established, as a core body for 
comprehensive support with respect to the implementation and establishment of 
support from defence attorneys and related experts’377 , and it provides court-appointed 
attorneys 378 . The expenses and fee would be partially or fully paid by the 
suspect/defendant379. The Court-Appointed Defence Attorney System was established 
by the 2004380 and 2006381 amendments to the CCP, and this service has been provided 
by the Japan Judicial Support Centre, which was also established in the 1999 reform.  
3.5.3.2 Immunity Systems 
The JRC proposed the introduction of new forms of investigations and trial 
proceedings, as well as adversarial principles in juvenile cases. Because of the 
heinousness, complexity, organisation, or internationalisation of crimes, it is necessary 
to update the techniques and proceedings for investigation and hearing evidence in 
trials. The immunity system was introduced into the Japanese criminal justice system in 
2015 by amendment to the CCP382. The prosecutor is able to obtain evidence from a 
witness which will not be used against him or her383. According to Emoto, there are three 
points concerning the immunity system which violate the Constitution. The constitution 
prohibits the defendant from testifying against him/herself, and guarantees equality 
under the law, and the separation of the three powers of the administration, legislation 
                                                          
374 Ibid, sec. 2.  
375 The Constitution, art. 37(3), CCP, art. 36.  
376 The Amendment of CCP, act no. 62of 28/5/2004. 
377 Comprehensive Legal Support Act, act no. 74 of 2004, art. 1. 
378 ibid, art. 38.  
379 Act on the Cost of Criminal Procedure, act no. 40 of 1971, art. 2 (3); Comprehensive Legal Support 
Act, art.39 (2).  
380Act no. 62 of 2004.  
381Act no. 36 of 2006. 
382The 189th congress, 13/03/2015.  
383 CCP, art. 157(2)1. (2)2.  
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and judiciary384. The Japanese investigative procedure already involves enough secrecy 
and the immunity system will lead to even more secrecy in procedures. This appears to 
be a part of the international movement towards plea bargaining. Although arguments 
about its availability have been arisen in the light of the legitimacy of the truth385 and 
the legal ethics of the justice system386, the extensive use of plea bargaining became a 
popular solutions both in domestic and international criminal justice systems387. 
In addition, the internationalisation of the criminal justice system was also proposed 
to improve international cooperation and mutual legal assistance388, support for legal 
enforcement organisations in developing countries, and the advancement of legal 
professionals’ knowledge and techniques to correspond to those of the international 
society389. 
3.5.3.3 How the Legal Professionals Should Support the Justice System 
The JRC recommendations for legal professionals to support the legal system come 
under six headings. These are the legal professional population, the legal training system, 
the lawyers system, the public prosecutor system, the professional judge system, and 
mutual exchanges between the legal professionals390.  
The recommendations suggest increasing the number of successful candidates 
passing the bar examination to reach 3,000 in 2018391, as well as the increasing the 
number of judges, court’ and public prosecution support staff. The lack of professional 
judges has been a long-lasting problem in Japan392. In comparison with other countries, 
the number is low. Before the Judicial Reform 1999, the total number of legal 
                                                          
384M Emoto, ‘Testimony Compelling System on the Basis of Criminal Immunity (5)’ (2012) 62 Myojo Law 
School Journal 31–58. 
385 R Henham, ‘The Ethics of Plea Bargaining in International Criminal Trials’ (2005) 26 Liverpool Law 
Review 209–224. 
386 GB Palermo, MA White, and others, ‘Plea Bargaining: Injustice for All?’ (1998) 42 International 
Journal of Offender Therapy and Comparative Criminology 111–123. 
387 A Pathmanathan, ‘“Round Peg, Square Hole?” The Viability of Plea Bargaining in Domestic Criminal 
Justice Systems Prosecuting International Crimes’ (2013) 13 International Criminal Law Review 319–
384; K Kovarovic, ‘Pleading for Justice : The Availability of Plea Bargaining as a Method of Alternative 
Dispute Resolution at the International Criminal Court’ (2016) 1 Journal of Dispute Resolution 283–308. 
388JRC, supra note 5, ch. II, part 3, . 
389Ibid.  
390Ibid, Part III. 
391ibid, Part III, ch. 1, 1. 
392Y Matsuura, ‘Law and Bureaucracy in Modern Japan’ (1989) 1 Stanford Law Review 1627–1640, 1627. 
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professionals in 1999 was 20,730 in Japan, 941,000 in the U.S., 83,000 in the U.K., 
111,000 in Germany, and 36,000 in France, as the JRC referred393. The realisation of the 
lack of legal professionals during the 1999 Judicial Reform impacted on the reform policy 
devised to increase the number. As a result, the total number of legal professionals in 
2015 in Japan was 35,113394. The number of successful candidates increased between 
2005 and 2015 to reach 2,102, but decreased to 1,810 in 2014395. Although the number 
of successful candidates has started to decrease, the overall number keeps increasing396. 
The number of students in law schools, who are potential candidates for the bar exam, 
started to decrease in 2009 397 . Regarding the legal training system, the JRC 
recommended the introduction of law schools398, a review of the bar examination and a 
legal apprentice system. In 2004, 74 law schools were established. Because of the 
increasing number of lawyers, their salaries decreased and there was a particular 
problem finding salaried job opportunities after passing the bar examination. As a result, 
the Ministry of Justice declared a decrease in the number of successful candidates 
again399. 
The reforms of the lawyer system, the public prosecution, and the judges’ systems 
were aimed to enhance the transparency of administration procedures and payments, 
and lay participation in the systems 400  in relation to the transparency of the Bar 
Association’s administration 401 , the transparency of lawyers’ fees 402 , and lay 
participation in the public prosecution and courts’ management403. 
                                                          
393JRC, supra note 5, Part III, ch. 1, part1. 
394 Cabinet Secretariate Legal Training System Reform Office [Naikakukanbo Hoso Yoseiseido Kaikaku 
suishinshitsu], ‘A Research Report Draft on the Number of Legal Professionals [Hoso Jinko Chosa 
Hokokusho an]’ (2015) , 203 <http://www.cas.go.jp/jp/seisaku/hoso_kaikaku/dai19/siryou4.pdf> 
accessed 5 March 2016. 
395Japan Federation of Bar Association, ‘Lawyer White Paper’ (Tokyo; 2014), 74. 
396Ministry of Justice [Japan], ‘The Population of Legal Professionals’ (2014), 
7,<http://www.moj.go.jp/content/000102262.pdf> accessed 11 September 2015. 
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399In the Ministry of Justice Survey, there are 500 successful candidates could not find a job opportunity. 
See JSRC LDP The Policy Affaires Research Concil, ‘Midterm Report on the Legal Professional Training 
System Reform’ (Tokyo; 2013). 
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The judicial reform in 1999 which impacts on the judicial system include a decrease 
in the number of expected successful candidates for the bar exam, which seems to have 
adjusted to the practice of the newly introduced system, following each amendment to 
seek the best improvement for the Japanese criminal justice system. These adjustments 
appear to reverse the previous system at some points. Significant doubts remain over 
the restricted transparency during the investigation phase and the implementation of 
the immunity system.  
 
Conclusion 
This chapter developed the conceptual framework of the research by examining the 
relationship between the legal traditions and the criminal justice system in Japan 
through consideration of the issues involved in finding a solution in the judicial reforms 
of 1999. As I have argued in Chapter 2, the practice of any lay adjudication system will 
be conditioned by the influence from the political and social context as well as the 
democratic principles emphasised. The legal history and traditions of a country may 
impact on the introduction of a lay adjudication system. Moreover, the democratisation 
of the criminal justice system will affect the culture within the system, which is related 
to the wider society. Considering these issues is vital for an evaluation of the citizen 
judge system. 
The developments in the Japanese criminal justice system have resulted from the 
modernisation and westernisation of the system and, moreover, by adopting and 
blending it with the indigenous legal traditions and social cultures. Therefore, Japan 
faces a criminal justice procedure in flux under the influence of two legal traditions, with 
the formal process guided by an ostensibly adversarial principle. However, the Japanese 
criminal procedure having characteristics from the inquisitorial model, such as the 
powerful public prosecutor’s coercive powers, in particular in the investigation process, 
and professional judges have a dominant role throughout the procedure. The emphasis 
on principles of orality and immediacy appears to be the focus for the introduction of 
the citizen judge system. However, the inquisitorial approaches applied in the procedure 
may rise to the procedural challenges and limit lay adjudicators’ participation.  
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The legal traditions and the historical features that shape Japanese criminal justice 
have conditioned the acceptance of democratisation by injecting more adversarial 
principles, in particular, in the democratisation of the criminal justice system as well as 
the practice of the citizen judge system. However, it is important to observe that the 
citizen judge system is a development of the criminal justice system as a whole. Japan 
has a history of democratising its system piece by piece. A clear picture of the real 
progress of the citizen judge system needs to be illustrated. Therefore the following 
chapter, the Citizen Judge Act will be evaluated to assess what the new system brings to 
the Japanese criminal justice system through applying the evaluation criteria proposed 
in Chapter 2 and this chapter taking a textual approach.  
128 
 
CHAPTER 4  AN EVALUATION OF THE CITIZEN JUDGE 
SYSTEM I 
 
Introduction 
This chapter examines the Citizen Judge Act (CJA) [Saiban-in no Sankasuru Keijisaiban 
ni kansuru Horitsu], promulgated into law in 2004 and evaluates it, applying the 
evaluative criteria for procedural testing proposed in Chapter 2. It is organised into four 
sections. Section 4.1 briefly explains the experience of the jury system between 1928 
and 1943 and examines the reasons for its international influences. Section 4.2 clarifies 
why the citizen judge system tends to be considered as a combination of the mixed judge 
model and the jury model of the lay adjudication system. In Section 4.3 the various 
components of the proposed evaluative criteria to evaluate the citizen judge system as 
a democratic institution are applied to the CJA. This section of the chapter considers the 
manner in which the citizen judges’ participation is being introduced, its compatibility 
with pre-existing laws, in particular the Constitution and the Code of Criminal Procedure 
(CCP), the extent of its correlation with the Japanese principles of criminal procedure 
and of its prospects of being considered meaningful from democratic perspectives. It 
also examines the international influences behind the introduction of both the mixed 
judge and jury model characteristics and possible justifications for the mixture of these 
models as a means of introducing the lay adjudication system and the effectiveness in 
its development. In addition, it assesses the extent to which the CJA has achieved the 
establishment of the citizen judge procedure for managing the targets discussed in 
Chapter 3 before evaluating the practice of the citizen judge system in the next chapter.  
As Lempert noted, identification of the variables of a lay adjudication system is 
significant in evaluating the functions of lay adjudicators in legal decision-making1, while 
Bifulco stressed the importance of the actors involved in citizen participation in the 
                                                          
1 R Lempert, ‘The Internationalization of Lay Legal Decision-Making: Jury Resurgence and Jury Research’ 
(2007) 40 Cornell International Law Journal 477–88, 482. 
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procedures2. The UNODC also suggested eight sets of questions which would determine 
how representative adjudicators are, in order to provide an assessment of a lay 
adjudication system, as referred to in Chapter 2. In this respect, a set of questions 
regarding lay adjudication procedures and the share of responsibilities between the 
actors involved in the procedures need to be answered in order to evaluate the degree 
of the lay adjudicators’ participation3. For example, what kind of cases do they hear?  
How and how many lay adjudicators are chosen? What is the proportion of lay 
adjudicators and professional judges in the lay adjudicator panel? and how are 
responsibilities divided and what is the cooperation between them? What 
responsibilities are allocated to the involved actors associated with the lay adjudicators’ 
participation? What are the conditions for appeal? Is it possible to overturn the verdict 
reached by the lay adjudicator panel? The aim of this chapter is to evaluate the Japanese 
citizen judge procedure established by the CJA and related legislation and to illustrate 
their participation by answering these questions. 
 
4.1 Lay Adjudication in Japan  
The mixed legal traditions have remained a pervasive presence underpinning the 
criminal procedure and the whole criminal justice system. The two legal traditions: civil 
law and common law have often worked in tandem but were influenced by political 
upheaval and judicial reform. Discussions on lay adjudication in criminal cases had taken 
place concerning previous reforms before the most recent one, in 1999. 
Although Boissonarde proposed that the lay adjudication system should be 
introduced into the Japanese system4 and scholars in the eighteenth century referred to 
the English jury system as an ‘excellent institution’5, the Japanese government did not 
introduce lay adjudication because of the immaturity of the Japanese legal system, for 
                                                          
2 L Bifulco, ‘Citizen Participation, Agency and Voice’ (2013) 16 European Journal of Social Theory 174–
187 
3 Ibid. 
4  GE Boissonade, Projet de Code de Procédure Criminelle Pour l’Empire Du Japon, Accompagne D’un 
Commentaire (Tokyo, Japan; 1882), 498-502. 
5T Osatake, The Japanese Jury History in the Meiji Era [Japanese] (Tokyo; Kokodo 1926), 18; Y Fukuzawa, 
Complete Work of Fukuzawa Yukichi (1) [Japanese] (Tokyo; Iwanami 1969), 40. 
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example, the lack of a defence attorney and the difficulty of obtaining witnesses6. In 
addition, a coercive confession by torture was accepted as evidence in trials, and physical 
coercion was applied in formal investigations until 18827. Therefore, because of the 
necessity of organising the legal system first, as well as the opposition from the Grand 
Council of State, Kowashi Inoue, a lay adjudication system was not introduced. Moreover, 
the lack of democratic principles8 and an elitist approach and scepticism towards lay 
people9 prevented its introduction. 
4.1.1  The Jury System between 1928 and 1943 
The Jury Act [Baishin Ho] was issued on 18th of April in 192310 under the democratic 
movement in the Taisho era, and was triggered by Taisho Democracy and Taisho 
Liberalism, and was enforced from 1st of October 1928. In the jury system. All cases 
which could result in the death penalty, life imprisonment with or without hard labour 
were tried by jury trial, and cases with penalties of over three years imprisonment could 
be tried by jury trial if the defendant so wished11. The defendant had the right to waive 
a jury trial12. The jury consisted of 12 jurors who were Japanese male citizens over thirty 
years old and who had paid their national taxes13  over the previous two years. There 
were three reasons why the jury system was suspended after 10 years. First, the legal 
professionals, professional judges, public prosecutors and defence attorneys had a 
negative attitude towards the practice of the jury system. Because of the elaborate 
preparation and proceedings, they advised defendants to waive their rights to a jury 
trial 14 . Second, with a guilty verdict, the defendant had to pay the costs of the 
proceedings in a jury trial if the defendant claimed the right to a jury trial15. Third, jury 
                                                          
6K Kume, ‘The Report on the France Inspection Tour 1’ (Tokyo; Taiheikan Kiroku 1878), 18; K Kume, The 
Report on the France Inspection Tour 3 (Tokyo; Taijokan 1878), 145. 
7M Egi, ‘The Constitution and the Jury System’, Reihai Zenshu (4) (Tokyo; Reihai Zenshu Press 1927), 27. 
8Boissonade, supra note 12, 72. 
9K Inoue, ‘Opinions about the Jury System’, Legal Arguments: about the jury system (Tokyo; 
Mukenshoya 1927). 
10Act No. 50 of 1923. 
11Ministry of Justice [Japan], ‘The Jury System in Japan’ (2015) 
<http://www.moj.go.jp/keiji1/saibanin_koho_gallery02.html> accessed 27 August 2015. 
12Ibid. 
13 The amount of tax was 3 yen, which quite expensive at that time.  See, T Maruta, ‘The Criminal Jury 
System in Imperial Japan and the Contemporary Argument for Its Reintroduction’ (2001) 72 Revue 
internationale de droit pénal 215–224. 216-7. 
14 Ibid. 
15 Ibid. 
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trials, which required a lot of effort and cost, were avoided because of the expense of 
war damages16 that had to be required. In short, the jury system ‘was unpopular, costly 
to maintain and, because in the war situation there was a lack of prospective jurors as 
the overwhelming majority of men over the age of thirty holding Japanese citizenship 
had joined the army’17. It was regarded as an unsuitable and inappropriate system for 
the Japanese people at that time, and, therefore, the system was considered a failure18. 
In addition to the unpopularity of the jury system, the authoritarian rule by the Japanese 
government, in particular in the early 1940s, leading to a ‘deformed public sphere’19, 
abolished the jury system.  In addition, as Maruta stated, although there were repeated 
arguments about the re-introduction of the jury system after the war, it did not happen 
because of the two major issues of the high reliability of professional judges and 
Japanese culture, which lacks a sense of the rights and responsibilities of citizens20. 
In the post-war reforms, the jury system did not remain in the new Constitution. 
Because of the aim of democratisation arising from the American influence, the 
Constitutional Problem Committee on 13 October 1945, was established. The drafts by 
the Committee were supervised by SCAP, who suggested adding an article regarding the 
jury system21.  However, the jury system was not stipulated in the second draft and the 
final version of the Constitution. Koba has claimed two possible reasons for this. The 
first possible reason was that SCAP considered that the jury system would prevent the 
smooth operation of the occupation policy, and the other reason was that SCAP 
regarded that the word ‘tribunal’ in Article 37(1) of the Constitution included a jury trial22. 
In the process of drafting the Constitution, the reintroduction of the jury system was 
rejected by most members of the Commission and the Minister for Foreign Affairs ad 
                                                          
16 Japan had a series of wars in the 1920s, 1930s and 1940s, such as the First World War starting in 
1914, the Second Sino-Japanese War in 1937, and the Second World War in 1941. See P Cave, 
‘Japanese Colonialism and the Asia-Pacific War in Japan’s History Textbooks: Changing Representations 
and Their Causes’ (2012) 47 Modern Asian Studies 542–580. 
17A Dobrovolskaia, ‘Japan’s Past Experiences with the Institution of Jury Service’ (2010) 12 Asian-Pacific 
Law & Policy Journal 1–23, 17. 
18 Ibid, 217. 
19 ME Berry, ‘Public Life in Authoritarian Japan’ (1998) 127 Daedalus 133–165, 136-7. 
20 Dobravolskaia, supra note 17, 221. 
21Y Koba, ‘The Jury System and the Citizen Judge System [Baishinho to Saibanin Seido]’ 13–22 
<file:///C:/Users/Owner/Downloads/KJ00006611300.pdf> accessed 15 August 2015, 16-7. 
22Ibid.  
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interim referred to the unsuccessful practice of the jury system in the pre-war period 
and doubted the compatibility of Japanese cultural characteristics with the system23. The 
Jury Act has been suspended since 1943. Therefore, Japan had not had a lay adjudication 
system in criminal cases until the citizen judge system was introduced in 2009. 
 
4.2  Reasons for International Influences on the CJA 
Japan introduced the citizen judge system based on an international model, namely 
the English, U.S., French, Germany lay adjudication systems. Considerable studies on 
various lay adjudication systems were undertaken during the drafting process of the CJA. 
When the Judicial Reform Council (JRC) proposed the introduction of a lay adjudication 
system, the JRC declared that reviews of the historical background, systems and 
practical terms and conditions of the system adopted in the Western countries should 
be considered24. In fact, The Japanese government sent research teams to England 
(London), U.S. (New York, Washington D.C., and Seattle), France (Paris and Bordeaux), 
German (Köln and Munich)25 in order to conduct investigations into hearings in 200026. 
The team visited the Ministry of Justice, the court, the law school, the Bar Association 
and law firms in each place to study their basic structures, their implementations, 
contentious issues and the advantages of both the legal systems and the lay adjudication 
systems27. The result of the research reports from these visits highlighted the high cost 
of the all systems, the decline of the usage of the system (England/Wales), the 
incompetence of the lay judges (Germany), the reform of the systems (England/Wales 
and France), the use of the voir dire system (the U.S.), judicial appointment systems 
(France, Germany and the U.S.) and legal education systems (France and Germany)28. 
The examination and adaptation of other legal systems is a common methods used in 
                                                          
23 Ibid.  
24 Judicial Reform Council, For the Judicial Reform : The Points of Contentions (Shihoseido kaikaku ni 
mukete: ronten seiri) (Tokyo, 1999) , at 10. available at the website: 
http://www.kantei.go.jp/jp/sihouseido/pdfs/1221ronten.pdf. 
25 The JRC, ‘Outline of the International Research Trips’ 
<http://www.kantei.go.jp/jp/sihouseido/sonota/kaigai/gaiyou.html> accessed 24 May 2016. 
26 The reports from the research trips are available at the website: 
http://www.kantei.go.jp/jp/sihouseido/etc-dex.html. 
27 Ibid.  
28 Ibid. 
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the drafting of Japanese laws, as the two historical Japanese legal systems developments 
show, as described in the previous chapter. 
After studying other systems, the drafters of the CJA aimed to focus on building the 
best lay adjudication system to introduce into the existing Japanese criminal justice 
procedure. Some constructive suggestions were introduced at the planning stage by the 
comparative study, and the main recommendations was made to adopt the American 
jury system and the German system 29 . While Maruta advocated the American jury 
system because of the high Japanese conviction rate and the desire to maintain the 
Japanese criminal procedure tradition, in particular the careful and detailed judiciary 
administration30, Langbein recommended the German system because of its efficiency 
and accuracy in fact-finding31. In addition, the chief member of the Citizen Judge System 
and Criminal Justice Investigative Commission (CCC), Masahito Inoue, pointed out that 
‘we should not focus on which model, the jury model or the mixed judge model, should 
be adopted or which foreign system should be adopted.’32 However, it is noteworthy 
that Inoue’s knowledge of the Japanese justice system and its legal traditions impacted 
throughout the course of both the introduction of the citizen judge system and the 
drafting of the CJA. He has been a high-profile legal figure in Japan, having Japanese and 
American educational backgrounds, and is considered to be an expert in Japanese 
criminal justice procedures. He continues to contribute to the development of Japanese 
criminal justice as a member of many governmental committees including the JRC and 
the CCC.  This may account for his decisions to base the CJA on the CCP, of which he has 
specialist knowledge and expertise 33 . Although the CJA did not emerge as a legal 
transplant from particular provisions, the CJA is largely sourced from Inoue’s report. 
                                                          
29 See, A Dobrovolskaia, ‘Japan’s Past Experiences with the Institution of Jury Service’ (2010) 12 Asian-
Pacific Law & Policy Journal 1–23, 3; M Ibusuki, ‘" Quo Vadis?: First Year Inspection to Japanese Mixed 
Jury Trial’ (2010) 12 Asian-Pacific Law & Policy Journal 24–330, 28; T Maruta, ‘Japanese Nationality 
Argument and the Mixed Court System: Is the Mixed Court System Appropriate for Japan? [Nihonjin No 
Kokuminsei to Sannshinnseido: Sanshinnsei Ha Nihonjin Ni Muiteiruka?]’ (2000) 51 Law and Politics 
[Hou to Seiji] 163–213; Thaman, ‘Japan’s New System of Mixed Courts: Some Suggestions Regarding 
Their Future Form and Procedures’. 
30Ibid. 
31JH Langbein, ‘Mixed Court and Jury Court : Could the Continental Alternative Fill the American Need ?’ 
(1981) 6 American Bar Foundation Research Journal 195–219, 195. 
32 JRC, ‘The 30th JRC Conference Proceedings’, Judicial Reform Council Metting (Tokyo; JRC 2000). 
33 See his profile on the website: http://members3.jcom.home.ne.jp/masinouye/framepageprofile.html 
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Thus the very first draft of the CJA submitted showed the clear influence of other legal 
systems34. For instance, the report suggested a citizen judge panel which consisted of 
three professional judges and four citizen judges, which is the same as the French and 
German system35. Moreover, the fundamental contents of the CJA appear to be based 
substantially on his report, despite the fact that it omitted some details, such as the size 
of the fine to be imposed on citizen judges for the violation of confidentiality36. as a 
result, very different lay adjudication systems’ influences were indirectly imported into 
the CJA. 
As a consequence of the legal traditions and international influences that led to the 
drafting of the CJA, it is the mixed features of both the mixed judge and jury models 
which have impacted on the degree of the citizen judges’ participation. The collaborative 
structure of the citizen judge panel as well as the civil law tradition in the Japanese 
criminal procedure satisfy the definition of a mixed judge model of lay adjudication 
system identified in this research. The Japanese citizen judge system is the product of 
borrowing selected existing lay adjudication systems provisions and adapting and 
making them compatible with the pre-existing criminal procedure. There are also 
inherited incompatible principles, derived from the Japanese civil law tradition, which 
undermine the citizen judges’ democratic functions. According to Kiss, there was no 
obstacle preventing the introduction of lay adjudication into the Japanese legal system, 
although its introduction would drastically change the role of legal professionals37. Legal 
institutions participated in the discussions about whether Japan should introduce the 
jury mode or the mixed judge mode.  In the 30th meeting of the JRC, opinions from the 
JFBA, the Ministry of Justice, and the Supreme Court were outlined. The JFBA strongly 
insisted on the introduction of the jury model38. The Supreme Court and Ministry of 
Justice raised an objection to the jury model, but gave a positive response to the mixed 
judge mode39. The discussion did not reach a conclusion at the JRC, and was deferred to 
                                                          
34M Inoue, ‘Material 1: The Outline of Possible Citizen Judge System, Submitted in the 28th Meeting’ 
(Tokyo; 2003). 
35Ibid, 1. 
36Ibid, 13. 
37Kiss, supra note 2, 281-2. 
38JRC, supra note 32. 
39Ibid. 
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the CCC established in December 2001. In the 31st investigation meeting, they concluded 
that there should be a mixed judge system, although some local organisations indicated 
their objections to lay participation in sentencing40. The following sections will elaborate 
the CJA and the citizen judge procedures.  
 
4.3 The Citizen Judge Procedure 
Article 1 of the CJA added special provisions to the Court Act41, the Code of Criminal 
Procedure (CCP)42 and other necessary legislation for criminal trials with citizen judges’ 
participation. In other words, amendments of related acts were introduced43, while the 
CJA’s 113 Articles, divided into eight chapters, prescribed procedural rules and the 
duties of citizen judges and legal professionals to govern all stages of the citizen judge 
system.   
The baseline of the citizen judge procedures did not depart from the original regular 
criminal trial procedure, as stated in the CCP, which was referred to in Chapter 3. 
However, the introduction of the CJA led to the amendment of the Court Act and the 
CCP 44 .  The police and public prosecutors are empowered to commence criminal 
investigations to collect all evidence45, and if the prosecutor decides on an indictment, 
with the penalties applied to relevant cases explained in the following paragraph, the 
case file will be sent to the court and the citizen judge procedures will be followed. These 
can be divided into four stages in relation to citizen judges’ duties and the procedures. 
Firstly, District Courts are required to organise a pre-trial arrangement conference after 
they receive the case from the prosecutor prior to the first trial date in order to prepare 
                                                          
40Judicial Reforn Council Secretary General, ‘The Citizen Judge System, Criminal Justice Investigation 
Committee Conference Proceedings’ (Tokyo; Judicial Refirn Council Secretary General 2004). Regarding 
the details of the process for determining the citizen judge system, see Z Wang and H Fukurai, ‘Popular 
Legal Participation in China and Japan’ (2010) 38 International Journal of Law, Crime and Justice 236–
260; H Tsuji, The Citizen Judge Act/Criminal Procedure Law (Tokyo; Shoji Homu 2005). 
41Act no. 59 of 1947. 
42Act no. 131 of 1948.  
43In addition to the two acts, for example, the amendment of the Penal Code (act no. 45 of 1907) in 
2005 expanded the duration of the imprisonment for serious criminal charges (amendment no. 156 of 
2004). 
44Art. 1. 
45CCP, art. 189-246. 
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a successful and effective trial46. Secondly, citizen judges are randomly chosen from the 
electoral register but the courts are authorised to finalise the citizen judges and 
supplementary citizen judges selection47. Thirdly, citizen judges are entitled to attend 
the proceedings 48 , hear and deliberate 49  the case in the trial, reach a judgement 
including culpability and sentence in collaboration with professional judges. Lastly, after 
the trial, the citizen judges are bound by a life-long duty of confidentiality relating to the 
case50.     
4.3.1 Subject Cases 
Article 2 states that serious criminal cases for which the public prosecutor seeks the 
death penalty or at least one year imprisonment are to be tried by a citizen judge panel. 
The cases are in two categories: those which are punishable by death or indefinite 
imprisonment with hard labour, and those in which the victim has died due to an 
international criminal act, as listed in Article 25(2)(2) of the Court Act51. In short, the 
subject cases of the citizen judge systems are generally eight crimes, as follows: 
1)  homicide; 
2)  robbery resulting in bodily injury or death;  
3)  bodily injury resulting in death;  
4)  unsafe driving resulting in death;  
5)  arson of an inhabited building;  
6)  kidnapping for ransom;   
7)  abandonment of parental responsibilities resulting in the death of a child; and 
 8) other rape, drug and counterfeiting cases. 
Serious crimes were chosen at the suggestion of the Recommendations of the Justice 
Reform Council 52  because of the dramatic impact on society rather than for the 
                                                          
46 Art. 49. 
47 Art. 37 
48 Art. 60. 
49 Art. 66. 
50 Art. 70. 
51 Art, 2(2).  
52The Judicial Reform Council, ‘Recommendations of the Justice System Reform Council - For a Justice 
System to Support Japan in the 21st Century’ [Japanese] (2001) 
<http://www.kantei.go.jp/foreign/policy/sihou/singikai/990612_e.html> accessed 14 August 2015, 
ch.III, part 2, 1. 
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protection of the defendant’s right or for any other reasons53.  Wilson points out the 
Japanese government’s intention to extend the subject of cases from serious crimes to 
less serious ones and even to civil cases54, although a lay adjudication system in civil 
cases is extremely rare, in many contemporary legal systems55, apart from in the U.S.56 
Serious criminal cases tend to be chosen for lay adjudicator trials. For example, the 
jurisdiction of the French lay adjudicator trial in Cour D’Assisses, is for crimes which are 
punishable with ten or more years imprisonment 57 . The German Schöffengericht 
(collaborative lay court) is practically a lay adjudication trial court, which hears cases 
where minimum punishment is one year’s prison imprisonment, and the Schwurgericht 
(independent lay court), hears serious cases58. In addition, in the English jury system, all 
serious indictable criminal offences must be tried by the jury in the Crown Court, which 
deals with four classes of criminal offences59, but triable either way offences60 can be 
tried either by the lay bench panel or a District Judge in the of Magistrates’ Court or by 
a jury in the Crown Court 61 . The subject-matter of cases heard by the newly 
                                                          
53 K Ida, ‘Challenges Concerning to the Citizen Judge System[Shimin Hanji E Nokoru Kadai]’ Asahi 
Newspaper (Tokyo, 2004).  
54 MJ Wilson, ‘Japan’s New Criminal Jury Trial System: In Need of More Transparency, More Access, and 
More Time’ (2010) 33 Fordham International Law Journal 487–572, 515. 
55 In many legal systems, a lay adjudication system in civil cases was/has been abandoned including 
England and Canada. See, M Zander, ‘England and Wales Report’ (2001) 72 Revue internationale de 
droit pénal 121–157, 123; Department of Justice [Canada], ‘The Role of the Public’ 
<http://www.justice.gc.ca/eng/csj-sjc/just/12.html> accessed 11 April 2016;  
56 See LG Dooley, ‘Essay: Our Juries, Our Selves: The Power, Perception, and Politics of the Civil Jury’ 
(1995) 80 Cornell Law Review 325–361; VP Hans and S Albertson, ‘Empirical Research and Civil Jury 
Reform’ (2002) 78 Notre Dame Law Review 1497–1524. 
57 B Mckillop, ‘Review of Convictions after Jury Trials : The New French Jury Court of Appeal’ (2006) 28 
Sydney Law Review 343–358, 344. 
58 GR Newman, Crime and Punishment around the World, vol.4 (Santa Barbara, CA; ABC-CLIO 2010), 127; 
MD Dubber, ‘The German Jury and the Metaphisical Volk: From Romantic Idealism to Nazi Ideology’ 
(1995) 43 American Journal of Comparative Law 227–272, 230. However, according to Dubber, 
Schworgericht (independent lay court) has not functioned any more.  
59 The offences are the most serious offences including treason and murder (Class 1), manslaughter and 
rape (Class 2), all remaining indictable offences (Class 3), and all triable either way offences (Class 4). 
See, G Slapper and D Kelly, The English Legal System: 2012-2013 (13th edn, Hoboken; Taylor and 
Francis 2012), 245. 
60 Triable either way offences include: theft from an employer, burglary, fraud, actual bodily harm, 
grievous bodily harm, drug offences, harassment, criminal damage (more than £5,000, sexual offences, 
possession of indecent images, affray and violent disorder, racially or religiously-motivated offences, 
dangerous driving, death by careless driving, witness intimidation, and threats to kill.  
61 P Duff, ‘Criminal Law Review the Defendant ’ S Right to Trial by Jury : A Neighbour ’ S View’ (2000) FEB 
Criminal Law Review 85–94, 86. 
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(re)introduced lay adjudication systems since the 1990s, such as the Spanish62, Russian63 
and Korean systems64, are also serious criminal cases, although the range of cases65 
varies 66. 
In some instances of serious criminal cases, citizen judges trials can be avoided in 
order to protect citizen judges’ and the safety of their families. Article 3 grants discretion 
to the District Court, a public prosecutor, a defendant, a defence attorney or sua sponte 
to avoid a citizen judge trial, and exercise the right to a bench trial in cases where the 
lives, bodies and their interests of the citizen judges or their families may be threatened. 
In this respect, it is likely that, as Tsuchiya highlighted, terrorist and organised crimes 
cases will be excluded67. Uncommonly, the case where there is a suspected danger to 
lay adjudicators tend to be excluded from trials, including, for example, in English68 and 
Irish69 trials.  
The CJA does not allow either a defendant or a defence attorney to request to waive 
the trial by a citizen judge panel70, as the JRC recommendations were proposed with the 
intention of increasing civic participation rather than upholding bench trials for 
defendants71. This is a noticeable contrast between the CJA and the 1923 Jury Act. The 
defendant’s right to waive a jury trial is sometimes believed to have caused the collapse 
                                                          
62 M Jimeno-Bulnes, ‘Lay Participation in Spain: The Jury System’ (2004) 14 International Criminal Justice 
Review 164–185, 165. 
63 SA Pashin, ‘The Reasons for Reintroducing Trial by Jury in Russia’ (2001) 72 Revue internationale de 
droit pénal 253–257, 254. 
64 J Lee, ‘Korean Jury Trial : Has the New System Brought About Changes ?’ (2010) 12 Asian-Pacific Law & 
Policy Journal 58–71, 61. 
65 In the Russian jury system, the cases of aggravated murder and other crimes of the second level 
courts of original jurisdiction, regional courts, territorial courts, republican supreme courts, and capital 
city courts are subject for the jury trial. See SC Thaman, ‘The Good, the Bad, or the Indifferent: “12 
Angry Men” in Russia, Part of Symposium: The 50th Anniversary of “12 Angry Men”’ (2007) 82 Chicago 
Kent Law Review 791–808, 796. 
66 There is an argument about the exclusion of political crimes in the Spanish system. See,  SC Thaman, 
‘Spain Returns to Trial by Jury’ (1997) 21 Hastings International and Comparative Law Review 241–537, 
260. 
67 Y Tsuchiya, Start of the Citizen Judge System: The Expectations and Concerns (Tokyo; Kadensha 2008), 
28. 
68 Criminal Justice Act 2003 [England], sec.44. 
69 JD Jackson, K Quinn and T O’Malley, ‘The Jury System in Contemporary Ireland: In the Shadow of a 
Troubled Past’ (1999) 62 Law and Contemporary Problems 203–232, 220. 
70 Art. 62. 
71 JRC, supra note 52, 216. 
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of the pre-war jury system72. Kiss explained that the unpopularity of a jury trial was 
because defence attorneys believed that waiving a jury trial and choosing a bench trial 
was a way to show the defendant’s loyalty to authority in the hope of a lenient 
sentence73. However, the defendants often tend to be allowed to waive the right to be 
tried by a lay adjudication trial in some legal systems74, such as the American75, German76, 
and Korean77 systems in different conditions. The defendant’s waiving right may be 
related to the issue of whether the concept of lay participation in criminal justice 
systems is the fundamental or ‘nominal’ right for the citizens 78 . Moreover, the 
defendant’s right to waive a lay adjudicator with the consent of public prosecutor and 
professional judge will represent a possible exercise of the defendant’s control against 
the prosecutor’s and judge’s discretion79. In Duff’s comparative analysis between the 
English and Scottish jury systems, he shows four methods to control defendants’ access 
to lay adjudicator trials: the law itself, prosecutorial discretion, judicial choice, and the 
decision of the defence80. The lack of defence rights in the Japanese citizen judge system 
to choose a citizen judge trial or a bench trial, appears to be symbolic of the weak 
position of the defendant as well as the powerful authority of the public prosecutor in 
the preliminary investigative procedures81.  As West has suggested, the lack of detailed 
instructions on discretionary prosecution, the tenure position of a prosecutors, and a 
high conviction rate, lead the prosecutor to have ‘tremendous power within the criminal 
                                                          
72 Dobrovolskaia, supra note 9, 12-3. 2010 ; M Dean, ‘Trial by Jury: A Force for Change in Japan’ (1995) 
44 International and Comparative Law Quarterly 379–404, 388; K Anderson and L Ambler, ‘The Slow 
Birth of Japan’s Quasi-Jury System (Saiban-in Seido): Interim Report on the Road to Commencement’ 
(2006) 6 California Law Review 55–80, 62. 
73 LW Kiss, ‘Reviving the Criminal Jury in Japan’ (1999) 62 Law and Contemporary Problems 261–283, 
269. 
74 Lee,  supra note 64, 61. 
75 EN Griswold, ‘The Historical Development of Waiver of Jury Trial in Criminal Cases’ (1933) 20 Virginia 
Law Review 655–669. 
76 Langbein, supra note 11, 199. 
77 RY Park, ‘The Globalizing Jury Trial: Lessons and Insights from Korea’ (2010) 58 American Journal of 
Comparative Law 1–74, 58. 
78 Langbein,  supra note 76. 
79 K Anderson and M Nolan, ‘Lay Participation in the Japanese Justice System: A Few Preliminary 
Thoughts Regarding the Law Assessor System (Saiban-in Seido) from Domestic Historical and 
International Psychological Perspectives’ (2004) 37 Vanderbilt Journal of Transnational Law 935–992, 
953. 
80 Duff, supra note 61. 
81 JJ Kodner, ‘Reintroducing Law Participation to Japanese Criminal Cases: An Awkward Yet Necessary 
Step’ (2003) 2 Washington University Global Study Law Review 231–254, 236.  
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justice system’82. Furthermore, Anderson and Nolan claimed that introduction of the 
citizen judge system would enhance the prosecutor’s power in spite of three 
implications to control their power: the primary motives of the reform in 1999 to limit 
their power and discretionary control, the increase in the use of plea bargaining, and 
their inability to divert confessed and summary cases from citizen judge trials83. The 
problematic unequal relationship between the defendant and the prosecutor seems to 
persist in the citizen judge system. Moreover, this reinforces the impression that 
introduction of the citizen judge system aimed at enhancing democracy rather than 
defendant’s rights84. The next section evaluates the CJA, considering how democracy is 
enhanced in the light of citizen judges’ participation. 
 
4.4  Evaluating the CJA 
4.4.1  Selection of the Citizen Judges 
A number of lay adjudication studies have highlighted the extent of influences on the 
selection process for lay adjudicators and the importance of the process from a fair trial 
perspective. Becoming a lay adjudicator as a citizen judge seems not to be a 
constitutional right because of possible unconstitutionality and there is no guarantee by 
legislation, unlike in some other legal systems such as in serious criminal cases in the 
U.S.85, and Russian systems86. Arguments about the right to have a lay adjudicator trial 
seem to be related to legal guarantees regarding lay adjudicator trials and defendants’ 
choices87. The duty of a citizen judge in Japan tends to be considered as an obligation 
rather than a public right. In fact, according to the Supreme Court, 50.1% respondents 
                                                          
82 MD West, ‘Prosecution Review Commissions : Japan ’ S Answer to the Problem of Prosecutorial 
Discretion’ (1992) 92 Columbia Law Review 684–724, 691, 688-691. 
83 Anderson and Nolan, supra note 79, 953. 
84 Ibid, footnote 88.  
85 R Kitai-Sangero, ‘From Murder to Eating French Fries in a Metro Station - The Defendant’s Right to a 
Jury Trial for All Types of Offenses’ (2008) 30 Whittier Law Review 5–40. 
86 SC Thaman, ‘The Nullification of the Russian Jury : Lessons for Jury-Inspired Reform in Eurasia and 
Beyond’ (2007) 40 Cornell International Law Journal 355–428, 358. 
87 T Brooks, ‘The Right to Trial by Jury’ (2004) 21 Journal of Applied Philosophy 197–212, 198. 
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out of 18,000 attendees at the Citizen Judge Forums between 2005 and 2006 confirmed 
that they would participate as a citizen judge only if it was unavoidable88.  
The Japanese Constitution does not require trial by lay adjudicators. The Sixth 
Amendment to the U.S. Constitution states that ‘[i]n all criminal prosecutions, the 
accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury of the State 
and district …’89The right to trial by lay adjudicators is derived from the principle in 
Magna Carta, which is commonly cited, as the right to trial by peers90, usually defined 
as equal, i.e. citizens, although there are arguments about the historical background91 
and misinterpretation of this term92. The European Court of Human Rights’ case law 
declares that the use of lay adjudication had not been automatically a violation of a fair 
trial93. 
The Japanese Constitution provides that the accused in all criminal cases shall enjoy 
the right to a speedy and public trial by an impartial tribunal as in Article 3794. Regarding 
the right to trial by lay adjudicators in Japan, there were doubts about whether the 
citizen judge system is constitutional or not because of three key points. Firstly, The 
Constitution states the judiciary should be only composed of professional judges, so the 
citizen judge system could be against the accused’s right to have a fair trial as provided 
in Article 37, because the professional judges must be appointed by the Cabinet 95. 
Secondly, from the perspective of the independence of the professional judges, the 
citizen judge system could work to undermine the independence of judges, declared in 
Article 76, because their decisions made will be influenced by the citizen judges in 
collaboration with the professional judges. Thirdly, if the duty of the citizen judge can 
                                                          
88 The Supreme Court, ‘The Citizen Judge National Forum: The Summary of the Results of Questionnaire’ 
(Tokyo; 2006), 8. 
89 The U.S. Constitution, Amendment VI,   
90In the clause 39 of Magna Carta, ‘[n]o freeman shall be taken or/and imprisoned, or disseised, or 
exiled, or in any way destroyed, nor will we go upon him nor will we wend upon him, except by the 
lawful judgement of his peers or/and by the law of the land’.  
91WT Cornish, Jury (London; Allen Lane 1968), 12. 
92P Darbyshire, ‘The Lamp That Shows That Freedom Lives—Is It Worth the Candle?’ [1991] Criminal Law 
Review 740–52, 741. 
93A Doobay, ‘The Right to a Fair Trial in Light of the Recent ECtHR and CJEU Case-Law’ (2013) 14 ERA 
Forum 251–262, 256. 
94The Constitution, art. 37. 
95Ibid, art. 80(1). 
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be regarded as an obligation by the state, this evokes conscription, so the citizen judge 
system could be seen as in opposition to freedom from bondage96. Moreover, the strict 
requirement of confidentiality by citizen judges could impinge on freedom of 
expression97. The JRC noted this interpretation of potential violation of the constitution, 
but concluded that it does not prohibit a lay adjudicator trial, although this triggered 
arguments among academics and the public98. On the other hand, supporters of lay 
adjudication claimed that the Japanese Constitution was established under a great deal 
of American influence, therefore, the introduction of a lay adjudication system was 
assumed to be present in the Constitution as it is in the U.S. constitution99. 
The Supreme Court approved the constitutionality of the citizen judge system in 
November 2011100. It held that the structure of the citizen judge system guarantees that 
a fair trial will be conducted by the courts and professional judges, who are recognised 
as responsible for a fair trial, and therefore, the citizen judge system does not interfere 
with the fundamental principles of the criminal justice procedure stated in the 
Constitution101. In addition, the judgment declared that ‘the courts in the Constitution 
depend on the principle that the Constitution allows public participation in the judiciary, 
and it does not prohibit public participation in the inferior Courts, which are different 
from the Supreme Court.’102 Although the Supreme Court approved the constitutionality 
of the citizen judge system, the responsibilities for being citizen judges should not be 
imposed on citizens, particularly because of their fragile support for the citizen judge 
system through lack of education and practice as lay participants. The inclusion of the 
citizen judge system within the Constitution seems to be urgent and necessary work. 
The argument about whether the citizen judges are exercising obligations or rights is still 
                                                          
96Ibid, art. 18. 
97Ibid, art. 19, 21.  
98There are other 9 points arose as the reasons for the violation of the constitutionality. See T Shinya, 
‘The Constitutionality of the Citizen Judge System [Saibanin Seido No Gokensei]’ (2013) 9 Omiya Law 
Review 133–144, 136; K Nishino, Criticisms towards the Citizen Judge System (tokyo; Nishikanda 
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101Ministry of Justice [Japan], ‘Citizen Judge System Q&A [Saibanin Seido Q&A]’ 
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being developed mainly in constitutional studies103.  With the continuing arguments, the 
importance of selecting citizen judges is also highlighted in order to construct 
appropriate citizen judge panels which reflect the community104. 
The selection process consists of three broad phrases: the listing of the candidates 
and the summoning stage, the summons response stage, and the voir dire stage, 
conducted privately. It is similar to the American process as explained by Rose, Diamond, 
and Musick who suggested, however, that the American selection process is open to the 
public, in a way which is different from the Japanese one105.  
Citizen judges are randomly selected from the electoral register list106, and compiling 
the list is the responsibility of each individual District Court107. Random selection will 
bring three advantages: an equal chance for all citizens to be a lay adjudicator, 
prevention of the manipulation of the composition of the lay adjudicator panel, and the 
construction of the panel as a ‘cross-section’108 of the community derived from a variety 
of social groups109. The court and the municipal electoral council are responsible for the 
candidates list. First, the court will notify the municipal electoral council of the number 
of prospective citizen judges for the following year by 1st of September110, and second, 
the council must randomly choose candidates, compile the list by excluding disqualified 
candidates, and send it to the court by 15th October111. Lastly, the court might modify 
the list by excluding candidates who are not qualified or who are prohibited from 
                                                          
103 See D Midori, ‘The Duties of Saiban-in and “Involuntary Servitude” (Constitution Art. 18)’ (2003) 2 
Studies, The Hitotsubashi Journal of Law and International 305–328; H Ishida, ‘The Purpose and 
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105 MR Rose, SS Diamond and M a. Musick, ‘Selected to Serve: An Analysis of Lifetime Jury Participation’ 
(2012) 9 Journal of Empirical Legal Studies 33–55, 35. 
106 Art. 13. 
107 Art. 20, 21. 
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becoming a citizen judge112. If the council discovers that candidates have died or have 
lost the right to vote, it must notify the court113.  
A list of qualifications and disqualifications relating to citizen judges is set out in 
Articles 14-16. As the result of random selection from the electoral register, a person is 
qualified to be a citizen judge if he or she holds Japanese nationality and is 20 years old 
or over. The minimum age of suffrage has changed to 18 in Japan, as in many countries114, 
from 19th June 2016115, but the Ministry of Justice announced that the age of 20 years 
old as the qualification for citizen judges will be maintained after this change116. A person 
is disqualified if he/she has not finished his/her compulsory education, if he/she has 
received a prison sentence, or if he/she has difficulty in performing the duty of a citizen 
judge because of his/her mental or physical problems117. Potential citizen judges are to 
be prohibited from serving if they engage in certain occupations in particular in the legal 
fields or in national administration institutions 118 . These qualifications and 
disqualifications for being a citizen judge seem to be basic requirements, compared to 
other jury models of lay adjudication systems, such as the English or American119 jury 
system. However, the list could be more lenient, like the English list, for example, which 
has removed legal professionals and people who are involved in justice business, such 
                                                          
112 Art. 23(3). 
113 Art. 23(4). 
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as judges, lawyers, and police officers from disqualification120 under Schedule 33 of the 
Criminal Justice Act 2003. 
The CJA also makes provisions for exemptions from citizen judge service on grounds 
of age, illness or important social responsibilities121. Examples of exemptions are as 
follows; a person who is over seventy years old; is a member of the local government; is 
a student; (has) served as a citizen judge or a supplementary citizen judge in the past 
five years; was called to be a citizen judge candidate in the past year; (has) served as a 
member or supplementary member of the a Prosecution Review Commission in the past 
five years; has difficulty in getting to the court because of disease or injury, nursing care 
for family, important work, or the funeral of a parent122. Moreover, a person who may 
be related to anyone directly involved in the case is also considered for excusal123. While 
there is broad acceptance for the adoption by random selection, lenient exemption 
requirements provide some flexibility in the citizen judge system.  
The selection process for citizen judges including the summons process is stipulated 
in the CJA between Articles 25 and 40. After compiling the list by the court, notification 
with a questionnaire is sent to the candidates to establish if they are to be included in 
the list in November for the coming year124. The questionnaire requires the candidate to 
respond to any of the stated excusals, and if so, he/she will not be summoned125. For 
each citizen judge trial, the prospective citizen judges are chosen randomly by lot, and 
the appearance request letter will be sent by six weeks before the summons126. At the 
                                                          
120 Regarding the attitudes of those people, the Bar Council illustrate a few words of caution, such as 
unnecessity to inform their occupations to other jurors and follow the judges’ instructions as to any 
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122 Ibid. 
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prospective citizen judges appearance in the court, six citizen judges are chosen after 
voir dire and challenges127.  
The CJA provides a detailed procedure of voir dire, which will be expected to exclude 
unfair-minded lay adjudicators128, and as Anderson and Amber noted the Japanese voir 
dire system is ‘a limited U.S.-style’129. To confirm there is no connection between the 
candidates and the case, the professional judge must send the list of the candidates to 
the prosecutor and defence attorney at least two days before the date of the summons, 
and they are allowed to view copies of questionnaires submitted by the candidates on 
the date of the summons130. In addition, the court is authorised to dismiss a person if 
there is a possibility that he/she may act unfairly 131 , and the court can question 
perspective citizen judges about their involvement in the case and their relationship 
with the defendant132. Furthermore both the public prosecutor and the defence attorney, 
can challenge up to four citizen judges without specifying a reason133, and also challenge 
them with reasons, such as on the ground that the prospective citizen judges did not 
take the oath134, but the court has the responsibility to authorise the challenge135.  
In other words, the finalisation of selected citizen judges is in the hands of the court. 
Throughout the selection phase of citizen judges, the court is granted considerable 
power by compiling the list of prospective citizen judges and finalising selected citizen 
judges. This can be critical bureaucratic control endangering democratised citizen judge 
panels. As studied in Chapter 2, a lay adjudication panel underpinned by the concepts 
of democracy is expected to be representative of all members of the community who 
are not influenced by bureaucracy. However, there is a possibility of manipulating the 
selection of citizen judges by the court. Moreover, the selection process, including voir 
dire and challenges, is exercised in secrecy and there is no way to check if manipulation 
                                                          
127 Ibid. 
128 Langbein, supra note 11, 202. 
129 K Anderson and L Ambler, ‘The Slow Birth of Japan’s Quasi-Jury System (Saiban-in Seido): Interim 
Report on the Road to Commencement’ (2006) 6 California Law Review 55–80, 64. 
130 Art. 31. 
131 Art. 18. 
132 Art. 34. 
133 Art. 36. 
134 Art. 41. 
135 Art. 37 
147 
 
is set in the CJA. Therefore, the powerful courts’ and professional judges’ positions in 
the selection of citizen judges could prevent the democratic function of a citizen judge 
system. 
While the U.S. jury systems has ‘extensive voir dire and challenges’136, the English 
system does not allow voir dire, apart from reference to prima facie evidence for 
challenges for cause 137 .  The extensive system adopted in the U.S. allows defence 
attorneys, public prosecutors and professional judges to question and challenge jurors, 
and this raised the concerns about the use of race138 and gender139 in the exercise of 
peremptory challenges. As Rose, Diamond, and Musick argues, although direct 
influences of race-based excuses and unrepresentativeness of a lay adjudicator panel 
were not found in their study, the biases were ‘legally and morally illegitimate’ 140 .  
Marder noted in the analysis of the Batson case in the U.S., ‘harms that discriminatory 
peremptories caused, including harms not only to the defendant, but also to the 
excluded juror and to the community at large’141. However, voir dire in the Spanish 
system follows the U.S. style due to the belief in the advantages of voir dire, resulted in 
the exclusion of hostile lay adjudicators142. On the other hand, England abolished the 
voir dire in 1988 because of concerns about the effect of the peremptory challenge on 
the acquittal rate and the government’s wish to avoid a professionalised jury143. The 
absence of voir dire can be found in the Canadian144 and Scottish145 systems. Roberts 
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notes the impossibility of screening and discovering potential lay adjudicators’ biased 
attitudes by questioning in the selecting process, in his study of the American voir dire 
system146. Spence, however, claims that skilful attorneys will be able to forecast lay 
adjudicators’ decision-making tendencies in terms of their experience and social group 
inclusion147. In other words, uncertainty about the effectiveness of voir dire to exclude 
hostile citizen judges is based on the differences between each legal professional’s 
tactical and contingent skills. Thus, voir dire and peremptory challenges may lead to an 
unrepresentative composition and the professionalisation of the citizen judges, 
although they might be effective to exclude biased or inattentive citizen judge 
candidates.  
The racial, gender, and social compositions of lay adjudicator panels are of 
fundamental concern, in the light of its influence on verdicts. In particular, the research 
on jury model systems, such as the U.S. and English systems, has been extensive. Bowers, 
Steiner and Sandys found in the American jury system that there were definite 
connections between the race and gender compositions of panels and their capital 
sentencing tendencies because of the ‘jurors’ narrative accounts yielding to ‘further 
insights into their decision making’, such as the defendant’s back ground148. On the other 
hand, Baldwin and McConville showed that juries in Birmingham, England were the 
partial representatives of the community and there were no significant relationship 
between the racial compositions of juries and the verdicts149. The mixed results of much 
of the empirical research has revealed the importance of demographic improvement of 
selections for lay adjudicator panels to reflect the population150. Moreover they have 
stimulated the analysis of detailed parameters, which influence the decision-making 
processes and the outcomes, such as different ways to apply the sentencing guidelines 
and the relationship between racial disparities in imprisonment and sentence length151. 
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4.4.2  The Size and Composition of the Citizen Judge Panel 
The Japanese citizen judge panel consists of three professional judges, six citizen 
judges, and three supplementary citizen judges in contested cases152, while it is made up 
of one professional judge, four citizen judges, and supplementary citizen judges153 in 
uncontested cases, in which there is no dispute about the facts and issues154. The size 
composition is the result of ‘a key political battleground’ between the enhancements of 
citizen judges’ participation and a greater professional judges’ involvement in the 
drafting process of the CJA155. As Fukurai has argued, the majority of the CCC supported 
a greater involvement of professional judges, while Shinomiya, one of the member of 
the CCC, strongly supported a much more limited participation for them 156 . 
Consequently, the CCC remained the Japanese conventional concept of civic 
participation derived from the inquisitorial approach, including the subordinate role of 
citizen judges in the deliberative process in the collaborative form of the citizen judge 
panel with professional judges157. 
The number of lay adjudicators in a mixed judge panel for criminal cases varies 
depending on the lay adjudication system. For example, there are nine lay adjudicators 
and three professional judges in the French lay adjudicator panel158.  According to Ivkovic, 
the Croatian lay adjudication system has three different sizes and compositions 
depending on the seriousness of the offences in the case 159 . In the jury model lay 
adjudication systems, the composition varies, for example, between twelve jurors in the 
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English160 and Russian criminal trial jury and nine in the Spanish system161. The various 
size of the lay adjudicator panels and the share of lay adjudicators appears be related to 
the degree of the expected judicial control. As van Zyl Smit and Isakow commented in 
their comparative analysis on the German lay adjudication system, the lay adjudicators’ 
participation as a part of a mixed lay adjudicator panel reflected their reduced 
independence of judicial control162. They also suggested that it was symbolic that the 
choice between a ‘professional affair’ and lay adjudicators’ participation in the justice 
system influenced ‘the open or democratic nature of the society’163. In addition, King 
and Nesbit attributed the significant influence of the size of the lay adjudicator panels 
to various factors, such as deliberating time lengths, the possibility of hung juries and 
most importantly, their examinations of evidence164. The size of lay adjudication panels 
is also an important variable in relation to their ability to exercise meaningful influences. 
The influences, as Thomas and Fink concluded, will be ‘group performance, distribution 
of participation, the nature of interaction, group organization, member performance, 
conformity and consensus, and member satisfaction’ 165 . Hence, there is inevitable 
uncertainty about parameters in evaluating the relationship between the size and 
composition of a lay adjudicator panel and its influences on the decision-making 
processes and the outcomes because of aspects of law and a variety of practical aspects 
of actual lay adjudicators’ behaviour166. 
The selection and composition of the citizen judge panel is the fundamental feature 
required to select representatives in the community. The essential groundwork of lay 
adjudication based on representative democracy necessitates the equal participation of 
citizens and respect for the opinion of all members of the community, as discussed in 
Chapter 2. There are important concerns relating to judicial control because the 
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collaborative role of the citizen judge and the lenient qualifications and disqualifications 
relating to citizen judges may enhance citizen judges’ representativeness. However it 
seems to be reasonable to conclude that the citizen judge panel, composed by the CJA, 
has the potential to be representatives of the Japanese people. 
4.4.3  The Responsibilities of Citizen Judges 
The responsibilities of citizen judges, the CJA stipulates, are largely confined to three 
procedural phases: the selection process, the decision-making process, and the post- 
trial process.  
In the selection process, the CJA requires the appearance of the prospective citizen 
judges on the date of the selection process for citizen judges 167  and the other 
responsibilities are that citizen judges shall swear oaths that they will execute their 
duties in compliance with the laws and regulations impartially and in good faith168. The 
citizen judges will be subject to a fine for making false statements in the selection 
procedure169 or refusing an answer without legitimate reasons170.  Moreover, Article 102 
states that if the prospective citizen judge does not appear and refuses the oath without 
legitimate reasons, he/she may be punished by a non-criminal fine of not more than 
¥100,000 (£724.63)171. According to Nishino, who is a scholar strongly opposed to the 
introduction of the citizen judge system, the prospective citizen judge who fails to 
appear for the selection process can theoretically avoid paying fine forever because of 
the nature of the Japanese criminal procedure and unconstitutionality of the citizen 
judge system172. The existence of the fine for nonappearance at the process aims at 
forcing the prospective citizen judges to appear at the court as well as to change the 
general legal consciousness in Japanese society. Fukurai claimed that the requirement 
for the prospective citizen judges to appear in the selection process relies on nothing 
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more than their own ‘consciousness’173, in spite of the possible imposed fine. He pointed 
out the low rate of litigation and low interests and influences of cultural and social values 
on the judiciary system in Japan but he expected that introduction of the citizen judge 
system would change this and legal consciousness would be enhanced in Japanese 
society174. Kawashima pointed out the unique Japanese legal consciousness, in which 
there is less awareness of rights or contract because of Japanese social and cultural 
factors175. 
 In the deliberation process, the presence of citizen judge is one of the requirements 
of the opening of a citizen judge trial. Article 54 of the CJA states that the requirements 
for the opening of a citizen judge trial, are the appearance of professional judges, citizen 
judges, the court clerk, and the public prosecutor176. The existence of the defence is also 
a requirement177 but not in circumstances where the court deems that the attendance 
of the defendant is not important for defence of his/her rights178   or the detained 
defendant refuses to appear without justifiable reason and it is extremely difficult for 
the officials of the penal institution to bring him/her to the court179. In addition, in 
pronouncing judgment, the citizen judges must appear, and if not, they will be subject 
to fine180, although his/her nonappearance must not prevent the pronouncement or 
ruling from being rendered181. To sum up, attendance for the whole of the citizen judge 
trial procedure is the responsibility of the citizen judges themselves.  
In addition, citizen judges must attend the deliberations and express their opinion in 
the deliberation room182. Article 9 of the CJA stipulates the responsibilities of citizen 
judges, such as the execution of their duties in compliance with the laws and regulations 
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impartially and in good faith183, the prohibition of acts that could impair trust in the 
impartiality of decisions184, and the forbidding of acts that could offend citizen judges’ 
dignity185. In the deliberation process, when the presiding judge presents interpretation 
of laws and regulations and court proceedings on the basis of a consensus with other 
professional judges, citizen judges must execute their duties in accordance with the 
professional judges’ decisions186. In short, citizen judges have to cooperate with but, at 
the same time, obey professional judges’ decisions.  
In the post-trial process, the CJA sets a strict duty of lifetime confidentiality on citizen 
judges regarding information gained throughout the citizen judge trial proceedings187. 
The information includes, for example: 
1) Specific information learned in the trial, such as the case background and other 
members’ information; 
2) specific opinions of any member of panel about the question of guilt and 
sentencing; and  
3) details of the vote, such as the ratio of votes or whether a reached unanimous 
decision was reached. 
If citizen judges reveal this information, they will possibly be subject to a fine of up to 
¥500,000 (£2,616) or up to six months imprisonment188. This can create a mental burden 
for citizen judges and prevents a sharing of their experiences and opinions with the 
community189, which was one of the expected outcomes of a citizen judge system. The 
further question arises as to what is included as subject to confidentiality. For example, 
if the citizen judges discuss their personal opinion about their general experience, this 
is not included under the confidentiality rule 190 . The ambiguous regulations are 
confusing and increase citizen judges’ anxiety. The nature of the information which 
cannot be disclosed should be explained more fully in the CJA and the mandatory 
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penalty should be removed191. This view has been expressed by a number of scholars192. 
Indeed, post-trial interviews and access to information can engage the public interest 
and it also leads experienced citizen judges to review their experience as well as to 
encourage responsible and careful deliberations. The prohibition on sharing the 
experience will also prevent the community from observing the function of the citizen 
judge system193, and no one is permitted to contact a citizen judge regarding the case or 
for the purpose of learning information about the deliberations194.  
The CJA mandates that the identities of citizen judges are also to be kept secret, 
unless they specifically agree to disclosure195, both during and after the trial196. Moreover, 
the citizen judge is protected after having completed their duty to some extent, for 
example, in his/her employment for the service197, privacy and being contacted after 
their service198 , and if threatened 199 . The purpose of the strict confidentiality is to 
guarantee that the citizen judges can freely express themselves and debate with the 
other members in the panel without a fear of being threatened and or abused in public. 
Therefore, the strict confidentiality rules stimulate the democratic function of citizen 
judges as a result of in-depth discussions during deliberations and potential personal 
attacks by their final decisions200. 
To summarise, this section argued that the responsibilities of citizen judges 
throughout the citizen judges procedure, enforced by the possibility of strict sanctions, 
are necessary to protect their settled democratic functions.   
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4.4.4  Cooperation between Citizen Judges and Professional Judges 
The reasons for the collaborative structure of a citizen judge panel have been 
discussed earlier in this Chapter and in Chapter 3. According to the JRC’s 
recommendations, the importance of the citizen judges’ participation is equal to the 
cooperation between members of the citizen judge panel. The recommendations 
suggested that: 
… while judges and citizen judges share responsibilities, the judges who are 
legal specialists and the citizens who are laypersons will share their 
respective knowledge and experience through mutual communication and 
reflect the results thereof in their judgment201. 
The cooperative deliberation between members of the citizen judge panel appears 
to be essential not only because of the recommendations of the CJA but also because of 
the Constitution as explained in the previous chapter. The dominant influence of 
professional judges’ instructions on citizen judges’ deliberation has been one of the 
major concerns in the mixed judge model but also, to some extent, in the jury model of 
lay adjudication systems202.  Such concerns also occur in relation to the citizen judge 
system. In Japan, citizen judges’ independent legal conclusions could be considered as 
unjust in that the Constitution stipulates that the judiciary should be composed of 
professional judges 203 . Thus, without professional judges, the judiciary may be 
considered as inadequate, and unconstitutional. In this respect, it is likely that citizen 
judges are not authorised to decide law and fact independently. The presiding judge 
takes on the duty of explaining the relevant laws or ordinances to make them 
understandable to citizen judges so that they are able to perform their duty204. Moreover, 
the professional judges on the panel have full authority for the interpretation of laws 
and ordinances, the procedure and other decisions205. Instructions should include an 
indication that both the professional judges and citizen judges are independent and 
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equal to each other, while an important role of the professional judges is the provision 
of guidance on appropriately structured deliberation by the citizen judges. In 
accordance with the judges’ instructions, citizen judges are required to reach the 
determination by themselves. Therefore, the professional judges summarise the 
arguments of prosecutors and defence attorneys, prepare the information materials 
including the questions of facts and tenets of law in order to instruct the citizen judges 
in the pre-trial arrangement conferences206. The instructions of professional judges need 
to support citizen judges reaching their decisions independently in accordance with 
Article 9 of the CJA. Coercive pressure of professional judges on citizen judges should be 
avoided, while professional judges must provide uniformity of judicial decisions, 
reducing the differences between professional and citizen judges’ attitudes towards 
their decisions207. The relationship between the instructions by the professional judges 
and the lay adjudicators’ independence is one of the most challenging aspects relating 
to the principles of democracy and a fair trial.  Professional judges’ instructions can 
prevent citizen judges from using their common sense in deliberating on the evidence208, 
but without them lay adjudicators become ‘uncontrollable’209. As mentioned earlier, the 
CCC maintained the conventional civil law approach in which citizen judges are 
subordinate to the powerful professional judges’ authorities in the decision-making 
process. Hence, there appears to a contradiction related to the independence of the 
citizen judges and the professional judges’ authorities in the name of ‘consideration’ 
[Hairyo]210 in the deliberation process. 
The established citizen judge trial procedures are governed by the detailed trial 
procedure codified in the CJA, CCP, and Regulations of the Citizen Judge Trials211. Citizen 
judge trial procedures from the opening of a trial to the declaration of the verdict can 
be divided into five stages. A trial starts with the public prosecutor reading out the 
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indictment defining the crime which the defendant has allegedly committed212. After the 
reading, the presiding judge informs the defendant of their rights including the right to 
silence, and to refuse to answer all questions 213  [Stage 1: initial appearance [Boto 
Tetsuzuki]. Both parties present evidence in according with the course decided in the 
pre-trial arrangement conference [Stage 2: examination of evidence [Shoko Shirabe 
Tetsuzuki]. The prosecutor gives an indication of the level of punishment that the 
defendant should receive for the crime if found guilty and explains how the evidence 
would support a guilty verdict, while the defendant and defence attorney may make 
final submissions to rebut or mitigate the accusations by the prosecutor [Stage 3: 
argument proceedings [Benron Tetsuzuki]. A citizen judge panel retires to the 
deliberation room to deliberate the evidence and consider the verdict [Stage4: 
deliberation [Hyogi]. The panel must rely only on witness statements or oral evidence 
presented during the trial and their probative value is reliant on the discretion of the 
adjudicators214. The decision is declared in court, identifying the relevant facts of the 
case and providing a verdict with reasons with reference to fact and law [Stage 5: 
Rendering of the verdict [Hanketsu senkoku]. Between Stage 1 and 3, and 5 the 
proceedings are conducted in the open court, and Stage 4 is carried out in the 
deliberation room. 
4.4.4.1 In the Courtroom 
It was expected that the role of professional judges would be dramatically changed 
by the introduction of the citizen judge system. Soldwedel suggested that their role was 
to routinely rubber-stamp prosecutors’ recommendations’ 215  highlighting their 
tendency to rely on written documents rather than live testimony. Moreover, Fukurai 
claimed that Japanese professional judges ‘near blind acceptance of confessions as 
evidence of guilt’ as one of reasons for forced confessions216 which are one of the serious 
problems in the Japanese investigative stage.  In addition, it was pointed out that the 
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limited autonomy and the lack of independence of professional judges was because of 
the educational system and the powerful authority of the Secretariat of the Supreme 
Court which reappoints professional judges every ten years217. It is expected that these 
concerns will be improved by the collaborative decision-making process of citizen 
judges218. 
The introduction of the collaborative structure of the citizen judge panel introduced 
a new layout in the courtroom (see Appendix 5). The new design of the courtroom of 
the District Court appears to provide citizen judges’ seats next to the professional judges 
and the citizen judges sit down facing up to the public gallery. The courtroom layout in 
other lay adjudication systems, especially the jury model systems, including English and 
American systems, have a clear separation between lay adjudicators and professional 
judges. The courtroom architecture shows an engineering of separation between 
different groups: members of the public, jury, advocates and witnesses, and officers of 
the court under controlled conditions, as Hanson suggested in his analysis of the English 
courtroom219.  Rosenbloom highlighted that the professional judges’ space show his/her 
independent and impartial refereeing position 220 . The architectural features of the 
courtroom provide for full attention of the public gallery towards the citizen judges, and 
visual impact shows an openness to the public and the pressure of the responsible role 
of the citizen judges as well as unity on the citizen judge panel between citizen judges 
and professional judges.  
 Moreover, the citizen judges are allowed to take notes and ask questions of 
witnesses and experts in the court and outside of the court221. The citizen judges are also 
allowed to ask questions of the defendant either in voluntary or requested statements222 
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and of victims in court223, and the citizen judge can comment on this224. The right to 
question in the court is one of important features which is intended to enhance citizen 
judges’ participation, although professional judges have the power to limit the questions 
presented in order to prevent irrelevant statements in court225. The questioning by 
citizen judges signifies that the targets which the citizen judge system aims for is citizen 
judges’ active participation, an educational learning process, and collaboration with the 
professional judges. 
Research on juror questioning in the American system shows the conflict between 
substantial effectiveness and the risks of undermining defendants’ rights. Senger noted 
that direct questioning by citizen judges will be effective in supporting their crucial 
presence in the courtroom 226 , while he also pointed out the controversies of juror 
questioning in the American system which can lead to antagonism, inefficiency and 
complications227. Although the Japanese system is much more professional judge-driven 
and there are less possibilities for controversies compared to the American system, the 
citizen judges’ rights to question in the decision-making process will lead to potential 
difficulties as well as the introduction of a new role of the professional judges as a 
‘mediator’228 for the citizen judges, as a presiding professional judge interviewed for this 
research suggested. In addition, Lundy criticised questioning by lay adjudicators in that 
it may lead to improper prejudices by them and the necessity to protect defendants’ 
rights and dignity by the avoidance of juror questioning229. McClanahan examined the 
possible violation of the defendants’ right to silence giving the example of citizen judges’ 
inappropriate statements in a rape case 230 . On the other hand, questioning could 
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enhance lay adjudicators’ understanding231, but Heuer and Penrod suggested making lay 
adjudicators better informed by giving more information rather than allowing them to 
ask questions232.   
In the Japanese system, questioning by citizen judges appears to be important, as in 
the mixed judge model, because the question list can provide a record of ‘sentence-
aggravating or sentence-mitigating elements through excuses or justifications’ 233 in a 
reasoned judgment. The citizen judges’ right to question will stimulate the principle of 
orality in criminal procedure. As referred to in Chapter 3, one of the expected 
transformations of the system is from the dependence on a written dossier to the 
practice of the principle of orality. All evidence, including witnesses’ testimony, must be 
presented in open court234. This common focused principle is in line with other principles, 
such as immediacy, publicity and the presumption of innocence235, which are seem as 
adversarial principles, found in the criminal procedures of other systems, such as the 
German236 and French237 systems. The emphasis on orality and immediacy, and the right 
to confront the witnesses for the defendants had been expected following the 
introduction of the citizen judge system238. Broom believed that emphasised orality in 
the Japanese trial would reveal probable abuses in obtaining confessions at the 
investigative stage, and the unavailability of witnesses239.  
However, Alldridge offered criticisms of orality in the light of the increased cost, the 
preparation time, and possible distortion by expert witnesses according to their 
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experiences and behaviour240. Moreover, Coen commented on the importance of orality 
in adversarial principles but criticised the lack of written materials, such as summaries 
of evidence and lists of witnesses, which would support lay adjudicators’ 
understanding 241 . The other expected transformation is in respect of the delay in 
criminal procedures which includes the long term detention of the defendant, 
inadequate procedures for disclosure evidence, and the difficulties in examining, as 
immediate practice, the credibility of confession statements242. The two transformations 
appear to be common expectations from the introduction of a lay adjudication system, 
as Thaman shows in the study of the Spanish and Russian systems243. The emphasis on 
the principles of orality and immediacy seem to result in the inconsistency that these 
principles requires convictions to be based on the evidence documented in the case file 
but it is solely the evidence and witnesses’ testimony presented in open court that will 
be deliberated244. Overall, the Japanese citizen judge procedure is based on a conflicted 
principle derived from the Napoleonic mode of an inquisitorial pre-trial approach 
devoted to creating a dossier and the emphasis of orality at trial derived from the 
adversarial mode. 
4.4.4.2 In the Deliberation Room 
In contrast to the citizen judges trial procedures in the courtroom, the procedure in 
the deliberation room seems not to be regulated by the CJA or other legislation. The 
inadequate provision of deliberation procedures with poor support for the citizen judges’ 
participation and insufficient assistance to cope with professional judges’ or co-citizen 
judges pressures are likely to be contributing factors to the propensity of judges to 
manipulate directly or indirectly citizen judges’ participation. A worrying concern is that 
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professional judges consequently control the decisions with or without citizen judges’ 
realisation despite their participation. 
After hearing all the evidence and testimony in court, the citizen judge panel moves 
to the deliberation room and starts the discussion that will result in a verdict. The CJA 
does not contain any provisions which set out procedural rules to reach a verdict. It 
stipulates only that the citizen judges shall attend deliberation and express their opinion 
in the deliberation room245. Moreover, the presiding judge shall give consideration, 
ensuring that the citizen judges are capable of executing their duties, by organising the 
deliberations comprehensibly for the citizen judges, and by arranging sufficient 
opportunities to speak to citizen judges246. Article 6 of the CJA clarifies the cooperative 
and separate authorities of citizen judges and professional judges. Both the citizen 
judges and professional judges will deliberate and reach decisions regarding fact-finding, 
application of laws and regulations, and sentencing, but only professional judges decide 
on the interpretation of laws and regulations and court proceedings247. 
A question list for citizen judges, which tends to be common in the mixed judge 
system, does not exist in the citizen judge system. However, professional judges present 
the contested point document [Soten Seirihyo], which is based on the results of the pre-
trial arrangement conference 248 . When the professional judges instruct the citizen 
judges by explaining points of argument, a contrast in status is set up between them. It 
has been previously noted in Chapter 3 that the principle of in dubio pro reo: innocent 
until proven guilty in criminal procedure in Japan is stated in the CCP249 and the Supreme 
Court has declared that the proof should have verisimilitude to an extent that no one 
can call it into question250. In addition, the probative value of evidence is at the free 
discretion of the judges251, and when pronouncing a sentence, the court shall identify 
the significant facts constituting the crime, the list of evidence, and the application of 
                                                          
245 Art. 66(2). 
246 Art. 66(5). 
247 Art. 6. 
248 Professional judges tended to proceed the deliberation in mock trials opened before the 
introduction. See H Murase and M Kawamoto, ‘Regarding to Deliberation of the Citizen Judge Trial: The 
Evaluation of the Mock Trials [Saiban-in Saiban No Shinri Nado Ni Tsuite]’ (2008) 1358 Jurist 89–95. 
249 CCP, art. 336.  
250 The Supreme Court Decision, 5/8/1948, 2, no. 9, 1123. 
251 CCP, art. 318.  
163 
 
laws and regulations252. This approach has been applied in the citizen judge system. 
Article 67 of the CJA states the approach to verdicts: 
1) The decision with participation of the citizen judge at the deliberations … shall 
be rendered by the majority of opinions of the number of persons constituting 
the panel including the opinions of both professional judges and citizen 
judges…  
2) In cases where opinions are split on the sentencing and none of them obtains 
the majority of opinions of the number of persons constituting the panel 
including opinions of both professional judges and citizen judges the verdict 
must be rendered by the most favourable opinion to the accused, which 
number is obtained by adding the number of the most unfavourable opinions 
to the accused to the number of favourable opinions one by one. 
These provisions were introduced to divide equal responsibilities and influences over 
decisions amongst the members of a citizen judge panel without violating the 
impartiality of the judgment. Historically, Japanese criminal procedures have struggled 
to be regarded as legitimate because of the extent of the ‘unfettered’ judges’ discretion 
in the interpretation of laws253.  This is likely to remain a possible threat because of 
governmental intervention which is often extensively influenced by external Western 
powers254. This influences the extent to which any lay adjudication system allows both 
lay adjudicators’ discretion as well as professional judges’ supervision. The extent to 
which the system can be regarded as successful depends on the appropriate balance 
between them. What is the potential the CJA to encourage citizen judges’ participation 
in the process for verdict and sentencing? It is likely to trigger arguments about 
judgment and sentence whether by the bench trial or by the citizen judge trial. Its 
potential in this respect is tied to the degree of its compatibility with other principles of 
a fair trial, mentioned in Chapter 2. The correlation between these principles and the 
CJA in criminal procedures and rules ensure that the responsibility for supervising citizen 
judges should rest with professional judges. However, this will lead the citizen judges’ 
participation to depart from the democratic function, with respect to the greater 
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enhancement of citizen judges’ participation being more favourable. The greater the 
compatibility with the principles of a fair trial, the less the prospects of success.   
The CJA sought to balance the democratic principles of citizen judges’ participation 
and collaboration with professional judges by the adoption of special majority verdicts, 
while the existing constitutional and criminal procedural norms aligned with citizen 
judges’ participation. A majority vote is accepted in most countries. For example, in 
European lay adjudication systems, including the French and German systems, a two-
thirds majority verdict255  has always been exercised 256 . The English jury system has 
exercised a super-majority verdict, ten-to-two verdicts after unanimous verdict 
requirements since 1967257.  Abramson pointed out three negative points resulting from 
the lack of unanimous verdict requirement. There would be less time for deliberating; 
less lay adjudicators’ confidence in their decisions; and the exclusion of minority 
opinions258. The unanimity verdict underpins representative democracy derived from 
the Abramson’s view of democracy values as ‘conscience of the community’259. However, 
a majority vote questions the principle of ‘beyond a reasonable doubt’ guaranteed in 
the Constitution260.   
Article 67 provides that each citizen judge has a vote as well as each professional 
judge, and a majority vote is acceptable. However, at least one professional judge must 
vote on the majority side261. In other words, in contested cases a professional judge has 
a veto. For decisions on sentencing, in the event that a majority cannot be reached, 
opinions in favour of the harshest sentence are to be added to those for the next 
harshest option, until the requisite majority is reached262. This is based on the existing 
criminal procedure norm stated in Article 77 of the CCP. However, the special majority 
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requirement sufficiently enhances the citizen judges’ participation to the extent that 
they could hope to demonstrate their representativeness and competence. 
The verdict stage in the citizen judge system contains important features of criminal 
procedure closely associated with the civil law tradition. Citizen judges panel decisions 
are issued in a public court and confirmed by a written judgment, and both parties, 
prosecution and defendant, can appeal the case263. The verdict procedures are, like the 
deliberation procedure, secretive and private264. On the other hand, citizen judges are 
expected to function as adjudicators who are capable of reaching their own independent 
decisions265. This collaborative style in verdict proceedings between professional judges 
and lay adjudicators are the same as in the French266 and German267 systems, which 
closely influenced the historic developments of the Japanese criminal procedure as 
explained in Chapter 3. The introduction of the CJA conformed to the existing legal 
tradition that had been in existence for nearly 90 years.  
The unchanged strict judicial control by professional judges seems to be linked to the 
important principle of substantial truth in criminal procedure, notwithstanding that 
professional judges may explain to citizen judges the importance of active participation 
in the trial268. The JRC envisaged the value of discovering truth through a legitimate 
criminal justice system believed in by the citizens269, rather than through a detailed 
deliberative process. Moreover, Jordan confirmed the modern shift of the focus of the 
justice system from a discovery of the truth to a fairness of the procedure270. However, 
for example, in the study of the Kazakhstan lay adjudication system, Kovalev concluded 
that the introduction of lay adjudicators in decision-making process would not impact 
upon the inquisitorial concept of the criminal procedure, in particular, because of the 
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professional judges’ controlling influences, unless ‘effective safeguards’ for lay 
adjudicators’ were provided271. 
Controversy had arisen about the desirability of a dichotomised deliberation 
procedure [Tetsuzuki Nibun Seido], which is the idea that culpability and sentencing 
should be deliberated separately in Japan. This approach is based on concerns about the 
pre-trial arrangement conference proceedings and the decision-making process. The 
separation may by the result of seeking an ‘easy to understand’272 process.  There is a 
concern that if the culpability and sentencing are deliberated together, citizen judges 
can be easily confused between arguments273. The dichotomised deliberation procedure 
had been considered since around the 1950s, but it was not applied until the 
introduction of the citizen judge system.  However, similar arguments have occurred in 
Japanese history on four occasions: firstly, at the introduction of the current criminal 
law in 1949 with a debate on the system to review the final judgment [Hanketsu mae 
Chosa Seido], which the defendant can request; 274  secondly, just after the 
implementation of the current law with the criticism of the practice in criminal court 
procedure;275 thirdly,  in the late 1960s, when Japanese legal scholars specialising in the 
German system, in particular the West German system, had started advocating a 
dichotomised procedure in deliberation;276  fourthly, in the introduction of the citizen 
judge system on the advice of legal academics and defence attorneys277. There seem to 
be five major advantages of the dichotomised procedure in deliberation. Firstly the 
procedure may preserve focus in the culpability deliberation. Separating evidence 
relating to culpability and sentencing will avoid the temptation for the defendants’ 
criminal record and the victim’s feelings to influence the deliberation on culpability. 
Secondly, the sentencing deliberation can be independent. The sentencing range in 
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Japanese Criminal Law is wide, so independence can mitigate harsher punishments, 
enabling a debate and the collection of a wide range of material aid for the defendants’ 
rehabilitation. Thirdly, it avoids the dilemma of defence attornies’ setting an advocatory 
strategy. If the deliberation procedure is separated, a defence attorney does not take a 
risk in his/her strategy. For example, in a contested case, a harsher penalty may be 
imposed on the defendant because the defence attorney has focused the debate on 
culpability rather than by the strategy where he/her admits guilt and gives mitigating 
evidence. Fourthly, if the citizen judge panel reach a not guilty judgment, the procedure 
will save time. Therefore, the procedure will operate effectively. Lastly, in a case where 
the defendant is not guilty, his/her criminal record and private information are not 
disclosed in the hearing. In other words, the innocent defendants’ privacy will be 
protected.  
Although the cooperative deliberative process in the citizen judge procedure seems 
to be the only possible structure for citizen judges’ participation in terms of 
constitutionality, the CJA appears to urge their active participation in the courtroom and 
the deliberation room by allowing them to question witnesses, defendants and victims 
and encouraging the citizen judge panel to have active discussions in the deliberation 
room. However, these encouragements seem to depend heavily on professional judges’ 
discretions derived from inquisitorial concepts. Professional judges and citizen judges 
are not only the two actors to have responsibilities to achieve active citizen judges’ 
participation.   
4.4.5  Responsibilities of Professional Judges, Public Prosecutor and Defence Attorney 
Article 51 of the CJA states that professional judges, public prosecutors, and defence 
attorneys shall endeavour to make proceedings prompt and comprehensible so that 
citizen judges may execute their duties fully whilst avoiding imposing an excessive 
burden on the citizen judges. In other words, not only professional judges but also the 
adversarial parties need to support the active participation of citizen judges’.  
4.4.5.1 Pre-Trial Arrangement Conference 
In order to introduce and emphasise citizen judges’ participation in the Japanese 
criminal procedure, the compulsory pre-trial arrangement conference procedure was 
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introduced, while the pre-existing preliminary investigation procedures remained. The 
pre-trial arrangement conference was mandated by Article 49 – 65 of the CJA and the 
amendment of the CCP278. The pre-trial arrangement proceedings stage is stated to be 
concerned with the establishment of ‘productive trial proceedings’ which are conducted 
successively, systematically, and speedily279, before the opening of court. To achieve that, 
after a public prosecutor indicts a suspect, a pre-trial arrangement conference 
procedure is held to discuss and to organise evidence and points of dispute points in 
advance of the trial. The conference consist of a public prosecutor, a defence attorney, 
and professional judges in order to clarify issues, applicable law, disclose disputed facts 
and evidence which will be easily discussed and understood by the citizen judges in the 
trial 280 . The pre-trial arrangement conference is not new in Japanese criminal 
procedure281, but it is compulsory in the citizen judge procedures. According to Article 
316-5 of the CCP, eleven issues are discussed in the proceedings: 
1. Clarification of the counts or applicable penal statues; 
2. Permission for addition, revocation or alternation of the counts or applicable 
penal status; 
3. Arrangement of the issues of the case by the allegation, which is planned to 
be put forward on the trial dates; 
4. Making of requests for the examination of evidence; 
5. Disclosure of the facts to be proved, the matters to be examined and other 
matters relating to the evidence requested; 
6. Confirmation of the opinion concerning the request for examination of 
evidence; 
7. Rendering of a ruling to examine the evidence or dismiss the request for 
examination of evidence; 
8. Decision on the order and method of examining the evidence for which a 
ruling for examination has been made; 
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9. Rendering of a ruling on the filing an objection against the examination of 
evidence; 
10. Rendering a ruling on the disclosure of evidence; 
11. Setting or changing of the trial dates and a decision on other necessary 
matters for the proceedings of the trial. 
In his study of the U.S. litigation, Rosenberg supported the idea that the pre-trial 
conference leads to a fairer trial because of good preparation by public prosecutors and 
attorneys and clear debates over the issues, although the active participation of 
attorneys is necessary282 .  Nevertheless, the pre-trial conference will provide more 
concrete supervision by professional judges, increasing the risk of formalisation and 
routinisation283. Although the preparatory stage appears to be effective in achieving a 
successful citizen judge trial, the compulsory pre-trial arrangement conference 
proceedings raised three concerns. 
The first concern is the secrecy of the pre-trial arrangement conference process 
which could lead to an information gap between the professional judges and the citizen 
judges. The pre-trial arrangement conference proceedings are not open to the public or 
to the citizen judges, although there is an obligation to record the information discussed 
during the proceedings 284 , and this can be made available to citizen judges 285 . The 
professional judges can exclude witnesses and evidence in the pre-trial arrangement 
proceedings which could lead to prejudice and an unfair judgment in the pre-trial 
arrangement proceedings. Therefore professional judges have access to all the evidence, 
some of which may not be presented in the trial. Basically the same judges have charge 
throughout the citizen judge procedure. This could lead to a disproportionate restriction 
of information to the members of the citizen judge panel. 
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The second concern is regarding evidence. Basically, new evidence cannot be 
requested after the pre-trial arrangement conference proceeding has taken place286, 
although a professional judge is not prohibited from requesting evidence on his/her 
authority287.  Evidence having indirect probative value could previously be submitted in 
a bench trial. However, that kind of evidence will now be excluded to avoid an increase 
in the amount of evidence presented in the trial which could cause delay. Landsman and 
Zhang claimed that the problems of the decrease in the amount of evidence and 
testimony presented at the pre-trial preparation could obstruct the major contribution 
of the citizen judges’ participation by lessening the chance of citizen judges’ making a 
‘common-sense assessment of witness credibility’288. 
The third concern is related to the equality of power between public prosecutor and 
defence attorney. A public prosecutor and defence attorney need to build their strategy 
before the pre-trial arrangement conferences and it is better that the strategy is 
consistent from the pre-trial arrangement conference to the trial. A public prosecutor is 
not required to disclose all evidence that they have collected. Therefore a defence 
attorney has to request disclosure of the evidence relevant to the case. Fukurai 
anticipated that public prosecutors would disclose broader types of evidence to support 
evidential discovery and information, compared to prior to the introduction of the 
citizen judge system289. However, submission of the full list of the evidence obtained at 
the investigative stage is not compulsory for the public prosecutors in Japan. Also the 
disclosure process must be requested by the defence attorneys or the professional 
judges and the reasons for the request must be revealed290. This may reveal the defence 
attorney’s strategy to the public prosecutor before the trial and may guide his/her 
preparation. Therefore, the pre-trial conference technique of defence attorneys is 
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important291 in order to pursue an effective legal strategy including possible settlement 
before the trial292. 
The pre-trial arrangement conference appears to have become more important than 
before in other lay adjudication systems. The Victoria Criminal Procedure Act 2009 in 
Australia introduced obligatory pre-trial procedure before the lay adjudicator trial293. For 
those countries which give the defendants/defence attorneys the right to waive a lay 
adjudicator trial, the pre-trial arrangement conference is considered ‘important’294 in 
order to make the decision as to whether they go forward to a lay adjudicator trial or 
not295. The popularity of plea bargaining appears to increase the importance of the 
conference particularly in the U.S.296 The Auld Report, in its analysis of the English jury 
system, claimed the importance of pre-trial assessment with defendant participation in 
an oral rather than dossier form297. The pre-trial arrangement conference appears to be 
fundamental in its emphasis which is both management focused, which aims at 
achieving speedy trials, and a defendants’ rights-focused approach, which aims at 
elaborating defence attorneys’ commitment and also the deliberations of the 
defendants/defence attorneys, public prosecutors, and professional judges. However, 
concern by both indirect and direct judicial influence over lay adjudicators is undeniable. 
As Dean has pointed out, the introduction of the citizen judge system has succeeded 
in promoting the examination of evidence from a prosecutors’ dossier to live-presented 
testimony298. This seems to be a considerable transitional experiences in relation to trial 
                                                          
291 L Walker and J Thibaut, ‘An Experimental Examination of Pretrial Conference Techniques’ (1970) 55 
Minnesota Law Review 1113–1138. 
292 The bill to claim the amendment of the parts of the CCP was submitted on 31/03/ 2015, which 
include the amendment of the disclosure procedures, however, there has not been no progress since 
the submission. 
293 The Hon Paul de Jersey Ac, ‘The Evolution of the Modern Criminal Trial: A Plethora of Change’ (2014) 
46 Australian Journal of Forensic Sciences 250–257, 252. 
294 Lee, supra note 69, 60. 
295 In particular, in the U.S. there are heated arguments about the pre-trial conference in not only 
criminal cases, but also civil cases. See, M Ponte, Lucille, ‘Putting Mandatory Summary Jury Trial Back 
on the Docket: Recommendations on the Exercise of Judicial Authority’ (1994) 63 Fordham Law Review 
1069–1098; JC Carlisle, ‘Simplified Procedure for Court Determination of Dispute under New York’s Civil 
Practice Law and Rules’ (1988) 54 Brooklyn Law Review 95–130, 104-28. 
296 See, King, ‘The American Criminal Jury’. 
297 A Auld, ‘Review of the Criminal Courts of England and Wales’ (London; 2001), ch.10 para. 221-228. 
298 M Dean, ‘Legal Transplants and Jury Trial in Japan’ (2011) 31 Legal Studies 570–590, 587-8. 
172 
 
preparation for public prosecutors and defence attorneys299. Moreover, they both need 
to advocate and ask questions to witnesses using language and visual aids which citizen 
judges can understand 300 .  Therefore training for this change was necessary and, 
especially, a shift in the practice of defence attorneys was fundamental301 in order to 
adapt as the adversarial party302.  However, Lempert expected that the introduction 
would affect prosecutorial charging decisions with a switch to plea bargaining in order 
to avoid a citizen judge trial303. There is an argument as to whether public prosecutors’ 
trial preparation, coaching witnesses before the citizen judge trial, could cause a 
presumption of guilt in the analysis of case studies304. The possible over-controlling 
authority of the public prosecutors appear to be problematic, which is something the 
German system has also faced305. In a comparative study between the Russian and 
Japanese lay adjudication systems, Mack noted the potential for more 
prosecutorial/judicial supremacy over the trial process. For example, the public 
prosecutors could be more critical in charging for their own purposes as well as their 
remaining right to appeal an acquittal as ‘a procedural insurance policy’306. 
4.4.5.2 Appeal 
In the citizen judge procedure, the standard appeal practice [Koso] has continued just 
as before the introduction of the citizen judge system. Appeal against a verdict reached 
by a citizen judge panel is allowed and a bench trial will be held at the appellate court, 
which is generally the High Court. The three professional judges in the bench trial are 
able to quash the original judgment reached by a citizen judge panel.  The possibility of 
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Proposed Lay Assessor System May Determine Its Fate’ (2008) 10 Asian-Pacific Law & Policy Journal 
199–234, 212. 
306 R Mack, ‘Reestablishing Jury Trials in Japan: Foundational Lesson from the Russian Experience’ (2012) 
2 Creighton International Law and Comparative Law Journal 100–127, 126. 
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a bench trial in appeal can lead to an underestimation of the citizen judge panel’s 
decision because it is possible for the decision to be overturned by the appellate judges. 
They may overturn a not-guilty verdict and set the sentence. In contrast, England has 
not introduced the right for the prosecution to appeal against a non-guilty verdict per 
se, but it has granted the prosecution the power to apply to the Court of Appeal for 
retrial if there is new and compelling evidence against the acquitted person in relation 
to the former offence307. The Russian appellate judges often overturn lay adjudicators’ 
verdict but the case is then retried by other lay adjudicator trials308. Overturning the 
citizen judges’ decisions by the appellate courts which are composed of only 
professional judges seems to diminish the effect of the citizen judge. This can be 
considered to hinder deliberative democracy as well as the legitimacy of the courts, and 
is contrary to the principle ne bis in dem309. Professional judges are appointed by the 
state, and in Japan, the professional judges in the District Courts are appointed by the 
judges of the Supreme Court appointed by the Emperor. 310  Professional judges’ 
rejections of the decisions of the people are a serious deviation from basic principles of 
democracy. From this perspective, the judgment reached by the citizen judge panel 
should not be discarded by the appellate court.  
While Japanese bureaucratic culture is rooted in the criminal justice system, the 
reform has at least introduced democracy into the system. This development could 
cause the inappropriate practice of the citizen judge system to be caught between these 
two cultures. The real problem in this respect is the procedural transformative nature 
of the reforms to Japan’s criminal justice system. The criminal procedure has been a 
static entity but also subject to continuous reforms by the government. Law reformers 
sought to balance democratic values with Japanese traditional principles, while the 
internationally-inspired lay adjudication system led to the adoption of a mixed lay 
adjudication procedure in between the jury and mixed judge models. Japan chose to 
align the criminal procedure with a moderate interpretation of democratic values.  
                                                          
307 Criminal Justice Act, sec. 75-80. 
308 VP Hans, ‘Jury Systems Around the World’ (2008) 4 Annual Review of Law and Social Science 275–
297, 288. 
309 Plogstedt, supra note 218, 427. 
310 The Constitution, art. 6(2). 
174 
 
 
Conclusion 
This evaluation of the CJA examines the citizen judge procedure by the means of a 
textual study on the CJA (before the empirical examination in the next chapter) and has 
discussed the extent to which citizen judges’ participation has been accepted. It also 
sought to examine the extent of the citizen judges’ participation in the criminal 
procedure The CJA’s provisions provide comprehensive rules for citizen judges’ 
participation in criminal trial procedure in line with the existing Japanese criminal justice 
procedure. The CJA certainly introduced enhanced civic participation in criminal 
procedure, which was quite limited before its introduction. There were entirely 
understandable reasons for introducing the citizen judge system and democratising the 
criminal justice system which was centralised and had limited lay participation. The 
drafters of the CJA succeeded in establishing a means by which lay adjudicators’ 
participation should be included in the existing system. 
The structure of the CJA was designed to introduce lay adjudicators’ participation. 
However, the Act and related legislation also stated the restrictions of their participation 
and introduced obstructive factors affecting how representative and attentive it is. 
Because of the considerable restrictions by the CJA as well as the continued reliance on 
the active role of the professional judges, judicial control still exists and seems to be 
emphasised alongside the collaborative structure of the citizen judge panel. 
There are some concerns, furthermore, throughout each stage of the citizen judge 
procedures, that the application of the CJA may result in it being construed as a 
government imposition and as a political act designed to control the judiciary rather 
than a reform to democratise the citizen judge system. Cooperation between 
professional judges and citizen judges who share the responsibilities and duties in some 
parts of the decision-making process will provide a sense of unity amongst group 
members and the process should encourage citizen judges to make individual decisions. 
Moreover, the extent of the citizen judges’ rights such as taking notes and questioning, 
will influence their decisions. If citizen judges’ participation is perceived as meaningful, 
it would certainly validate the CJA, which gives citizen judges the same rights as 
175 
 
professional judges, although it will be necessary to assess professional judges’ influence 
on citizen judges in particular in the deliberation room. 
In addition, the two procedural insurances of the pre-trial arrangement conference 
process and the bench trial in the appellate court establish concrete judicial control in 
the citizen judge procedure. The pre-trial arrangement conference procedure is 
considered as necessary to identify arguments and evidence heard in the trial. In the 
view of the Supreme Court, ‘the conference is essential to focus on certain points in 
disputes and make a trial simpler’311. On the other hand, the introduction of the pre-trial 
arrangement conference is part of safeguarding for legal professionals against citizen 
judges’ participation. 
There are also problems with the selection procedure of citizen judges which relate 
to the issue of how representative citizen judges are. The Japanese selection procedure 
employs random selection and limited voir dire vetting by the prosecution and defence, 
and avoids the ‘elite capture’ of the German lay adjudication system.312 The CJA provides 
a number of conditions for dismissal from citizen judge duty, and this results in damage 
to random selection which prevents citizen judge panel being fully representative of the 
community. 
Yamamoto’s views about the problem of the citizen judges promoting conflict in the 
Japanese criminal justice system rests on a wider picture of historic submission to the 
judiciary as legal professionals and the public to establish ‘just judgment’, and also on 
the principle of substantial truth in the judiciary administration313. The CJA confirms that 
citizen judges are obliged to ‘execute their duties in compliance with laws and 
regulations, impartially and in good faith’314, and not to ‘act in a way that could impair 
trust in the impartiality of decisions.’315 However, the Supreme Court view is that the 
                                                          
311 The Supreme Court, ‘For Achieving the Criminal Trial in Which Lay People Can Easily Participate’ 
[Japanese] (2005) <http://www.saibanin.courts.go.jp/topics/kokumin.html> accessed 13 September 
2015. 
312I Weber, ‘The New Japanese Jury System: Empowering the Public, Preservation Continental Justice’, 
[2009] East Asia Law Review 125–176, 166. 
313 M Yamamoto, ‘Problems on the Citizen Judge System in Japan [Saiban in Seido No Mondaisei]’ (2012) 
25 Chuo-Gakuin University Review of Faculty of Law 29–53. 
314 Art. 9(1). 
315 Art. 9(3). 
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impartiality of the trial is sustained by the existence of professional judges who decide 
on the interpretation of laws and regulations, court procedures, other than the decisions 
made with the consideration and participation of citizen judges under Article 73(1) of 
the Constitution. Therefore, the citizen judges’ participation in Japanese criminal 
procedure has no potential to exist without professional judges’ supervision. The real 
expectation in the CJA is that the practice of the citizen judge system is driven largely by 
democratisation of the criminal justice procedure. However, the citizen judges’ 
participation is greatly restricted because of the contradictions that have existed 
between concepts of democracy and those of substantial truth and these remain divisive 
and crucial issues. Diehm suggests that the discrepancies will result in ‘perceptions of 
insensitivity, misunderstandings, and ultimate failure.’ 316  The CJA provides the 
procedures which introduced lay adjudicators’ participation which did not exist before. 
But it also was to be applied by actors who are practicing in the system, leading to an 
injustice which can undermine democratic values, and more centralisation and control 
by the judiciary. In that context, the citizen judge system has the potential of being a 
failed rather than successful lay adjudication system because citizen judges’ 
participation and a representative and attentive position for citizen judges were not 
secured in the system. The absolute control by legal professionals over the citizen judge 
trial is to a large extent the result of the many challenges facing the citizen judge system. 
Considerable doubts about the poor capacity and application of the CJA remains. 
Therefore, the practice of the citizen judge system will be examined in the next chapter.
                                                          
316 JW Diehm, ‘The Introduction of Jury Trials and Adversarial Elements into the Former Soviet Union 
and Other Inquisitorial Countries’ (2001) 11 Law & Policy 1–38, 38. 
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CHAPTER 5  AN EVALUATION OF THE CITIZEN JUDGE 
SYSTEM II 
 
Introduction 
In this final substantive chapter, following the procedural examination in the previous 
chapter, I will examine the citizen judge system in practice and how it applies the CJA, 
using the examination criteria proposed in Chapter 2. The, quantitative data is secondary, 
gathered by the Supreme Court and from some District Courts. The primary qualitative 
data is original material collected by the researcher from interviews with the former 
citizen judges and legal professionals listed in Chapter 1 who had taken part in citizen 
judge trials. This chapter considers the manner in which the citizen judge system is 
applied and how far expected domestic outcomes occurred and are compatible with the 
existing criminal procedural principles. The most crucial question that arises is whether 
the CJA has been successfully put in place? In order to answer this question, five 
essential sub-questions are examined by applying the evaluation criteria proposed and 
developed in the 2 and 3 chapters. The question concerns: the frequency of the actual 
use of citizen judge trials: citizen judges’ ability to understand the law and the 
information obtained during their trial duties; citizen judges’ attentiveness in the 
decision-making process; the features that need to be improved; and the actors’- 
including the citizen judges’ satisfaction levels. 
This chapter is organised in four sections. Section 5.1 focuses on the citizen judges’ 
participation, representativeness and attentiveness. Section 5.2 deconstructs the 
impacts of the citizen judges’ participation on the citizen judges, the criminal justice 
procedures and legal professionals, defendants, and society. Section 5.3 examines 
citizen judges’ participation in death penalty cases drawing on the example of the 
Nagoya Family Homicide case in order to show its advantages and challenges in the case 
of trials where the death penalty could be imposed. Section 5.4 measures the success of 
the citizen judge system in terms of citizen judges’ and legal professionals’ satisfaction 
with the citizen judge system. 
178 
 
 
5.1  Citizen Judges’ Participation, Representativeness and Attentiveness 
5.1.1 The Frequency of Citizen Judge Trials 
The Supreme Court’s annual statistics are published in accordance with Article 103 of 
the Citizen Judge Act (CJA)1. Consisting of 78 tables divided into four chapters, the annual 
statistics report contains a wide range of quantitative data, including the number of 
defendants tried by new citizen judge trials, the duration of the pre-trial arrangement 
conference process, the selection process, the decision-making process, and the number 
of non-Japanese defendants tried in citizen judge trials. The Supreme Court estimated 
that the number of citizen judge cases would be approximately 4,000 per year, that is, 
3% of all criminal cases in the District Courts in 2005, for example2. However, the actual 
number of defendants tried in citizen judge trials in practice was far smaller than 
expected3. Only 9,652 defendants were tried in citizen judge trials between May 2009 
and February 2016. The annual number of defendants tried by citizen judge trials 
between 2010 and 2015 were 1,506, 1,525, 1,500, 1,387, 1,202, and 1,182, respectively4. 
Thus, the average number was 1,359 over each of the five years. The Supreme Court 
statistics indicate the actual use in practice of citizen judge trials: the number of citizen 
judge trials was far fewer than anticipated before the CJA was put in place. 
There are two possible reasons for the relatively low number of citizen judge trials: a 
decrease in the number of reported offences suitable for citizen judge trials and/or a 
change in prosecutorial policy. If the number of reported criminal cases decreases, the 
total number of cases received by the Public Prosecutor’s Office will be on the decrease. 
Also, if the criminal cases reported become less serious, the number of cases that are 
suitable subjects for citizen judge trials could decrease because of prosecutorial policy. 
However, a prosecutor interviewed for this research confirmed that there was no 
organisational or conscious strategy to avoid citizen judge trials when making indictment 
                                                          
1 The statistical data between 2009 and 2014 by the Supreme Court is available on the website at the 
moment (May 2016): http://www.saibanin.courts.go.jp/ [Japanese]. 
2 Y Tsuchiya, Start of the Citizen Judge System: The Expectations and Concerns (Tokyo; Kadensha 2008), 
28. 
3 The Supreme Court does not publish the number of citizen judge cases but does publish the number of 
defendants tried by citizen judge trials. 
4 The Supreme Court, ‘Digest: The Implementation of the Citizen Judge Trials’ (Tokyo; 2016), 1. 
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decisions5. The prosecution ratio has shown a constant small decline since 19976. It was 
64% of reported offences in 1997, at 37.8% in 2008 and at 32.8% in 20147. Although 
whether there was any change in prosecutorial policy is not clear, a decrease in the 
number reported offences since 2003 is evident. As a matter of fact, the total number 
of cases received by the Public Prosecutor’s Office has largely been on the decrease since 
19868. The total number of criminal arrests in 2006 and 2007 was 649,503 and 640,6579, 
while it was 394,121 and 370,568 in 2012 and 201310, according to the Supreme Court 
statistics. They also demonstrate significant variations in the number of citizen judge 
trial cases depending on the court/prefecture. For example, in the Tokyo, Osaka, and 
Chiba prefectures, 112811, 1,05812, and 989 citizen judge trials were held between 2009 
and 2016, whereas in Shimane, Tottori, and Toyama prefectures 22, 26, and 35 trials 
occurred during the same period13. These are the largest numbers and the smallest 
number for all Japan. 
5.1.2 Selection of Citizen Judges 
While the CJA was a product of government-driven judicial reform, there were 
concerns that the difficulty of ensuring citizen judges’ understood the process had led 
to fewer candidates presenting themselves to the selection process for citizen judges, 
than expected. The Supreme Court conducted a survey of citizens’ motivations for 
becoming citizen judges and the results showed that a very small number of 
respondents believed in the importance of the duties of citizen judges for the 
community – only 14.6% and 11.3% of Public Prosecutor Committee members with and 
without deliberative experience, respectively. Between 2009 and 2012, 1,241,406 
people were listed as citizen judge candidates and approximately 40% of citizen judge 
                                                          
5 Interview, public prosecutor, 11/06/2011. 
6 Ministry of Justice [Japan], ‘White Paper on Crime [Hanzaihankusho]’ (2015) 
<http://hakusyo1.moj.go.jp/jp/62/nfm/mokuji.html> accessed 20 March 2016, table 2-2-3-2. 
7 Ibid. 
8 ibid. 
9 National Police Agency, ‘Police White Paper 2007’ (2007) 
<https://www.npa.go.jp/hakusyo/h20/toukei/t1-05.pdf> accessed 7 June 2016. 
10 National Police Agency, ‘Police White Paper 2013’ (2013) 
<https://www.npa.go.jp/hakusyo/h27/data.html> accessed 6 June 2016, table 2-4. 
11 The number was the total between that of Tokyo District Court central (868) and Tachikawa branch 
(260). 
12 The number was the total between that of Osaka District Court central (834) and Sakai branch (224). 
13 The Supreme Court, supra note 5, 2. 
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candidates actually served each year between 2010 and 201314. In spite of concerns, an 
appropriate average of 74% of citizen judges who were summoned to attend, appeared 
in court between 2009 and 201315. For instance, 47 out of 49 candidates showed up for 
selection in the first citizen judge trial16. Subsequently, 6 citizen judges were chosen from 
the 47 candidates. A large number of candidates voiced their dissatisfaction with the 
inefficient selection procedure in 200917.  In Nagasaki District Court, approximately 30 
citizen judges candidates participated in the selection process18; this means that on 
average, 24 candidates were not selected for each citizen judge trial. These figures 
suggest that pre-introduction concerns regarding the public’s unwillingness to 
participate have not – in practice – affected the citizen judge system. However, there 
has been a certain amount of dissatisfaction amongst the candidates. In fact, the 
appearance rate when summoned to attend the selection process started to decrease 
from 2009 and has continued to do so every year since19.  
The excluded candidates who are excused from appearing seem to widely accept not 
being citizen judge candidates, while challenges to the selected citizen judges by the 
public prosecutors and defence attorneys were relatively rare. The court seems to have 
been very lenient in excusing people from their duty. The rate of acceptance of excuses 
was 28.3% at the notification stage20, 30.7% at the inquiry stage21, and 91.4 % at the 
summons stage 22 . The percentage of candidates who made excuses which were 
accepted increased throughout the selection process from 61.1% overall in 2009 to 
66.2% in 201623. The wide acceptance of excusals before and at the summons stage 
presumably make the pool of citizen judge candidates small before the random selection 
                                                          
14 The Supreme Court, ‘Report on the Implementation Status of the Citizen Judge Trials’ (Tokyo; 2013), 
3. 
15 Ibid, 20. 
16 ibid. 
17 Asahi Newspaper, ‘First Citizen Judge Trial in Japan’ (2009) <http://www.asahi-net.or.jp/~xx8f-
ishr/saibanin1.htm> accessed 1 June 2013. 
18 Nagasaki District Court, ‘The Implementation of the Citizen Judge System in Nagasaki District Court’ 
(2013), 1. 
19 The Supreme Court, supra note 14, 6. 
20 As explained in Chapter 4, the court shall randomly choose candidates, compile the list by excluding 
disqualified candidates, and send it to the court by 15th October.  
21 After the notification stage, the court modify the list by excluding candidates. The Supreme Court, 
supra note 14, 18. 
22 Ibid, 20.  
23 The Supreme Court, supra note 4, 5. 
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method by lot and this will affect the degree of representativeness of the community. 
However, few challenges to citizen judge candidates were made; actually, only 0.1% of 
potential candidates were challenged without cause, according to the Supreme Court 
survey24. The defendant in a robbery case which resulted in a death made a special 
appeal because the defence challenge with reasons of one citizen judge candidate was 
not accepted. Moreover, the implementation of the court’s decision was not 
suspended25. The argument in the case was whether the objection to the selection 
process of the citizen judge26 was applied according to Article 425 of CCP, the suspension 
of the criminal procedure, or not27. Ultimately, the Supreme Court decided the objection 
to the selection process of citizen judges had not been applied according to Article 425. 
Moreover, the judgment was that the selection process was suitable, with flexible 
cooperation between legal professionals 28 . Furthermore, the judgment stated that 
random selection by lot without challenges by the public prosecution or the defence 
attorney is preferable in order to make the operation of the citizen judge procedures 
consistent, and has been carried out effectively29. A public prosecutor interviewed for 
this research, claimed that he tried not to challenge the candidates, in fact, he had never 
challenged a citizen judge candidate30. 
Although there is leniency in accepting excuses for non-attendance, the citizen judges 
are representative of the community in Japan in terms of their ratio to the general 
population, as described below. The gender proportions were almost equal, with 55.3% 
of citizen judges being male and 43.4% female31. Their ages were from 20-29 (13.7%), 
30-39 (20.0%), 40-49 (24.2%), 50-59 (20.0%), 60-69 (18.6%), and over 70 (2.0%)32.  Their 
occupations were fulltime employment (employees) (57.4%), employers (6.3%), part-
time employees (15.2 %), and housewives/househusbands (9.4 %)33. Considering the 
                                                          
24 The Supreme Court, ‘Report: The Implications of the Citizen Judge System’ (Tokyo; 2015), 22. 
25 CCP, art. 425. 
26 CJA, art. 35(1). 
27 ‘Case Study’ (2015) 1478 Jurist 92–94, 92. The Supreme Court 15/03/2013. 
28 Ibid, 94. 
29 Ibid.  
30 Interview, public prosecutor, 22/05/2011. 
31 The Supreme Court, ‘Result Report of Questionnaire Data from Former Citizen Judges in 2015’ (Tokyo; 
2015), 100. 
32 Ibid. 
33 Ibid. 
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combination of all these factors, it is fair to say that the citizen judges selected from 
2009 to 2016 were from diverse backgrounds and fully representative of the community 
in Japan. 
5.1.3 Citizen Judge’s Attentiveness 
 
 
 
Table 5.1.3 Attentiveness and Competence of Citizen Judges34 
  
The Former Citizen 
Judges 
Had a difficulty  in understanding evidence 0 
Had a difficulty in understanding applicable laws 0 
Professional Judges’ Explanations were important to 
understand information they obtained during the trial 5 
Participated actively in the courtroom 5 
Believed co-citizen judges participated actively in the 
courtroom 5 
Participated actively in the deliberation room 5 
Believed that co-citizen judges participated actively in 
the courtroom 5 
Believed that professional Judges’ Explanations were 
important to understand information they obtained 
during the trial 5 
Reaching a decision by themselves without 
professional judges’ pressure 5 
 
The 5 former citizen judges interviewed for this research thought that they had 
carried out their citizen judge duties with care and attention throughout the decision-
making process, and they considered their five other co-citizen judges were attentive 
too35. Although the number and frequency of citizen judge questions and note-taking 
                                                          
34 Interviews, citizen judges, 12/05/2011 – 01/06/2011. 
35Ibid. 
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skills may not be a measure of their attentiveness, all citizen judges interviewed for this 
research confirmed that they asked questions and took notes, both in the courtroom 
and in the deliberation room 36 . As discussed in Chapter 2, the citizen judges’ 
attentiveness can be assessed by the competence of citizen judges in accordance with 
the parameter of the citizen judges’ satisfaction with, or confidence in their work, not 
by professional judges’ standards. The citizen judges’ competence, will be evaluated in 
terms of their understanding of the information given them throughout the citizen judge 
trial procedure and their ability to make an individual final decision independently 
without pressure from other members of the citizen judge panel: the three professional 
judges and five co-citizen judges. 
There are three different types of information citizen judges’ need to understand: 
information related to the citizen judge procedure and citizen judges’ duties, trial 
evidence and the appropriate laws. Greater access to clear and comprehensible 
information for citizen judges, according to Wilson, was aimed at providing ‘systemic 
transparency’ 37  as well as ‘civic participation and education’ to guarantee the 
fundamental rights of the defendants38. Furthermore, there are the expectations and 
requirements surrounding the criminal procedure and justice obligations set down in 
articles of the Constitution, which guarantee the principles of a fair trial and transparent 
standards and access to justice for all. Fundamentally, these principles are consistent 
with the overall vision of citizen judges being able to understand information and so 
ensure the fundamental rights and freedoms of Japanese citizens. 
Citizen judges are expected to understand all three kinds of information, mentioned 
above. Information about the citizen judge procedure and citizen judges’ duties is widely 
available to the public in cartoon booklet form and various videos on the Supreme 
Courts’ website39, while citizen judges have the procedures and their duties explained 
to them before the court case. All five former citizen judges interviewed for this research 
                                                          
36Ibid. 
37 MJ Wilson, ‘Japan’s New Criminal Jury Trial System: In Need of More Transparency, More Access, and 
More Time’ (2010) 33 Fordham International Law Journal 487–572, 528. 
38 Ibid, 572. 
39 The Supreme Court, ‘Information Related to the Citizen Judge System’ 
<http://www.saibanin.courts.go.jp/news/video.html> accessed 15 June 2016. 
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confirmed that the explanation of the information was easy to understand40. The second, 
the trial evidence, is about the facts and the evidence. All five former citizen judges 
interviews for this research noted that they had no problems understanding this 
information41. According to a Supreme Court survey, 96% of former citizen judges who 
answered the Supreme Court questionnaire thought that the information presented by 
the public prosecutors and defence attorneys and explained in the hearings were easy 
and straightforward to understand42. The third type of information is about law. All five 
former citizen judges interviewed for this research confirmed that they had no problem 
understanding the legal and deliberative issues43, while all of them also believed that 
professional judge’s explanations and support were important for that. Therefore, all 
former citizen judges interviewed for this research had strong confidence in their 
understanding skills in relation to all the types of information they obtained throughout 
their duties. Moreover, all eleven legal professionals interviewed for this research 
claimed that the citizen judges appeared to have a good understanding of all 
information44. The Supreme Court survey provides statistical data about the former 
citizen judges’ views about how easy it was to understand the information explained by 
the public prosecutors, defence attorneys and professional judges, as well as how easy 
it was for them to deliberate and discuss issues45. 
However, the survey does not provide any data about independent deliberation. All 
five former citizen judges believed that they were able to make their own minds up 
independently of the professional judges and their co-citizen judges. Independent, 
unbiased performance of duties is fundamental and in accordance with Article 8 of the 
CJA, which states that ‘citizen judges shall be independent in the execution of their 
duties’, but probably there are overlaps with the necessary cooperation between the 
citizen judges and professional judges, which are more focused on the citizen judges’ 
independence because of the collaborative structure of the citizen judge panel. 
                                                          
40 Interviews, supra note 34. 
41 Ibid. 
42 The Supreme Court, supra note 31, 5. 
43 Interviews, supra note 35. 
44 Interviews, professional judges, public prosecutors and defence attorneys, 26/04/2011- 10/06/2011. 
45 ibid. 
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5.1.4 Cooperation in the Citizen Judge Panel 
All former citizen judges interviewed for this research believed their understanding 
skills in relation to all the information and their independent deliberation skills were 
sufficient. However, maintaining the attentiveness and competence of the citizen judges 
is presumably influenced by the professional judges’ cooperation, not only because of 
the nature of the collaborative structure of the citizen judge panel, which consists of 
both citizen judges and professional judges. Moreover the structure leads to the judicial 
responsibility of professional judges and the citizen judges’ psychological dependence 
upon them.  
The relationship between the citizen judges and professional judges is thus largely 
dependent on the professional judges’ behaviour rather than a cooperative relationship 
with an equal knowledge base. They are supposed to be equally responsible as co- 
members of the citizen judge panel and in other words, there is no hierarchical 
relationship between them. 
As with the other collaborative structures with a lay adjudicator panel such as the 
mixed judge model, the citizen judge system also presents growing concerns about more 
powerful judicial control of the professional judges over citizen judges in the decision-
making process. For example, lay adjudicators in the former Soviet Union legal system 
were called the ‘nodders’ because of their tendency to always agree with the 
professional judges46. This tendency is a common concern, particularly in the mixed 
judge model of lay adjudication systems, while judicial control in the jury model arising 
from the professional judges’ instructions to help jurors come to their decisions, is also 
a concern. Machura highlighted the statistical data in the German lay adjudication 
system, pointing out that 85% and 80% of respondents answered that none, or hardly 
any time pressure was put upon them during their deliberations by the presiding 
judges47. In the Japanese citizen judge system, the professional judges often ask citizen 
judges whether they have any question in order to give them the opportunity to 
                                                          
46 NP Kovalev, ‘Lay Adjudication of Crimes in the Commonwealth of Independent States: An 
Independent and Impartial Jury or a “Court of Nodders”?’ (2004) 11 Journal of Eastern European Law 
123–157. 
47 S Machura, ‘Interaction between Lay Assessors and Professional Judges in German Mixed Courts’ 
(2001) 72 Revue internationale de droit pénal 451–479. 
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participate actively. However, how often and how many opportunities should be 
allowed for citizen judges to ask questions is not regulated by law and neither are 
professional judges required to ask citizen judges whether they have any questions. Thus 
the conduct of questioning sessions is dependent upon individual professional judges’ 
discretion. 
All 5 former citizen judges interviewed for this research had positive feedback about 
the comprehensibility of the professional judges’ explanations and their friendliness, 
and this seemed to encourage unity and cooperation amongst the members of the 
citizen judge panel and provoke feelings of trust in the professional judges48. The level 
of interaction between the citizen judges in the deliberation room seemed to differ for 
each citizen judge panel. For example, some citizen judges introduced themselves at the 
beginning with their names and credentials, and called each other by name in the 
deliberation room, although in general, particularly in the courtroom, they referred to 
each other by numbers49. However, a common response of the all former citizen judges 
interviewed for this research was that they appreciated the professional judges’ 
friendliness and generosity50. The professional judges did appear to devise ways and 
means to enhance the citizen judges’ performances. For example, the timeline of the 
deliberating process was available in the deliberation room as a guide or the 
professional judges explained the contents and aims of the procedure during breaks51. 
Moreover, one former citizen judge responded to the questions about the meaning of 
legal terminology ‘justifiable defence’, noting that the professional judges seemed to be 
happy to answer his questions. As a result he was confident that he understood all the 
information he was given52. A former citizen judge interviewed for this research referred 
to the fact that she found some information first, but she asked questions to the 
professional judges and they explained more clearly. Therefore she had no difficulty in 
understanding the information53. Therefore, it is likely that the professional judges are 
                                                          
48 Interviews, supra note 35. 
49 Ibid. 
50 Ibid. 
51 T Tanojiri, ‘The Future of the Citizen Judge Trials From the Public Prosecutors’ Perspectives [Saibanin 
Saiban No Korekara - Kennsatsukan No Shiten]’ (2014) 67 Horitsu no hiroba 19–26, 25. 
52 Interviews, citizen judge, 25/05/2011. 
53 Interview, citizen judge, 31/05/2011. 
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generally supportive in providing appropriate judicial instructions as well as responding 
to citizen judges’ psychological dependence. 
Paradoxically the professional judges’ relationship with citizen judges can be both 
encouraging and restrictive because the professional judges could manipulate them. A 
former citizen judge claimed that he felt they were guided by the professional judges54. 
In addition to direct manipulation, the professional judge interviewed for this research 
pointed out that it was not difficult at all for professional judges to manipulate or guide 
citizen judges without their being aware of what was happening55. The Supreme Court 
published former citizen judges’ responses suggesting that they had experienced 
coercive pressure from the professional judges56. Moreover, a gap in knowledge and 
information between professional judges and citizen judges appears to lead to the 
impossibility of building equal relationships between them. Vanoverbeke raised an 
example that a former citizen judge felt there was an information gap obtaining 
between the citizen judge’s and professional judges’ knowledge, and this frustrated him 
in his deliberations57. 
The Supreme Court statistics showed a significant increase in length of the decision-
making process. The actual number of days of citizen judge attendance increased from 
3.7 days in 2009 to 9.7 days in 201658. Moreover, the statistics show an increase in the 
length of deliberating time from 397 minutes in 2009, to 718.8 minutes in 201659. The 
Supreme Court acknowledged the increase in time for the decision-making procedure, 
but said that ‘it is likely that the increase was the result of the time used in deliberating 
and delivering the verdict increase rather than due to any changes in the details of the 
cases’60. The expanding duration of the decision-making process will become a burden 
on citizen judges and limited citizen judges candidates who can find time to attend the 
trial. 
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To sum up, the citizen judge system has provided the opportunity for citizen judges 
to participate in serious criminal cases, and these citizen judges seem to appropriately 
represent their communities. Moreover, the attentiveness of the citizen judges in terms 
of their competence to understand the information given throughout their duties is also 
indicated in the light of citizen judges’ own confidence; however, it is based on 
cooperation with the professional judges. 
 
5.2 Impacts of Citizen Judges’ Participation 
5.2.1 Impact on the Criminal Justice Procedure 
5.2.1.1 Pre-Trial Arrangement Conference Procedure 
The CJA was passed in 2004 and came into force in 2009. The pre-trial arrangement 
conference process, which takes place with the participation of the professional judges, 
public prosecutors and defence attorneys, was aimed to make the issues heard and 
deliberated in a citizen judge trial more comprehensible to citizen judges. There is no 
citizen judge participation in the pre-trial arrangement conferences. The compulsory 
pre-trial arrangement conference process in the citizen judge trial procedure was 
introduced to ensure effective decision-making proceedings for citizen judges, as 
discussed in Chapter 4.  However, the duration of the process has increased over time. 
The average duration increased from the 2.8 months starting point in 2009, to lasting 
5.4 months in 2010, 6.4 months in 2010, 6.9 months in 2013, 6.8 months in 2014, 7.4 
months in 2015, and 8.6 months in 201661. Therefore, apart from a small decrease in 
2014, the duration of the pre-trial arrangement conference process has become 
constantly longer. This increasingly lengthy process then raises two concerns. Firstly, 
that the trial dossiers are increasingly detailed, which has led to the reliance on written 
documents. Secondly, a lengthy pre-trial process leads to extending the defendants’ 
detention in custody62, which has caused financial problems for them and raised human 
rights concerns. 
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Detailed dossiers are prepared by the prosecution and defence, but there seems to 
be heavier dependence on that created by the public prosecutor. In addition to the two 
sets of dossier of documents, Investigative Reports [Sogo Sosa Hokokusho] explaining 
the non-disputed facts about the case are submitted by the public prosecutor, and the 
Bar Association can claim the right to introduce an agreement dossier [Goi Shomen]63. 
In spite of the efforts devoted to making these detailed dossiers, the level of detail and 
extra information could confuse the citizen judges. Tanojiri suggests that a fact-focused 
context rather than a story-telling approach should be taken in the proven registration 
fact dossier because the public prosecutors should anticipate the defence attorney’s 
possible counterclaims and alternative evidence64. Moreover, he also claims that the 
public prosecutor should clarify the extent of the citizen judges’ tasks; in other words, 
the public prosecutor has the authority to determine the range of the citizen judges’ 
deliberations. Nishimura points out that requests for expert evidence, which can be 
asked for by the public prosecutor and defence attorney during the pre-trial 
arrangement conference process, have decreased65. According to Vidmar, testimony at 
the trial has a significant influence on lay adjudicators’ understandings of disputed facts, 
although critics of expert testimony tend to focus on what they claim is lay adjudicators’ 
incompetence, irresponsibility and biased acceptance of expert testimony. They also put 
emphasis on the common sense of lay adjudicators rather than the systematic 
evaluation of data and the academic knowledge of experts66. Therefore, the increasing 
duration of the pre-trial arrangement conference process appears to show a pragmatic 
compromise in the preparation to support the citizen judges’ participation. In addition, 
the focus on the pre-trial could be taking over the management of information67 and 
knowledge so that the role of citizen judges in the decision-making process could be 
restricted. 
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 Ironically, the very first stage of the citizen judge trial procedure – the pre-trial 
arrangement conference process – has no citizen judge participation, and has become 
the main focus of legal professionals’ concern to ensure successful and effective citizen 
judge trials by making highly detailed dossiers. Sugita describes this as the addictive 
nature of ‘over-reliance on the written dossier’, which is one of the most criticised points 
in the Japanese procedure68.  
5.2.1.2 The Decision-Making Process 
The shift of emphasis from the inquisitorial approach to the adversarial approach was 
undertaken with the aim of introducing the citizen judge system. Moreover, changes 
aimed at emphasising orality and immediacy are confirmed to have taken place in the 
hearings, introducing rules of evidence similar to the trial procedure practice in common 
law jurisprudence69. The trial takes place over consecutive days, in contrast to the bench 
trials, before the introduction of the citizen judge system. Although the duration of 
citizen judge trial procedures has increased since 2009, in comparison with the bench 
(professional judge alone) trials before the introduction of the citizen judge system, the 
duration of the criminal trial procedure has dramatically shortened. Long trials could go 
on for many years and were criticised70 by many scholars, as Thaman has pointed out71. 
The trial used to be opened during one a month, but could then have intervals as long 
as three months before continuing72. Thus hearings over consecutive days without gaps 
are clearly one target of the introduction of the citizen judge system at which the Judicial 
Reform Council aimed73. This achievement has also led to the direct presentation of 
evidence74  in the hearings. 
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The principle of orality has been more emphasised since the CJA was introduced. Thus, 
an approach, called Hikokunin Shitsumon Senkōgata, which prioritises the direct oral 
testimony of the defendant and witnesses is often used in citizen judge trials rather than 
reading out the investigators’ record of the defendant’s statement in the case of 
confession75. There is still a tendency to use written material in citizen judge trials76, and 
the use of written material, including confessions obtained in the investigative process, 
is not disapproved of77. 
The development of citizen judges’ participation in trials could mark a dramatic 
departure from Japanese traditional principles. In particular, the principle of substantial 
truth, which underpins that adjudicators investigate written dossiers has given way to 
an emphasis on the prosecution’s and defence’s cross-examination when examining the 
evidence. Historically, the professional judges had assumed responsibility for both the 
discovery and the investigation of criminal offences 78 . The new procedural roles 
prescribed by the CJA are out of tune with the traditional cultural interpretations of the 
responsibilities of public prosecutors and professional judges. This has created 
confusion as to the general area of their duties and the level of trust between them. 
According to Ando, one of the key reasons why the CJA is effectively applied79  and 
enforced is because power remains with the professional judges and public prosecutors, 
because traditional principles include 80  a high level of trust in the authorities 81 . 
Moreover, the CJA leaves it to the citizen judges to subjectively evaluate the probative 
value of the evidence. As a consequence, professional judges have continued to use the 
same evaluation guidelines as in the past. Indeed, because the CJA does not address all 
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the procedural issues, such as the evidentiary standards, the citizen judges and 
professional judges are required to refer to earlier rules.  
5.2.1.2.1 Verdicts 
There is no significant change in verdicts reached by citizen judge panels and the 
bench judgements before the introduction of the citizen judge system. The Supreme 
Court’s annual statistics show 8,820 judicial decisions reached by the citizen judge 
panels from 2009 to 2016, as referred to above, while the statistics also show that only 
49 resulted in not guilty verdicts, while there were 8,591 guilty verdicts82. These figures 
suggest that if an individual is arrested and charged with an offence, there is a high 
probability that they will be convicted. In fact, the high conviction rate - 99.4%83 - still 
remains. The high conviction rate was the one of the concerns84, and this has not been 
changed by the introduction of the citizen judge system.  
However, sentencing has been changed by the introduction of citizen judge system, 
according to Kojima85 . In fact, there have been some shifts towards more punitive 
sentencing in attempted murder cases, accidental death, robbery resulting in grievous 
bodily harm and rape resulting in bodily harm cases86. In the bench trials before the 
introduction of the citizen judge system, the most likely sentences for individuals 
convicted of homicide were 11 years imprisonment, whereas in the citizen judge trials, 
defendants convicted for the same offence were sentenced to 16 or 17 years 
imprisonment87. At the same time, the use of probation has been increased in homicide 
cases, robbery resulting in grievous bodily harm and arson in inhabited buildings cases88. 
Therefore, as Kojima also pointed out, citizen judges’ participation has increased the 
range of sentences, with both more punitive and more lenient tendencies89. Possibly, 
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due to the change in sentencing patterns, in spite of unchanged high conviction rates, 
the prison population in Japan has decreased since 200990. 
This may suggest that citizen judges tend to focus on the rehabilitation of the 
defendants rather than the retributive effect of punishment. The average ratio of cases 
sentenced with probation was 35.8% in judicial trials; on the other hand, the ratio in the 
citizen judge system is 55.7%%91. The conviction rate has not changed much. The rate in 
the citizen judge system is still approximately 99%92. The ratio of lower court decisions 
that the appellate courts overturned dramatically changed from 41.0% to 23.9%93, which 
is a different change from that which occurred after the introduction of the  Russian jury 
system94. 
According to a professional judge, however, deliberation about sentencing has been 
conducted based on the Sentence database. At the first sentencing procedure, the 
professional judges provide the citizen judge with the typical sentence ranges for similar 
offences in the past from the database. There are several cases which drew attention to 
the fact that the sentences reached by the citizen judge panel exceeded the sentences 
asked for by the public prosecutor. For instance, a citizen judge panel in Osaka District 
Court gave a 15 year imprisonment sentence for a homicide case when 10 years 
imprisonment was asked for by the public prosecutor. Moreover, the Supreme Court 
rejected a final appeal by the defendant against the length of his conviction95. For the 
murder, mutilation and concealment of the corpse in Miyazaki District Court, the citizen 
judge panel gave a life imprisonment sentence in spite of 25 years imprisonment being 
demanded by the prosecution. These examples highlight a level of independent thinking 
by the citizen judge panels. Nevertheless, the use of the sentencing database has meant 
that there was little or no discussion or explanation of how to make sentencing decisions 
between the members of the citizen judge panel, and Venoverbeke claims that the 
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citizen judge system functions as the justification of ‘a well-established system’ which is 
still run by professional judges96. 
5.2.1.2.2 Written Judgment 
The written judgment has become simpler and plainer in terms of the reasons for the 
citizen judge panel’s decisions97. Article 335 stipulates the necessity to signify the facts 
constituting the crime, the list of evidence and the application of the laws and 
regulations in the written judgment, but the fact-finding process and the reasons for 
determining the verdict are not required. The lack of detailed information in written 
judgments can lead to a re-examination of the records and evidence heard in citizen 
judge trials by the appeal courts. This could cause citizen judge panels’ decisions and 
citizen judges’ participation to be discredited or undervalued. The cooperation between 
the citizen judges and professional judges should be accurately expressed in the appeal 
court in assessing the legitimacy of the appeal. As Sakamaki points out, the cooperation 
is on condition that the professional judges will take on vocational responsibility for 
correcting any citizen judges’ misconceptions and misunderstandings, and if this does 
not take place, then trial decisions can be overturned and corrected98 in the Court of 
Appeal. Therefore, the course of the cooperation reflected in the trial decisions should 
be clarified in the final written judgment. 
5.2.1.3 After the Trial 
The possibility of overturning the citizen judge panel’s decisions by a subsequent 
bench trial in the appeal courts appears to be symbolic of the limited extent of the citizen 
judges’ participation in the citizen judge procedures in Japan. An appeal with specific 
grounds, by either party, the prosecution or the defence, is allowed for an acquittal 
based on an error in applying the law, the sentencing 99 or fact-finding100 procedures. 
Moreover, Article 393 of CCP states that the court of the second instance may conduct 
an examination of the facts upon the request of the public prosecutor or the defence, 
or may do so ex officio when it is deemed necessary. Therefore it seems to be fair to 
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consider that an appeal in the appellate court is a rehearing bench trial procedure after 
a citizen judge trial. 
In fact, the Supreme Court survey shows frequent overturning of the citizen judge 
panel decisions by the Appeal Court. The three professional judges in the bench trial are 
able to quash the original judgement reached by a citizen judge panel and 35% of citizen 
judge trial cases have been subject to appeal against the ruling, and the ratio of cases in 
which a citizen judge panel reached a guilty verdict but which the appellate panel 
subsequently overturned with a not guilty verdict was 0.38% in 2012, which was lower 
than of the figure before the introduction of the citizen judge system: which was 
0.41%101. In 53 out of 804 cases in the appeal courts between 2009 and 2015 the citizen 
judge panel decisions were overturned102.  
There seem to be two principles used by the appellate courts to evaluate the factual 
basis accepted by the citizen judge panels in their decision-making: the logic and 
empirical principle [Ronrisoku, Keikensoku Ihan Setsu] and the belief-priority principle 
[Sinsho Yusen Setsu].103 The first principle means that the appellate courts can overturn 
citizen judge panel decisions when the decisions are in opposition to their logic and 
experience, but also when the decisions are not more than a different determination of 
the probative value of the evidence104. The belief-priority principle emphasises that the 
beliefs of the appellate courts are superior and the court decisions take priority over 
citizen judges’ decisions105. The written judgements of the appellate courts are unlikely 
to clarify the distinction between the two principles. However, the principles of orality 
and immediacy practiced in the citizen judge trials are also emphasised in the appellate 
courts106. Goto points out there are simpler requirements for overturning a guilty verdict 
than for overturning a judgment of innocence because a guilty judgment can be 
overturned if there is reasonable doubt, but in the latter case, if there is any possibility 
                                                          
101 The Supreme Court, supra note 4, table 81. 
102 Ibid, table 79. 
103 T Oshima, ‘Citizen Judges Trials and the Role of Appeal from Practitioner’s Perspectives’ (2015) 54 
Criminal Law Journal [Japan] 374–394, 376. 
104 Ibid. 
105 Ibid. 
106 Ibid, 378 
196 
 
that the professional judges consider the defendant is not guilty, the verdict cannot be 
overturned, according to the Supreme Court107.  
The appellate courts should respect the citizen judge panels’ decisions within this 
framework, although they could be considered as a ‘second chance’ of an acquittal for 
the defendants108. Wilson has pointed out that the appeal requires additional expenses 
and the right to appeal tends to be used ‘as a matter of right and receive de novo review 
of their case’ 109 .  As Dean has pointed out, the appeal process can ‘redress the 
miscarriage of justice’ by investigating throughout the criminal justice procedure. 
However, the appeal could provoke public anxiety over the jury system in Japan110. The 
media coverage of miscarriages of justice determined by the appeal courts could lead to 
a ‘crisis of public confidence’ in the criminal justice system111. A former citizen judge 
attending the post-citizen judge trial meeting in Kagoshima District Court referred to the 
fact that ‘when he/she found out that the defendant in the case in which he participated 
had appealed to the High Court, he regarded his time and effort as being a citizen judge 
was nonsense. It was shocking.’ 112  Two former citizen judges interviewed for this 
research showed similar emotion, such as shock and disappointment with the fact that 
the defendant who showed his regret in the citizen judge trial subsequently   appealed 
to the higher court113 . A former citizen judge interviewed mentioned that she was 
disappointed with that she heard the appeal on the TV news, and she preferred to hear 
from the court or at least in a more formal way than the news114. However, one of other 
citizen judges received a handwritten letter from the presiding judge of the trial that she 
attended, letting her know about the appeal, so he understood that115. It seems that the 
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appeal, in particular the lack of notification to the former citizen judges, contributes to 
a sense of distrust. 
5.2.2 Impacts on Legal Professionals 
5.2.2.1 Professional Judges 
The introduction of the citizen judge system has had an impact on the role of the 
professional judges. It was expected that they would be more neutral, compared to their 
role before the citizen judge system was introduced. In the past they would read through 
and review the investigation documents and ask for more investigations, prompt the 
public prosecutors to change or review the charge, make judgment based on a large 
amount of evidence and create detailed and precise written judgments 116 . The 
professional judges have the responsibility to evaluate the rationality and validity of the 
evidence and to check whether the public prosecutor has fulfilled his/her role 
responsibly. This seems to be the original role of judges in the inquisitorial legal tradition. 
Revealing the true facts of the case should also be achieved under the citizen judge 
system. The professional judges in Japan used to have a substantial investigative role 
during the investigative and hearing phrases of the criminal justice procedure, which 
derived from the inquisitorial roots of the legal system. However, that role was 
supposed to change with the introduction of cross-examination by the two sides: the 
prosecution and the defence. In addition to the change, the additional role of supporting 
citizen judges has been added, although notwithstanding this, the previous active role 
of professional judges seem to have remained in place.  
It has been suggested that the existence of citizen judges has produced a change in 
the professional judges’ consciousness. Before the introduction of the citizen judge 
system, professional judges did not often discuss the meaning of concepts in the law 
invoked, or the grounds for procedures. However, professional judges now need to 
explain legal terminology and trial procedures in understandable language for citizen 
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judges and Ono has claimed that this has made the professional judges rethink the 
substantive nature of these factors117.  
5.2.2.2 Public Prosecutors and Defence Attorneys 
The presentation, preparation and skills of public prosecutors and defence attorneys 
appears to be more important than before. Considering the Public Prosecutors Tanojiri 
has showed how the Basic Policy on Citizen Judge Trials,  encouraged prosecutors to 
make considerable efforts in their preparation by producing understandable dossiers 
and evidence for citizen judges. They were also concerned about getting negative 
feedback from former citizen judges alleging that the public prosecutors’ explanation 
was hard to understand, an outcome which occurred in 3.8% of cases in the Supreme 
Court survey of 2013118. A former citizen judge interviewed for this research mentioned 
that the ‘defence attorney seemed to be reluctant to his work and his preparation was 
poor in comparison with the public prosecutor. The poor presentation skills of the 
defence attorney had affected the judgment he made’119.  Moreover, a former citizen 
judge attending a post-citizen judge trial meeting in 2016, pointed out the difficulty 
encountered in understanding the defence attorney’s explanation120. Akita also studied 
the defence attorneys’ preparation and presentation skills and referred to former citizen 
judge criticism to the effect that they had difficulty understanding the defence 
attorney’s explanations. 28.8% from the Supreme Court Survey of 2015 and some citizen 
judges mentioned that defence attorneys seemed unmotivated, and talked in low 
tones121. In addition to the introduction of the citizen judges’ participation in criminal 
trials, there was also a series of reforms, which included victims’ participation in the trial 
and the introduction of Ichibu Shikkoseido, a system whereby inmates serve shorter 
periods of imprisonment, innovations which demand changes in defence attorneys’ 
strategies122. The Supreme Court survey also showed that 30% of former citizen judges 
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were not able to understand the reasons for or the context of the defence attorney’s 
questions123. Moreover, the survey shows that the 26.7% former citizen judges noticed 
that the defence attorneys’ way of speaking and the context of his/her comments were 
hard to understand124. This seems to be a transitional problem and suggest the necessity 
of better training for the defence attorneys to develop their presentation skills. 
The capacity of the citizen judge system to handle the increasing number of cases has 
not been questioned in Japan. The Cabinet Secretariat has claimed that at the time that 
the CJA came into being in 2009, the recruitment of clerks of the court, public 
prosecutors assistants, and legal professionals was increased125. As a result, the Public 
Prosecution Office appears to have ensured adequate human resources. Finance and 
technological capacities were also appropriately well-prepared for in citizen judge 
trials126. In fact, the number of public prosecutors has constantly increased since 1991127, 
and the annual budget for the Public Prosecution Office, except for a decrease in 2013, 
has increased since 2005128. 
By contrast, the defence attorneys appear seriously handicapped by a shortage of 
support staff as well as funding. The White Paper on Lawyers [Bengoshi Hakusho] 
reported that there were 36,415 qualified lawyers in Japan in 2015129, and defence 
attorneys were assigned to 99.5% of criminal cases in the District Courts in 2014130. The 
statistics in the White Paper show that 84.4 % of defence attorneys were court-
appointed, while 19.5% were private defence attorneys131. The cost of court-appointed 
attorneys is covered by the government132 and the professional fee for these attorneys 
appears to be quite low compared to the fees of private defence attorneys. Some 
qualified lawyers have suffered from a lack of work because of the judicial reform in 
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1999, which increased the number of attorneys133. A defence attorney interviewed for 
this research claimed they had few or poor training opportunities to develop their skills 
compared to public prosecutors, as well as difficulty in finding time to prepare for citizen 
judge trials because of their workloads134. 
The imbalanced capacity between the legal professionals may be due to the heavy 
demands of the preparation for the pre-trial arrangement conference procedure. A 
direct consequence of the public prosecutors’ elaborate preparations leads to an 
increase in their workloads and other issues, such as extensions of the pre-trial 
arrangement conference process and the strengthening of their powers throughout the 
citizen judge trial procedures. 
The general lengthening of the whole citizen judge procedures seems to have led to 
a focus on efficiency. As Ando points out, streamlining and shortening the pre-trial 
arrangement conference process as well as the decision-making process through 
cooperation between the opposing legal professionals are necessary135. For example, an 
opening statement takes normally five to ten minutes if, the factual details of case which 
are in the written dossiers are omitted136. 
5.2.3 Impacts on Defendants 
Judicial verdicts have not been dramatically influenced by the introduction of the 
citizen judge system as anticipated beforehand, in particular with regard to guilty or not 
guilty verdicts. However, there is the possibility that citizen judges’ participation could 
put defendants in a weaker position in the criminal procedure because of the citizen 
judges’ prejudge and bias, emotional rather than logical responses to crime and their 
general competence – the negative aspects of lay adjudication as discussed in Chapter 
2. However, positive aspects could influence the citizen judges panel’s decisions. As 
Malsch pointed out and as also mentioned in Chapter 2, there are numerous advantages 
of a citizen judge panel, for example, nine adjudicators in comparison with a professional 
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judge panel in the bench trial with three professional judges - 137. There are also other 
advantages including community involvement, avoidance of case hardening, the 
openness and comprehensibility of the criminal justice system 138 . However, if the 
democratic functions of citizen judges are achieved, the citizen judges’ participation 
with other developments could lead to equality of arms between the prosecution and 
defence. 
In addition to the existing inequality of arms between the prosecution and the 
defence because of the gap of in capacity between the public prosecutors and defence 
attorneys, citizen judges’ participation has impacted on the defendants’ attitude in court. 
One obvious change is their clothes and appearance. They are provided with suits, shoes, 
and ties to wear in the courtroom. The shoes look like proper leather shoes, but actually 
are slippers in order to discourage them from running away. The tie is also a normal tie 
attaching by buttons in order to prevent its use for committing suicide. This would 
appear to indicate, however, that the authorities believe the defendants need to 
consider their image and appear respectable in front of the citizen judges by being 
careful about how they look and how they behave in court. In addition if the defendant 
claims the right to silence, this may negatively affect his or her image, as it suggests that 
he/she does not feel remorse, although the right to silence is guaranteed by the 
Constitution139 and CCP140. For example, in 2013 the citizen judge penal reached a death 
penalty verdict in a homicide case where the defendant used the right to silence, 
although the appellate court commuted the sentence to life imprisonment141. There is a 
concern that citizen judges are unable to deliberate the case without the defendant’s 
testimony because the right to silence prevents any meticulous questioning process. As 
Soldwedel has claimed, it also prevents the victim’s feelings being affected by the 
defendants’ remorse, a process which appears to be emphasised in the Japanese 
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139 Art. 38(1). 
140 Art. 291(3). 
141 STCJ System, ‘About the Case Where the Death Penalty Sentence Was Overturned in the Tokyo 
High Court’ (2010) <http://saibanin-iranainko.com/topics/2013/06/20/東京高裁の死刑判決破棄を
受けて 黙秘権を思う/> accessed 1 June 2016. 
202 
 
criminal justice procedure142. In this respect, he also claimed that the Judicial Reform in 
1999 ignored the promotion of the defendant’s rights.  
A former citizen judge interviewed for this research raised the issue of the lack of 
concern for foreign defendants. She mentioned that the defendant in the case in which 
she participated was Cuban. After the trial, she was scared about foreigners, in particular 
who have different skin tones from Japanese, on the street, remembering the 
defendant143. Although this might also have happened if the defendant was Japanese, 
nevertheless the danger of discrimination is bound to arise because of the ethnic 
homogeneity of the Japanese population and the rigid separation amongst majority, 
‘internal others (minorities)’, and ‘external others (foreigners)’144 in the Japanese society. 
There is a fundamental issue with citizen judge trials involving foreign defendants from 
the aspect of representative democracy on the grounds that the foreign defendant may 
not be involved in the community where the trial takes place145. 1,202 defendants were 
foreigners and 130 interpreters were called in 2014146. The major languages used by the 
interpreters were English, Chinese, and Spanish147, but the quality of the interpreters 
was questionable148. Poor interpretation damages the probative values of the evidence, 
both statements and hearsay evidence149. 
5.2.4 Impacts on the Citizen Judges 
5.2.4.1 Educational Effects and Civic Participation 
It was expected that experience of citizen judge trial would be educational and 
encourage former citizen judges to participate in civic activities150. Furthermore, the JRC 
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expected that sharing the trial experience with citizen judges as adjudicators would lead 
to the successful conduct of trials, a closer relationship between citizens and the 
judiciary and increased citizen judges’ understanding of the judiciary151. A Supreme 
Court survey shows that 2,149 former citizen judges mentioned that their citizen judge 
duties were educational and 2,552 former citizen judges also mentioned that the courts 
and trials were more accessible than before the duties152. It highlights the point noted 
by a former citizen judge who suggested that the experience of citizen judge duty 
corrected his/her wrongful image and knowledge about the citizen judge system and 
the criminal justice system153. All former citizen judges interviewed for this research said 
that, as a result, they began to have more interest in the system as well as Japanese 
governmental activities 154 . Although there has been no empirical research into the 
relationship between the citizen judges’ experience and the enhancement of their 
political activity, as Corey and Hans point out, there are potentially positive potential 
effects155 , while Fukurai found enhanced political activity after the experience of a 
member of the Public Prosecutorial Review Committee156. The Supreme Court survey 
showed that 96.1% of former citizen judges believed that the citizen judges’ experience 
was very good or good157. 
5.2.4.2 Mental Stress 
There could be three reasons for mental stress arising from the experience of being 
a citizen judge. First is the possibility of distressing evidence presented in court, the 
second is the heavy responsibility of being a decision-maker, and the third is the burden 
of confidentiality about information gained. A former citizen judge was diagnosed as 
having Acute Stress Disorder after her duties as a citizen judge in 2013, and she claimed 
her duties violated Articles 13 and 18 of Constitution – the right to avoid bondage, and 
to life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness158. A twenty-four hour telephone service was 
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established for consultation with counsellors to ease former citizen judges’ mental 
stress and the service is free up to five times159.  
Secrecy runs through the entire citizen judge system, from the selection of citizen 
judges, their deliberation process, and after the trial. Article 101(1) of the CJA says: 
No person shall publish the name, address and other information capable of 
identifying a current citizen judge, alternative citizen judge, citizen judges to 
be appointed or candidates for citizen judge or other potentially involved 
persons. 
‘Publish’ in this context means in such a way that the general public would know 
about the selection of a citizen judge, including media coverage print publication, 
broadcasting, placing on the Internet and so on. In other words, the names of actual and 
potential judges must be kept anonymous. However, after the end of the case, 
publishing the fact that a person served as a citizen judge is not prohibited160. It seems 
apparent that secrecy in the citizen judge system as well as the requirements of the 
contempt of court rules, as stated in the Act Concerning the Maintenance of Order in a 
Court of Law 1952, focuses on the disclosure of information and the maintenance of the 
courts’ dignity rather than the finality of the verdict. Strict confidentiality has been kept 
between citizen judges and society. There is a possible punishment of ¥500,000 (£2,616) 
fine or up to 6 months imprisonment for breaking confidentiality, leading to unease at 
being selected as a citizen judge. The vagueness of the restrictions imposed on the 
citizen judges causes anxiety as does the severity of the punishment for breaking 
confidentiality. However, no former citizen judges or citizen judge candidates have had 
any sanction imposed on them - including fines - since the start of the citizen judge 
system in 2009. Therefore, it seems clear that sanctions were created for their deterrent 
effect.  
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5.2.5 Impact on Society 
It has been noted that although democratic concepts in the criminal justice system 
have existed - to some extent - since the jury system was introduced in the early 
twentieth century, and in particular, since the post-war reforms, there has been no 
improvement in public education regarding the law and democratic principles. The JRC 
affirmed that ‘the citizen is proactive in administration and judiciary’, and citizens should 
support and realise the justice system operates on their behalf and maintain keep in 
touch with the operations of the legal profession161. During the five-year preparation 
period before the introduction of the citizen judge system, the legal institutions, the 
government, the Japanese Federal Bar Association and the Supreme Court made efforts 
to promote public awareness of the introduction of the citizen judge system. The 
Japanese government advertised the system by means of publishing posters and leaflets, 
broadcasts and television programmes, making videos, making mascots, and holding 
mock trials and meetings nationwide. Approximately five billion yen (£33million) was 
spent on the campaign162. 
The apparent aversion which a large number of the Japanese population, bear to the 
introduction of the citizen judge system is, to some extent, the result of general 
antipathy to adjudication and the sense of being burdened by it163, and that it is the 
reserved operation of an elite. According to a study by Fukurai and Krooth regarding 
Japanese people’s willingness to serve as citizen judges between 2008 and 2010, most 
surveys, conducted by the Ministry’s office, the Supreme Court, and the National 
Broadcasting Corporation, indicated a lack of enthusiasm for participating in citizen 
judge trials. For example, 55.7% of respondents were reluctant to serve as citizen judges; 
however, two surveys of respondents who were actively involved in governmental work, 
indicated great enthusiasm for participating in trials 164 . Three major reasons were 
identified as to why people are reluctant to participate in citizen judge trials. Firstly, they 
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feel the mental burden of making decisions that control someone’s future (45.1%). 
Secondly, they have no confidence in their ability to determine a verdict because it is a 
very difficult task (43%), and thirdly, they worry that they might be threatened by the 
defendant or people related in some way to the defendant/victim (34.6%). In contrast 
to the U.S., Japanese people appear to rarely see their personal needs as a reason to be 
reluctant to serve as a lay adjudicator, as Boatright suggests people’s lifestyles and 
relationships are common reasons for avoiding jury service in the U.S.165 By contrast, the 
Japanese criminal justice system has a history of being highly-‘professionalised’166, with 
limited lay participation and public education, hence lay attitudes are different. Public 
participation in the criminal justice system is more important for its legitimacy and 
duration than allegiance to legal professionals, whose directives and influences can 
seem to relate more to a fair verdict. Public education supporting the concept of lay 
adjudication and emphasising more community values than professional-driven values 
is one of the important challenges for the introduction of the citizen judge system. 
The first trial under the CJA on 3rd of August, 2009, was an historical event. 
Approximately 2,300 queued for the 58 public gallery seats at the trial. It is clear that 
the introduction of the citizen judge system attracted the attention of the public. One 
aim of the citizen judge system – to increase citizens’ awareness of the judiciary167 - had 
thus been achieved.  
The media attention may well have been motivated to increase public awareness. 
However, Japan does not allow cameras in the courtroom or the broadcasting of legal 
proceedings during trials, although camera filming is allowed for two minutes after the 
judges enter the courtroom and before the opening statement of the court, as stated in 
the 1999 Application Standard of Camera Coverage in the Courtroom. This remained the 
case in the citizen judge system, so filming in a citizen judge trial is carried out before 
the citizen judges enter the courtroom. In January 2008, the Guideline on Japanese 
Newspaper Coverage of the Citizen Judge System [Saibanin Seido Kaishi ni atatteno 
Shuzai Hodo Shishin] stated that careful consideration when reporting testimony was 
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needed because of the privacy of the persons involved in the cases, and the comments 
of experts could have a prejudicial influence on readers and audiences. 
In Japanese history, there has been a range of legislation restricting freedom of 
speech, in particular, before the Second World War168, related to contempt of court169. 
It defined interference with the course of justice as an action occurring when the courts 
and judges deliver their judgement, either in front of them or in another place, and 
includes verbal abuse, assault, being harassed or when other inappropriate behaviour is 
used. All such acts interfere with the courts’ dignity and sentences of up to 20 days 
imprisonment or/and no more than ¥30,000170 (£217.39)171 fine shall be imposed.  
Since the introduction of the citizen judge system, a press conference has been 
hosted by the press club after the end of each case and citizen judges are invited to the 
conference. Their participation at the press conference depends on their consent. One 
of the reasons in favour of media coverage of the citizen judge system is to gain public 
attention and put pressure on citizen judges to consider their duties and responsibilities 
seriously and without bias172. The publicity and media coverage has contributed to the 
openness of the trial system as well as having implications for the citizen judge system. 
Therefore it is fair to say that since the introduction of the citizen judge system, more 
democratic values have been injected into the system, with more open justice and an 
increase in public awareness of trials and broadcast programmes related to the new 
system. Secrecy related to citizen judges’ participation was brought into the citizen 
judge system in order to protect judicial accountability and privacy.  
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5.3 Death Penalty Cases and Citizen Judges’ Participation 
On 18th December 2015, the first death penalty sentences for two inmates on death 
row made by a citizen judge panel in 2011 and 2012 were carried out173. The Minister 
for Justice declared the following in a press conference, that in relation to the executions 
of these two inmates who were sentenced by citizen judge trials:   
The majority of the public considered the death penalty was unavoidable for 
extremely heinous and wicked crimes, thus the abolition of the death penalty 
is not appropriate174.  
Is this true? There is presently a serious concern about the death penalty in many 
countries around the world175. This is most obvious from the human rights perspective 
of the defendant176. These perspectives both require criminal justice policies for the 
public and there are concerns arising from potential errors in this system as well as 
human rights abuses177. On the other hand, the supporters prioritise the values of the 
preservation of due process and efficient criminal control178.  There was public support 
for capital punishment, according to Research about the Conscious Understanding of 
the Role of Citizens and Judges in Sentencing [Ryokei Ni Kansuru Kokumin to Saibankan 
No Ishiki Ni Tsuiteno Kenkyu] in 2009179. It showed that only 11% of randomly chosen 
Japanese citizens answered ‘I do not agree with capital punishment under any 
circumstances’, while 88.1% answered ‘I agree with capital punishment in particular 
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situations’180. There are many reasons put forward as to why the punishment should be 
abolished because of constitutional challenges181, distortion of its deterrent effect182, 
and incompatibility with Japanese concept of death183.  
The death penalty reached by the citizen judge panel cannot be directly regarded as 
a public endorsement on the practice of the death penalty. Japan has retained the death 
penalty and the cases in which the public prosecutors demand the death penalty are 
subject to citizen judge trials, although Harada insisted that the criticism against lenient 
or severe penalties imposed by professional judges could be relieved by the citizen 
judges’ participation in sentencing184.  According to Yamamoto, a stronger movement 
towards the abolition of the death penalty would occur because of the introduction of 
a citizen judge system185.  Between 2009 and 2015, 27 citizen judge trials reached death 
penal verdicts186 and the death sentences was carried out on four prisoners in 2012. No 
execution was carried out, however, in 2013 and 2014187. 128 defendants sentenced to 
death were detained to await execution in 2015188. The long detention period of inmates 
on death row is a serious concern in terms of human rights and from a financial 
perspective. The cost of detaining inmates on death row is three to four times as much 
as an ordinary prisoner, which is 1,367 yen per diem189.    
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5.3.1  The Nagano Family Homicide Case 
The Nagano Family Homicide case concerns three victims killed and approximately 
¥ 416,000 (£3,014)190 stolen in Nagano prefecture in April 2010. Five defendants were 
accused of robbery-homicide191 and concealing their bodies192 (See Appendix 7). The 
Nagano Family Homicide case attracted the attention of the public because Matsubara 
was the first time that the Supreme Court accepted a death penalty verdict from a citizen 
judge panel.193 The evaluation of this case will focus on the influence of citizen judge 
participation. 
This participation clearly appears to have influenced the speed of trials. The citizen 
judge trial procedure for Matsubara, from the selection of citizen judges to the 
declaration of the verdict, was carried out between 11th and 25th March 2011194, only 15 
days in total. The trials of the other two defendants took 47 days and 23 days195. Before 
the introduction of the citizen judge system, potential death penalty cases suffered from 
extensively long hearings. For example, Asahara, leader of the Japanese religious group 
- Aum Shinrikyo – was the accused in multiple death penalty cases, the first trial opened 
on 24 April 1996 and on 15th September 2006 and the death penalty verdict was 
confirmed by the Supreme Court’s rejection of his appeal196. Thus, over 19 years passed 
between the first trial and the confirmation of the verdict, which would not have 
happened in a citizen judge trial process. 
On the other hand, there was a considerable reliance on written dossier evidence by 
the citizen judge panel, according to the written judgements of all three death penalty 
cases in the Nagano Family Homicide proceedings, Matsubara, Ito, and Ikeda. For 
example, 8 out of 10 pieces of evidence came from the written dossiers of, the public 
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prosecutor and the police in the Matsubara case197.  The other two cases of Matsubara’s 
accomplices had the same tendency, while the defendants’ oral testimony and 
confession statements from the investigative process were also accepted198. Therefore, 
apart from the defendants’ oral testimony and material proof, the traditional approach 
towards the use of written dossier evidence remains.  
In addition, reviews of three written judgements in the Nagano Family Homicide case, 
in which the presiding judge was Judge Takagi for all three defendants199, appear to 
reveal several common features. According to the Judicial Training Institution founded 
by the Supreme Court to conduct research into the professional judge culture and 
provide training for legal apprentices, the written judgment is intended to show 
terminus ad quem, the goal of the first trial200. Moreover, it has five functions. Firstly, 
the written judgment indicates the legitimacy of the verdict as the conclusion of the 
judicial process. Secondly, it presents the court’s decision to the defendant, defence 
attorney, and public prosecutor. Thirdly, it provides any objects of deliberation for the 
appellate court. Fourthly, it clarifies the explanations and grounds for the verdict and 
offers the basis for respect or criticism of the victims and those related to the case as 
well as the public201. Moreover, in the citizen judge trials, the written judgment has the 
function of asking the citizen judges to confirm the results and aims of their work.  
It is noteworthy that reviews of the three written judgements in the Nagano Family 
Homicide case, where the presiding judge was Judge Takagi for all three defendants202, 
revealed three features. The first is that the written judgement in the citizen judge trial 
consists of the same four concerns as in bench trials: factors constituting the crime, the 
list of evidence, the application of the law and regulations, and the reasons for the 
sentence. This is in accordance with Article 335(1) of the CCP, as mentioned in Chapter 
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3, in order to focus on the facts of the crime and important points at issue. The second 
feature is that all three written judgments concluded with the same wording of the text:  
In conclusion, by evaluating the nature of the nature, motivation, and 
situations of a crime, the number of victims, the damage done to the victim, 
the  social influences, the age of the defendant, his/her criminal record, and 
condition after the crime, all indicate the extent of the criminal responsibility 
of the defendant, although the defendant's current more positive  situations 
and remorse have been taken account of  as far as possible, the fact remains 
that the death penalty is unavoidable203. 
The wording of this conclusion highlights the fact that in order to apply the death 
penalty, it should be ‘unavoidable’ in the light of the nature, motivation, and character 
of the crime, the number of victims, the victim impact, social influence, age of the 
defendant, his/her criminal record, and condition after a crime, which are applied by the 
‘Nagayama criteria’ as well as the new framework after the Hikari Prefecture Mother 
and Daughter Homicide case204. The Nagayama criteria refer to the nine factors needed 
to reach a death penalty judgment. They are the extreme and cruel measures used to 
kill in the light of the nature, motivation, and context of a crime, the number of victims, 
the damage or mutilation of the victim, social influence, the age of the defendant, 
his/her criminal record, and condition after the crime. 205 In addition, the judgement of 
the Hikari Prefecture case declared that ‘there is no way to avoid the death penalty’206. 
The framework means that if the case fits the Nagayama criteria, the punishment should 
be the death penalty, and the exception is the avoidance of the death penalty. Since 
1997 when the criteria were set down, the law had been increasingly more severe until 
the introduction of the citizen judge system. The criticism of the lenient or severe 
penalties imposed by the professional judges could be deflected by the citizen judges’ 
participation in sentencing207. Sentencing is in flux because it should be influenced by 
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the social and criminal situations, which change with the times208. The abolition of the 
death penalty was expected to come nearer with the introduction of the citizen judge 
system or reduce death penalty sentencing. However, since the citizen judge system was 
introduced, fourteen people were given death penalty sentences, and only in one 
potential death penalty case was the defendant acquitted209. Although Masumoto210 and 
other researchers claim that the ‘Nagayama criteria’211, while comprehensive, are not 
actually put into practice as criteria to be satisfied, nevertheless, it seems that they are 
have been applied in citizen judge trials just as much as by professional judges.  
Lastly, with the application of the criteria, the context of the written judgement is 
simpler and easily understandable by explaining the fact of crime in chronological order. 
For example, in the written judgment of the Matsubara defendant case, 
The defendant (Matsubara) made C fall into a comma, but he believed that 
he had to kill C’s wife (G) to complete the killing of C because she concerned 
about C’s condition. Then D (another defendant) put a rope around G’s neck 
from behind and threw her down on the floor, while, D and E ( another 
defendant) each took an  end of the rope and pulled. As a result, G died from 
asphyxiation …212 
The explanation seems to be used with a story-telling style without complex words and 
legal terminology. Moreover, the written judgment refers to ‘a bereaved family meeting 
with the three remains of the dead mentioning the victims’ family memories and the 
loss of a husband, son and daughters and anger at the defendants; moreover, the 
bereaved family wanted capital punishment.’ 213  It also mentioned the rejection of the 
defence attorney’s claim that the defendant had opposed the marriage to his girlfriend 
and had been short of money for many years, and this long-term grudge against the 
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victim was enough for him to avoid capital punishment214. The contents of the written 
judgment clearly appear to be influenced by the discussions between members of the 
citizen judge panel, the timeline of the crime, logic of the extenuating circumstances for 
the crimes claimed by the defence and the final sentence. 
Although a focus on specific members of the adjudicator panel in the written 
judgment is unreasonable, it is preposterous to regard the decision of citizen judge panel 
as public support for the death penalty. Koike points out in death penalty cases reached 
by citizen judge panel that appellate judges do not show particular respect for the citizen 
judges’ panel decisions215. In fact, the death penalty verdict on defendants in the Ikeda 
trial in the Nagano Family Homicide case was commuted by the High Court to life 
imprisonment and finalised by the Supreme Court in 2014 because he was not involved 
in the planning of the crime. Therefore, the death penalty was excessive216. In addition 
to the Nagayama Family Homicide Case, some drug related cases, such as the Chocolate 
Tin Case217, Mexico Case218, Penang Case219, and Kasai Airport Case220, raised similar 
arguments concerning the citizen judge panels’ decisions and the ‘belief-priority 
principle’ tends to be the focus rather than the ‘ logic and empirical’ principle221. In 
addition, the logic and experience of professional judges was more heavily emphasised 
than the validity of the citizen judges' decisions222. In Oshima’s study evaluating the 
citizen judge panels’ deliberations before an appeal, presented five different examples 
after careful consideration of their deliberations. The examples include errors in taking 
account of factors relating to sentencing, vague and inappropriate reasoning in the 
written judgements, and obvious different sentencing patterns compared to other, 
similar cases223.  
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Moreover, in the selection process, the citizen judge candidates are asked if they 
would decide not to vote for a death penalty notwithstanding any of the evidence 
and/or discussions and if he/she says yes, the candidates will be questioned. As Honjo 
pointed out, this would give an impression to the candidates that opposition to the 
death penalty was not good and the question would influence their fact-finding224. From 
a representative democratic perspective, the exclusion of people who are against a 
death penalty is questionable because the representation of death-penalty opponents 
should be included as a part of community. In addition, the citizen judge trials are based 
on a majority vote and therefore, the citizen judges or professional judges, who believe 
that the defendant is innocent, must participate the vote to decide a death penalty case. 
As Shert argued, if four out of nine members of the citizen judge panel think that there 
is another option than the death penalty, this would not satisfy the criterion that the 
death penalty is unavoidable225. 
The evaluation of the Nagano Family Homicide Case and issues relating to death 
penalty sentencing as well as citizen judge panels’ decisions being overturned by 
appellate courts seem to reveal impediments to citizen judges’ participation.  Adherence 
to the sentencing guidelines and judicial controls applied to the citizen judge procedure 
inhibits how actively citizen judges can participate or how submissive they must be. 
Death penalty cases tried by citizen judge panels could lead to the risk mentioned above 
of minimal participation. Moreover, Sher criticised the unanimity required of citizen 
judges’ verdicts as leading to less citizen confidence (the herd instinct), less 
understanding, involvement and lack of full deliberation countermining citizen judges’ 
common sense influence on the verdicts 226 . In addition, Masumoto points out the 
difficulty of the death penalty cases for citizen judges remaining ‘neutral’227.  As Steiner 
et al claim, there is a tendency for death penalty jurors’ folk knowledge to affect their 
ability to reach death penalty decisions, while the death penalty case decision-making 
process is very particular and decisions should be made based on a ‘reasoned moral 
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choice’ between life and death228. Moreover, citizen judges are asked to deliberate their 
moral positions in connection with their ‘responsibility to the collective to decide on 
appropriate punishments for defendants’229.  It is likely that there is not only a failure of 
citizen judge participation to have any active influence in death penalty cases, but there 
also needs to be a consideration of how the function of citizen judges can contribute to 
fair trials. As long as any doubts or concerns exist about citizen judges’ participation in 
the death penalty trials, it is submitted that they should be excluded from the citizen 
judge trials.  
 
5.4  The Successful Citizen Judge System 
5.4.1  The Success of the Citizen Judge System 
The satisfaction level of citizen judges with their duties and decisions seem to be 
closely related to their confidence in them. Moreover these feelings appear to be also 
connected to satisfaction and confidence with the citizen judge system as a whole. In 
the interviews I conducted for this research, the same question was asked to all 18 
interviewees at the end of the interviews: ‘Do you think the citizen judge system has 
been successfully put into practice?’ The question aimed to inquire about their own 
experience with the citizen judge system, and the open question included views of other 
people’s performance - co-members of citizen judge panels, professional judges, public 
prosecutors, defendants, defence attorneys, and the court staff. All the interviewees in 
this research answered that they believed that  the citizen judge system was successful 
in practice. Although the question was very open and vague, the positive answers 
represent the current situation:  the citizen judge system in practice seems to have 
fulfilled its expectations.  
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All respondents answered that the citizen judge system was successful. There were 
eight different reasons given to explain why they thought it has been ‘successful’ (see 
table).  
 
Table: Reasons why citizen judge system is successful 
  
Former  
Citizen 
Judges 
Professional 
Judges 
Public 
Prosecutors 
Defence 
Attorneys 
Law-
makers total 
Community Involvement 1     2   3 
Smooth Introduction of 
the new citizen judge 
system   2 1 2   5 
Gathering public 
awareness         1 1 
Satisfaction with citizen 
judges' (own) work  2         2 
Education of citizen 
judges and the public 1       1  0 
Confidence in the citizen 
judge system 1         1 
Increased confidence in 
the criminal justice 
system            0 
Bringing fresh insight into 
the criminal justice 
system   1   2   3 
Other     1     1 
Total 5 3 2 6 2   
 
Among the most frequent reasons mentioned by respondents was its smooth 
introduction. One lawmaker, who was a member of the Judicial Reform Council, felt that 
the smooth introduction of the citizen judge system was the result of the long-term 
218 
 
efforts by many people involved in the judicial reform and the introduction of the system 
inside and outside of the judiciary230. In addition, legal professionals felt the same, and 
they have been actively involved in the preparatory activities before the introduction. 
One public prosecutor indicated that nothing had been changed although he considered 
the citizen judge system as successful. He also believed that there was no problem with 
the bench trial and his work did not change compared to the pre-citizen judge system231. 
A former citizen judge interviewed for this research answered that ‘it was the first 
time for me that I was a part of a community. I thought I would decide what I could do 
to make the community better.’ One of the defence attorneys also felt that community 
involvement is important in the court in particular where it seems to be isolated from 
the community and it was in the bench trials232. A citizen judge claimed that after the 
experience, ‘I think I am kinder to others in the community although I also worried for 
young girls walking on the street at night because my case was a rape case.’233 
None of the respondents felt that educating the citizen judge and the public and the 
increase in confidence in the criminal justice system could be included amongst the 
reasons for the success of the citizen judge system, although respondents raised these 
as advantages.  
As an additional question, all respondents were asked the question ‘do you think the 
citizen judge trials are better than the bench trials?’  
  
Former  
Citizen 
Judges 
Professional 
Judges 
Public 
Prosecutors 
Defence 
Attorneys 
Law-
makers total 
Yes 3 2 0 4 1 10 
No 1 1 1 0 0 3 
I do not know 1 0 1 2 1 5 
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According to a number of respondents, participation by citizen judges is a desirable 
outcome for both citizen judges and professional judges. As one of the professional 
judges stated, ‘I have often found so many things though communication with citizen 
judges and preparation for the citizen judge trials.’234 Legal professionals tend to focus 
on achieving their duties and care immensely about whether their explanation was 
easily understandable. The discussion topics in meetings between former citizen judges, 
professional judges, public prosecutors, and defence attorneys in District Courts often 
related to this issue. 
In addition, the satisfaction of citizen judges with their duties and decisions seem to 
be closely related to their confidence in them. Moreover, these feelings appear to be 
also interconnected with their satisfaction and confidence with/in the citizen judge 
system. This is similar tendency within Matthews, Bridgeman, and Briggs analysis of the 
attitudes of English jurors. This suggested the importance of four inter-related but 
distinct internal processes: perceptions, understanding, confidence, and satisfaction 
supported by sub-factors, such as technical, organisational, procedural and facilitation 
factors235. All former citizen judges interviewed for this research were satisfied and had 
confidence with/in their understanding ability, active participation, and independent 
decision-making ability, while they also had satisfaction and confidence with/in the 
citizen judge system and criminal justice system. A former citizen judge said:  
During the hearing, the defendant maintained his right to silence, but the 
former citizen judges asked the question: ‘The other accomplice is younger than 
you, but why did you refer to him with an honorific title (san)?’ In Japan, it is 
normal to use an honorific titles when younger people address older people. The 
former citizen judges believe that this question triggered the defendant into 
making a statement and that question would not have been asked by 
professional judges. Moreover, the question impacted on the verdict236. 
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The citizen judge had strong confidence in what he did and was very satisfied with it. 
On the other hand, a professional judge mentioned that ‘to be honest, it is not difficult 
to manipulate citizen judges without their knowing, if I want to do it.’ 237  The 
overestimation of lay adjudicators regarding their abilities and qualifications seems to 
be an international tendency, as research in America 238  and Australia 239  shows. In 
particular, Ivkovic pointed that a greater tendency of overestimation was prevalent in 
the mixed judge model240. This concern could be outweighed by their attentiveness and 
honesty in their approach to their duties as well as through efforts of legal professionals 
to provide an environment in which citizen judges understand information and actively 
participate. 
The majority of former citizen judges who answered the Supreme Court survey gave 
positive feedback about the courts’ treatment of them. 73.9% of respondents felt that 
the court’s treatment including the court staff’s attitudes, the provision of information 
from the courts, and its building and equipment was appropriate241. The results of the 
questionnaire survey agree with the citizen judges interviewed for this research, who 
also recognised the court staff’s politeness and attention to citizen judges' needs. One 
of them commented on the well-equipped court facilities, such as the barrier-free 
architecture and the equipment in the deliberation room 242 . The continued 
development of court facilities could improve citizen judges’ motivation and satisfaction. 
However, this costs money that might be better spent on making sure all courts provide 
a minimum level of equipment.  There are gap in the level of quality of court facilities 
between different courts. Moreover, in addition to the well-organised architecture, the 
courts encourage citizens with have physical impairments to participate and serve as 
citizen judges. The National Federation of Organisations for Disabled Persons conducted 
a survey of about 60 District Courts’ facilities for disabled persons in 2011. The survey 
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showed that all the courts had toilets for special needs and braille blocks and 98.3% had 
elevators 243 . It also found that the courts were in close communication with 
organisations such as a sign language interpreter organisations and constantly checked 
on facilities in order to provide appropriate support for disabled people244. No survey 
has been published about the actual number of the people with physical impairment 
selected as citizen judges.  
In addition to the court staff and appropriate courts’ facilities, the majority of former 
citizen judges also gave positive feedback about the professional judges’ treatment of 
them. A respondent to the Supreme Court survey noted that he/she had thought the 
courts were austere and bleak places, but the professional judges were friendly and 
approachable, while the other respondents said the professional judges respected the 
citizen judges’ opinions and this led them to express their opinions honestly245.  A former 
citizen judge interviewed for this research expressed how friendly and respectful she 
found the professional judges and she also mentioned that a professional judge brought 
a cake made by his wife and shared it during the break246. On the other hand, there are 
some negative comments about the lack of professional judges’ encouragement of 
citizen judges participation. For example, a respondent to the Supreme Court survey 
claimed citizen judges were not able to  volunteer comments and felt a dilemma if  
he/she couldn’t express his/her opinions in only a few sentences only when the 
professional judge asked the citizen judges his/her views247. The Supreme Court survey 
collected 192 positive and 55 negative pieces of feedback results regarding professional 
judges and court staff attitudes248.  
5.4.2 Continuing Support and Reforms 
5.4.2.1  Financial Support 
Financial support by the government is a contributing factor affecting their being able 
to perform their functions. Adding to the large amount of financial support for publicity 
during the preparation period, a subsequent decrease in the budget for the practice of 
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citizen judge trials has been problematic. The Supreme Court estimated the annual 
expense would be 32 hundred million yen (£1720million) including citizen judges’ daily 
stipends and transportation fares249. The budget for judicial reform has decreased since 
2009 when the citizen judge system was started 250 . This seems to be an apparent 
reaction to the common accusation of the expensive cost of lay adjudication trials, as 
pointed out in Chapter 2. Comparing before and after the introduction of the citizen 
judge system, the expenditure of the courts decreased from 307 million yen to 306 
million yen between 2004251 and 2013252, although it increased when the citizen judge 
system was introduced253. The budget for the courts has also decreased, although the 
preparation for the courts’ facilities, such as the maintenance of equipment in the 
courtrooms and the deliberation rooms is a necessary expense. Every budget for the 
courts254 and the police255 has increased. Financial stability for the practice of citizen 
judge trials will be important, and this Japanese experience seems to demonstrate that 
the practice of a lay adjudication system is not costly. 
5.4.2.2  A Government Motivation for Democracy 
The Japanese government is a constitutional monarchy under the 1947 Constitution. 
It contains 47 prefectural and municipal divisions divided into three branches: the 
executive (the Cabinet), legislative (the Diet), and judicial branches (the courts)256, and 
the Emperor who has limited and primarily ceremonial duties. Japan has a parliamentary 
system of government consisting of the House of Representatives and the House of 
Councillors. The Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) [Jiyu Minshu To] was the dominant party 
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for more than 46 years, and because of this one-party domination, researchers have had 
doubts about the level of actual democracy in Japan257. A coalition government between 
the Democratic Party [Minshuto] and the People’s New Party [Kokumin Shinto] was 
formed in 2010. After several changes, a coalition government between the LDP and 
Komeito has retain since 2012.  The centralisation of power remains one of the greatest 
impediments to judicial reform efforts in Japan, undermining the implementation of 
democratic development policies promoting the decentralisation of the government 
through government-led judicial reform 258 . The Japanese history of centralised 
government has continued even after the establishment of the Act Regarding the 
Maintenance of the Decentralisation of Power in 2000259. The gaps between the heated 
public arguments and the aggressive adaptation of a bill by the parliament will be seen 
as far from being a democratic approach. 
However, the Japanese government led the debate on the introduction of the citizen 
judge system with a massive positive publicity campaign, spending large amounts to 
enhance public education and awareness 260 . This is evidence of the government’s 
positive motivation for having a citizen judge system as well as its outcomes, which are 
to democratise the criminal justice system. In other words, Japan is a liberal 
constitutional democracy supported by government branches. Moreover, because of 
the establishment of the citizen judge system, the Japanese government is regarded as 
having taken a political step to democratise the judicial system261. 
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5.4.2.3  Support by Legal Institutions and Legal Professionals 
After the lay adjudication’s introduction, support from each legal institution has 
grown. However, there are still some local organisations and individual legal professions 
that disagree with the citizen judge system262. The Public Prosecutors Office and the 
Ministry of Justice263, the Supreme Court264, and the JFBA265 have established a website 
and review committees266 for information about the citizen judge system. 
The Supreme Court set up an advisory panel of well-informed independent 
personalities regarding the implications of the citizen judge system [Saiban-in Seido no 
Unyō ni Kansuru Yushikishakondankai], consisting of eight members, five scholars, two 
defence attorneys, a public prosecutor and a journalist. It held meetings with 
experienced citizen judges in the District Courts in forty seven prefectures as well as 
discussion meetings participated in by citizens, legal professionals, and experienced 
citizen judges. In addition, the JBFA published a proposal for the reform to the citizen 
judge system including expanding the cases tried by the citizen judge trials, reform of 
evidence rules for disclosure, and the introduction of the dichotomised deliberation 
procedure [Tetsuzuki Nibun Seido], which is the idea that culpability and sentencing 
should be deliberated separately267. Moreover, the Citizen Judge Network [Saiban-in 
Network] has constantly provided information about the citizen judge system, organised 
discussion meetings amongst former citizen judges and defence attorneys, and gathered 
citizen monitors to observe citizen judge trials268. 
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The overall number of citizen judge trials is low and may continue to decrease 
because of the reforms to the CJA in 2015. The amendment to the CJA states that broad-
based and lengthy cases will be excluded from being tried in citizen judge trials, although 
it does not clarify how many days would make a trial too long to be a citizen judge trial. 
The 2015 amendment will thus inevitably lead to a decrease in the number of citizen 
judge trial cases. As mentioned in Chapter 4, the small number of lay adjudication trials 
are common features in other lay adjudication systems269, but the long-standing practice 
of lay adjudication trials greatly influences not only the development of the system itself 
but also the relationship between the citizens and their government270. Therefore, it is 
important to maintain the practice of citizen judge trials and make efforts to develop 
the system, as the international historical peaks and valleys in the practice of lay 
adjudication systems indicate that these are a common occurrence271. Moreover, there 
has been a gradual decrease in the motivation to become a citizen judge and the 
appearance rate of new citizen judge candidates over the last seven years. Improving 
public understanding and hence motivating the pubic to take up citizen judge’ duties is 
necessary in line with encouraging democratic principles within society. 
What can be concluded from these findings? This research has revealed the 
significant effect of the introduction of the citizen judge system on democratising the 
criminal procedures as well the fundamental level of public involvement in the legal 
system now through citizen judge participation supported by the careful support of the 
judiciary. An important finding in this research concerning the proposed evaluative 
criteria is that the Japanese government has somewhat contradictory policy aims for the 
criminal justice system in maintaining both its bureaucratic authority while 
democratising the system. In addition, it could be said that the enhancement of citizen 
judges’ participation while preserving secrecy in the citizen judge system led by 
confidentiality, is also stressful and can seem to be in conflict.  
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Despite the legal professionals’ efforts and cooperation, it will be important to open 
empirical research access to the citizen judge system for academic purposes. The 
secrecy which runs through the citizen judge system is significant because of the twin 
rationales for protecting citizen judges’ privacy and judicial accountability. Leakages of 
information in lay adjudicators’ deliberation can endanger ‘the finality of verdicts’ and 
damage public confidence with not only the verdicts but also the procedures and even 
the existence of lay adjudication272. However, the restricted citizen judges’ participation 
and the judicial control over citizen judges’ participation in terms of procedural and 
practical circumstances seem to be necessary to be observed by citizens separated from 
legal professionals and the government.   In England, Lord Justice Auld supported ‘the 
need to know argument’ regarding the English jury system and recommended the 
enablement of research into the relationship between the information provided and 
individual juries’ deliberations273. Accessible data relating to the citizen judge system has 
been assembled by the Supreme Court, and academic researchers have relied on 
simulation research 274  or small qualitative research 275  with limited budgets and 
researchers.  Confined research access and limited data conducted by the Supreme 
Court will hinder attempts to address existing problems and the overall development of 
the citizen judge system.  
 
Conclusion 
There are certainly some absolute and positive points to note in relation to the 
introduction of the citizen judge system as well as its practice. The citizen judge system 
enabled direct civic participation into the Japanese criminal trial procedures and has 
been complimented by the majority of former citizen judges and legal profession judges 
who experienced citizen judge trials and who have described the citizen judge system as  
‘successful’,  There are entirely understandable reasons for these favourable reactions 
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to the smooth introduction and practice of the citizen judge procedures because the 
judiciary cooperated and made an intense effort to make the introduction successful. 
Furthermore, the citizen judge system succeeded in establishing a new legal framework 
which has helped to secure direct civic participation in serious criminal cases in Japan, 
which did not exist before at all.   
Moreover, applying the evaluative criteria proposed in this thesis, the citizen judge 
system is a successful lay adjudication system in the light of the representativeness of 
the citizen judge panel as well as the citizen judges’ attentiveness to the procedures in 
respect of their competence to understand information and the independence of their 
decision-making. At the same time, their attentiveness and competence seems to be 
based on heavy reliance on the professional judges within the collaborative structure of 
the citizen judge panel. There are concerns that powerful judicial control over citizen 
judges’ participation can lead to ‘sham’ citizen judge participation, manipulated by 
professional judges.  
Furthermore, the shift from the inquisitorial to the adversarial approach in the 
criminal trial procedure was achieved by introducing the principles of orality and 
immediacy. However, the introduction of citizen judges has not impacted on the 
conviction rate or sentence ranges.  Moreover, adherence to the traditional legal culture 
has led to the role of professional judges remaining central, although the existence of 
citizen judge in the citizen judge panel has influenced the consciousness of professional 
judges, to some extent. The presentation skills of public prosecutors and defence 
attorneys have been focused on supporting citizen judges’ understanding, and there is 
a capacity gap between the two, possibly resulting in inequality of arms between them. 
This also could lead defendants to be placed in weaker positions.  
Many of problems surrounding the citizen judge system relate to issues which are 
part of the wider judicial, social, and political dilemmas affecting criminal procedures in 
Japan. Its careful and detailed judicial administration emphasises organised and legal 
professional-centred procedures rather than enhanced citizen judges participation but 
has nevertheless succeeded in allowing sufficient participation to enable the citizen 
judge system to function as a part of an appropriate democratic institution.  
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However, the research also raised some of the less attractive aspects of the citizen 
judge system, for example, that citizen judges’ participation can risk being controlled by 
the judiciary because of the lack of free discussion and deliberation due to pressures by 
and on the professional judges. In this respect, citizen judges’ participation is limited to 
restricted collaboration and transparency derived from the characteristics of long-
standing issues in the Japanese criminal procedures, strong judicial control and lack of 
democratic principles.  
Most citizen judges indicated that their experiences were positive in my interviews, 
as the Supreme Court’s survey also shows276. They also referred to professional judges’ 
pleasant and friendly attitudes in discussing and deliberating both in the courtroom and 
deliberation room277. It is likely that the nature of the Japanese criminal procedures, as 
well as furthering the unique culture of Japanese society and judiciary may well sustain 
the practice of the citizen judge system within the sight or control of the judiciary. 
However, it will be necessary to enhance the independence of citizen judges, and 
emphasise civic participation not only in criminal procedures but also within national 
government institutions. Ultimately, the citizen judge system appears in practice in 
Japan to be a successful lay adjudication system, suggesting that it is an agent for 
democratising criminal procedures. But it also reveals an exclusive reliance on judicial 
control, one of the features essential to citizen judges’ participation in practice but, 
could be its fatal curtailment and inhibitor.
                                                          
276 The Supreme Court, supra note 15. 
277 Interviews, supra note 34. 
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CHAPTER 6 CONCLUSION 
 
This study set out to evaluate the citizen judge system in order to determine whether 
or not its introduction and practice was a successful development of the criminal trial 
procedure that attempted to democratise the Japanese criminal justice system. In 
addressing this issue, this study seeks to contribute to the theoretical debate on lay 
adjudication as the mechanism for democratisation in criminal procedures as well as to 
consider the practical limitations of lay adjudication in Japan. 
As noted in Chapter 1, the introduction of the lay adjudication system followed the 
international tendency towards democratisation in criminal justice, encouraged by 
globalisation and Westernisation in non-Western countries. Moreover, the Japanese 
judicial reform, which was initiated in 1999, was designed to introduce international 
standards into the criminal justice system by engaging democratic concepts. As part of 
democratisation, the citizen judge system was introduced. Unfamiliarity with 
democratic concepts was derived from a lack of understanding of the relationship 
between the State and its citizens. Japan has undergone several democratisation 
processes in its history, however, and most of the international concepts of human 
rights and procedural fairness standards are established in the Constitution and 
protected by law. It is therefore important for Japanese society to acknowledge that 
citizens obtain guaranteed freedom, human rights, and equality, as well as also bearing 
responsibilities, in the criminal justice system.  
According to Munday, any form of lay adjudication system ‘offers a legal panacea, 
and the political decision to directly involve the people in the administration of justice’1, 
and democratisation in the ‘executives, legislative, and the judiciary’ has been a 
continuous ambition, since historical theorists claimed that it would be a barrier to 
oppressive governments 2 . In contrast, a critical issue regarding lay adjudication is 
                                                          
1 R Munday, ‘What Do the French Think of Their Jury? Views from Poitiers and Paris’ (1995) 15 Legal 
Studies 65–87, 87. 
2 For example, Weber, Tocqueville, Mill, Montesquieu, Rousseau, Duff, Christie and others decreed the 
functions of lay adjudicators were a safeguard against repressive governments. See AW Dzur, 
Punishment, Participatory Democracy, and the Jury (New York; Oxford University Press 2012). 
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whether or not the lay adjudication system actually does function as a tool for 
democratising the criminal justice system. There are contrasting theoretical views on 
the democratic values of lay adjudication and how far the lay adjudication system in 
practice may be undermined because of doubts over the legitimacy of judgments 
reached by the consciousness of lay adjudicators. This is possibly affected by prejudice 
and biased thoughts, not by evidence, and by a reliance on the legislative role and 
judicial controls of government or legal professionals.   
Chapter 2 proposed criteria with which to examine the citizen judge system, 
evaluating the theoretical background of lay adjudication as a mechanism for promoting 
democracy, and the related range of requirements for a fair trial. It also argued that lay 
adjudication underpins interdependent principles within the concepts of democracy and 
a fair trial. It would appear that the justification for introducing a lay adjudication system 
could be achieved by establishing the legitimacy of the criminal justice system through 
gaining the support and acceptance of society. 
In this respect, the success of a lay adjudication system is tied to the extent to which 
lay adjudicators participate, and the degree of their participation can be evaluated to 
some extent by its representativeness of the community from a democratic perspective. 
Moreover, the fundamental conditions of a lay adjudication system are based on the 
concept of a deliberative democracy, and the participation of ‘attentive’ and ‘competent’ 
lay adjudicators is essential. Because of the difficulty of evaluating the level of 
attentiveness and competence of lay adjudicators’ who participate, it was argued that 
consideration of lay adjudicators’ satisfaction, which is the key to achieving legitimacy, 
could be used. The evaluative criteria that I have proposed, and elucidated in Chapter 2, 
drew on positive socio-legal perspectives of the legal system and suggest that the 
practice of a lay adjudication system will be in line with the core principles of both the 
legal traditions and criminal justice policies. It was also argued in Chapter 2 that lay 
adjudication systems often share common challenges although they are within different 
legal systems, because of the shared purpose of bringing democratic values into the 
criminal justice system. Moreover, the main motivation for introducing or retaining a lay 
adjudication system is the enhancement of the legitimacy of the criminal justice system 
through lay participation. The evaluation criteria, established via a review of existing 
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literature on various lay adjudication systems, also shows the importance of the four 
separate phases of the lay adjudication system procedure: the pre-trial arrangement 
conference procedure, the selection process of lay adjudicators, the decision-making 
process and after the trial, all of which affect the practice of lay adjudication systems, as 
well as having potential impact on other parts of the criminal justice system. 
Chapter 3 illustrated the Japanese criminal justice procedural and social challenges 
resulting from implementing the citizen judge system. It showed the mixed legal 
traditions that shape the current Japanese criminal justice procedure and the unique 
challenges faced in emphasising adversarial principles in the procedure. The Japanese 
criminal justice system lacks judicial independence, systematically violates the principle 
of equality of arms between the prosecution and the defendant and is dominated by 
professional judges. The citizen judge system was expected to be able to mitigate these 
challenges. The chapter also contained an overview of historical developments in the 
Japanese criminal justice system, including the jury system between 1928 and 1943, and 
the contemporary relationship between low crime rate and powerful control of a central 
government. 
 It is arguable whether or not it is realistic to evaluate the enhancement of 
participation of lay adjudicators, as well as of the legitimacy of the criminal justice 
system through the real practice of the citizen judge system, while acknowledging that 
Japan is not a transitional country in the same situation as the post-Soviet countries. 
Moreover, the Japanese criminal trial procedure already included adversarial principles 
and the Japanese public already held the criminal justice system and legal professionals 
in high esteem. Consequently, it is reasonable to pose the question: what has the 
practice of the citizen judge system contributed, in terms of issues targeted, to improve 
the criminal trial procedure? It is clear that there were cogent reasons for the 
introduction of the citizen judge system as part of the reforms to the Japanese criminal 
justice system shifting away from ‘gentle authoritarianism’3. To an extent, the citizen 
judge system was deemed to be unnecessary because Japanese society was accustomed 
to relying on the administration of justice and legal professionals as tools to maintain 
                                                          
3 I Kitamura, ‘The Judiciary in Contemporary Society: Japan’ (1993) 25 Case Western Reserve Journal of 
International Law 263–275, 270. 
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crime control and due process of law. As explained in Chapter 3, since the eighteenth 
century, Japanese criminal justice reforms have attempted to create an 
internationalised and modernised criminal justice system to meet international 
standards. To do this, constitutional and legislative reforms were undertaken with 
reference to foreign systems, namely French, German and American ones. Western 
substantive and procedural laws with a civil law tradition were brought in and adapted 
to Japanese historical traditions, becoming the basis of the current Japanese criminal 
procedural concepts. Introducing Western legal solutions has been historically 
instrumental in the development of the Japanese criminal justice system. 
The characteristics of Japanese society and the Japanese people are often expressed 
as collectivism and authoritarianism, because they tend to prioritise harmonisation in 
the community and obedience to authority. Moreover, there was a separation between 
the lives of the judiciary and the lay people because of the professionalism of the 
judiciary. In other words, the lack of communication between the judiciary and the 
public was a considerable problem. Judicial reform in 1999 aimed at enhancing 
communication, with two targets: the development of a legal professional training and 
recruiting system, and public education. Japan appeared to meet the conditions to be 
capable of effective practice of a lay adjudication system because of the homogeneous 
nature of Japanese society and public, judicial, financial and political supports.  
Chapter 4 and 5 investigated whether the citizen judge system can be considered a 
successful lay adjudication system according to the proposed evaluation criteria in 
Chapter 2 and expected impact targets, in terms of criminal procedural principles, that 
were discussed in Chapter 3. It is obvious that the Citizen Judge Act (CJA) was drafted in 
reference to foreign systems, such as the French, German, American, and English 
systems. As a result, the citizen judge procedure has hybrid characteristics from both 
the mixed judge and the jury models, although it can be categorised as a mixed judge 
model, which is defined in this research as a collaborative structure between 
professional judges and citizen judges in the lay adjudicator panel. Moreover, the CJA 
shares some similar features with other lay adjudication systems, such as the limitations 
of subject criminal cases tried by citizen judges, random selection of citizen judges, the 
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acceptance of majority verdicts and strict confidentiality being imposed on citizen 
judges. 
There have been significant problems with the CJA regarding the introduction of 
democratic principles, largely because of its incompatibility with the participation of 
citizen judges and the principle of substantial truth. In addition, it is apparent that there 
is strong judicial control over the participation of citizen judges, which has moderated 
its impact on (former) citizen judges, criminal justice and the public.  
Chapter 4 raised issues of concern in current citizen judge systems in light of the 
responsibilities of citizen judges in cooperation with professional judges. It was pointed 
out that the CJA has succeeded in establishing a citizen judge procedure that could 
possibly enhance the participation of citizen judges by entitling citizen judges to 
positions equal to professional judges for hearing, deliberating evidence in the decision-
making process, voting and reaching a verdict together. In addition, the CJA has also 
succeeded in setting a procedure to provide a way to reach appropriate representatives 
and to engage citizen judges, by introducing a random selection by lot and giving those 
chosen the right to question and take notes in the courtroom and deliberation room. It 
has been argued, however, that the CJA has failed to respond to the challenges which 
the Japanese criminal justice procedure has faced. The domination of professional 
judges, from the pre-trial arrangement conference procedure to the after-trial, appears 
to be problematic. I have argued that the possible domination of professional judges 
over the participation of citizen judges increases the potential for manipulation by the 
professional judges and for the system to represent only a small presence of democratic 
involvement.  
In Chapter 5, the practice of the CJA was discussed, showing the impact of its 
application. The Supreme Court survey showed the actual practice of citizen judge trials, 
although far fewer trials occurred than were initially expected. The survey also showed 
the diverse background of citizen judges in terms of their genders, ages and occupations, 
although the excusals of citizen judge candidates tended to be accepted leniently, which 
could restrict the pool of candidates available for lot. All former citizen judges 
interviewed for this study believed that they were able to understand information 
obtained throughout their duties, including evidence, applicable laws and professional 
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judges’ explanations. They also believed that they and their co-citizen judges had 
actively participated in both the courtroom and the deliberation room. The same 
positive feedback can be found in the Supreme Court survey. In addition, all former 
citizen judges interviewed for this study believed that they reached their decisions 
independently from co-members of the citizen judge panel, both co-citizen judges and 
professional judges. Participation, representativeness, and attentiveness therefore 
appear to be successfully maintained by both citizen judges and legal professionals.  
Moreover, this study showed that all 18 interviewees believed that the current citizen 
judge system was successful. Former citizen judges believed that the system was a 
success because of their satisfaction with their work and duties, while most legal 
professionals believed the same because of its smooth introduction. The high level of 
satisfaction with and confidence in the citizen judge system led to the high level of 
satisfaction also found in the criminal justice system.  
Chapter 5 also argued, however, that there were significant issues related to the 
superior powers of the prosecution and the professional judges’ overwhelming power 
in the procedure, with limited allowance made for the participation of citizen judges 
relative to their procedural responsibilities and duties. A point to note is that there was 
more emphasis on the pre-trial arrangement conference procedure of preparing written 
dossiers, which suggests possible reliance on the dossiers rather than oral evidence 
presented in the court. Moreover, professional judges in the appeal court could overturn 
the verdict reached by a citizen judge panel, suggesting attempts to control the decisions 
of citizen judge panels. In addition, the application of the citizen judge trial procedure in 
death penalty cases has created incongruity in the representativeness of the citizen 
judge panel, as well as a distorted decision-making procedure. The difference between 
the public image of professional judges and their friendliness in-person may lead to 
feelings of admiration in citizen judges. The concentration of power with the 
prosecution and professional judges, together with the inexperience of the citizen 
judges, may exacerbate extant issues in the central administration of justice. In this way, 
judicial reform efforts to democratise the judicial system may actually have been 
undermined. 
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Because of constitutional challenges, the citizen judge system has not been able to 
show that participating in a serious criminal case as a citizen judge is a part of citizens’ 
rights. Furthermore, in its failure to reduce the professional orientation of the criminal 
procedure, the citizen judge system creates uncertainty and inconsistency in the 
participation of citizen judges in the criminal procedure, when judged from the point of 
view of democracy. It appears that the CJA has succeeded in introducing the 
participation of citizen judges and has emphasised adversarial principles in the criminal 
procedure, but it has not provided sufficient power to citizen judges with which to 
counterbalance that of the professionals. In this respect, the CJA has failed to link the 
participation of citizen judges to perceptions of democracy. As Inoue has suggested, the 
citizen judge system has become a mere façade4.  
Despite the Japanese government’s primary strong motivation to include lay 
participation in the criminal trial procedure, it has not carried out the judicial reform 
through any far-reaching investigative procedure or evidential rules. Without reforms of 
the whole criminal justice procedure and related legislation, the practice of the citizen 
judge system could perhaps actually increase uncertainty and doubts about 
manipulation of the participation of citizen judges, which could damage its legitimacy. 
In summary, on the basis of the research presented here, it is argued that three major 
changes would improve the operation of the current citizen judge system and aid in the 
achievement of its objectives. These proposed changes are: 
1)  the introduction of a panel composed of only citizen judges, or at least allowing 
the citizen judges time to discuss a case with co-citizen judges without the 
presence of professional judges; 
2)  the removal of death penalty cases from the jurisdiction of citizen judge trials; 
3) the establishment of an independent third-party observation structure to 
evaluate the practice of the citizen judge system without interfering in the 
administration of justice. 
                                                          
4 K Inoue, Stop! The Citizen Judge System [Tsubuse Saibanin Seido] (Tokyo; Shincho Sinsho 2008). 
236 
 
In this research, I argued for citizen judges to be given trust in their competence to 
listen to and deliberate a case along with professional judges. There are clearly both 
conscious and unconscious judiciary and legal professionals’ controls over citizen judges 
throughout a citizen judge procedure. For example, the courts have considerable 
responsibilities at the selection stage to make a list of candidates and finalise the 
selected citizen judges, although dismissals of candidates and voir dire as well as 
challenges are established in the CJA. As discussed in Chapter 3, powerful prosecutorial 
discretion and heavy reliance on dossier, such as confession, obtained at the 
investigative stage appear to be strong bureaucratic controls in the Japanese criminal 
justice procedure. Moreover, the professional judges’ instructions for citizen judges and 
presence on citizen judge panels are constitutionally inevitable as well as significant to 
provide judicial instructions. However, citizen judges are entitled to discuss cases 
independently following ‘freedom of thought and conscience’5, as Takeshima claimed6. 
A discussion time amongst citizen judges would provide them an opportunity to 
organise their thoughts, expressing and exchanging their opinions freely and checking 
their understandings of a case, evidence and the procedure without any pressure from 
professional judges. This time would satisfy the citizen judges’ independence and 
contribution underpinned by the principles of democracy, disengaging citizen judges 
from judicial control. The independent discussion would help citizen judges improve 
their discussion skills. Also, the time would encourage them to focus on presented 
evidence in the courts, while professional judges have a tendency to rely on written 
dossiers. Furthermore, the independent deliberation time might be reserved for the 
introduction of the jury model, and some researchers have proposed introducing the 
citizen judge system (the mixed judge model) into Japan. The time without the presence 
of professional judges would raise the possibility of functioning as a representative of 
their communities. However, there are three main challenges to adopting the 
suggestion. First, discussion among only citizen judges might be against the 1947 
Constitution as the same reasons provoked arguments about the introduction of citizen 
                                                          
5 The 1947 Constitution, art. 19. 
6 C Takeshima, ‘Reconsideration of Citizen Judge System in Japan - An Analysis and Consideration from 
the Standpoint of the Freedom of Conscience - [Saibanin Seido Ni Tuiteno Saiko]’ (2017) 29 The 
Waseda Journal of Social Sciences 56–71, 67. She claimed the contradictions between the duty of 
citizen judges and the concept of ‘freedom of thought and consciousness’. 
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judges7. Second, it would be difficult to say that all citizen judges would have the ability 
and willingness to constructively deliberate a case with their peers without professional 
judges’ instructions. Third, discussions amongst only lay adjudicators would be, more or 
less, influenced by co-lay adjudicators, as much psychological research about lay 
adjudicators’ decision-making claimed.8 Moreover, in Sanders’ analysis of magistrate 
courts in England, Sanders’ pointed out dangerous lay adjudicators’ over-deferential 
attitude to professional judges in mixed judge systems. Moreover, he emphasised equal 
importance of legal theory and principles, on which academic research such as the Auld 
report and the Runciman Commission tends to focus, as well as core values of fairness, 
democracy and efficiency. 9  Therefore, the suggested independent discussion 
procedure—which is that only citizen judges discuss a case—should be limited and 
regarded as a preliminary phrase before a deliberation with professional judges.  
Social issues are vital conditioning factors for the practice of the citizen judge system, 
a view supported by many international scholars on lay adjudication, such as Hans10, 
Fukurai11 , Jackson 12 , and Machura13 . The findings of the current study accord with 
Jackson and Kovalev’s insistence on the importance of public education regarding the 
rights and duties of lay adjudicators as a means of supporting the empowerment of lay 
adjudicators, as well as the whole lay adjudication system14. The experience of the 
introduction of the citizen judge system in Japan does not align, however, with 
                                                          
7  Please see Chapter 4, 4.4.1. The 1947 Constitution provides that the judiciary should be 
composed of professional judges, who are appointed by the Cabinet. 
8 See Y Tinsley, ‘Juror Decision-Making : A Look Inside the Jury Room’, vol 4 (Leicester; 2000); JA 
Holstein, ‘Jurors’ Interpretations and Jury Decision Making’ (1985) 9 Law and Human Behavior 83–
100. 
9 A Sanders, ‘Core Values , the Magistracy , and the Auld Report’ (2002) 29 Journal of Law and Society 
324–341. 
10 VP Hans, ‘Jury Systems Around the World’ (2008) 4 Annual Review of Law and Social Science 275–297, 
279. 
11 H Fukurai and K Kurosawa, ‘Impact of the Popular Legal Participation on Forced Confessions and 
Wrongful Convictions in Japan’s Bureaucratic Courtroom: A Cross-National Analysis in the U.S. and 
Japan’ (2010) 7 US-China Law Review 1–18, 17. 
12 JD Jackson, ‘Paradoxes of Lay and Professional Decision Making in Common Law Criminal Systems’ 
(2001) 72 Revue internationale de droit pénal 579–594, 581. 
13 S Machura, ‘Fairness, Justice, and Legitimacy: Experiences of People’s Judges in South Russia’ (2003) 
25 Law & Policy 123–150, 146. 
14 JD Jackson and NP Kovalev, ‘Lay Adjudication and Human Rights in Europe’ (2006) 13 Columbia 
Journal of European Law 83–124, 123. 
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Abramson’s proposition that a lay adjudication system may work if the society accepts 
the ‘political function’ of lay adjudication, which is ‘to preserve public confidence in the 
justice of the verdict’, leading to the legitimacy of the verdict, without unquestioningly 
accepting the verdicts of professional judges15. The introduction of the citizen judge 
system in Japan has certainly resulted in increased legitimacy of the verdict, but this 
legitimacy comes from the citizen judges’ endorsement of the professional judges’ 
verdict. Legitimacy should instead be located in the lay adjudicators’ verdict alone. 
Moreover, familiarity with the concept of democracy, the lay adjudication system and 
civic duties should be enhanced through public education. This will take time, however. 
There is much evidence regarding the inadequacies of existing lay adjudication systems, 
notwithstanding that developmental analysis and reform has been in progress for many 
centuries. Evaluating the results of public education with the introduction of the citizen 
judge system will take more time and will be dependent on continued educational 
programmes and societal and judicial commitment to the practice of the system. 
On a practical level, the following lessons that should have relevance to those 
engaged in criminal trial procedural reform in the future emerge from the evaluations 
in this study of the citizen judge system. Firstly, there is justification for concluding that 
lay adjudication in criminal procedures can be successfully engineered in order to 
democratise and enhance the legitimacy of the criminal justice system. Secondly, 
sources for readily-available toolkits, such as the UNODC Criminal Justice Assessment 
Toolkit, can be useful fundamental evaluation points with which to check that the 
introduction and practice of a lay adjudication system complies with international 
standards for the requirements of a fair trial. As is suggested for transitional countries, 
however, the toolkit should be used only as a guide for possible legislative strategies 
that can be subsequently assessed for ‘balance’ and relevance, rather than as a tool for 
producing a template for a system which can be put into practice. 
Thirdly, it should not be assumed that a lay adjudication system is always able to 
democratise a criminal justice system. The practicality of such a system demands a 
balance between various factors. The system will likely be considered to have both 
                                                          
15 J Abramson, ‘The Jury and Democratic Theory’ (1993) 1 Journal of Political Philosophy 45–68, 60-1. 
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favourable and criticisable points but reasonable mechanisms, if employed on the basis 
of a sensible balance in the legal system. The practice of a lay adjudication system should 
improve the function of lay adjudicator panels and the legitimacy of the criminal justice 
system, and requires full and proper consideration of a number of fundamental issues, 
namely: 
1) an in-depth knowledge of theoretical perspectives of lay adjudication, as 
elucidated in Chapter 2, which should provide a valuable insight into lay the 
participation of adjudicators and the legitimacy of the criminal justice system 
as a tool for democratising the system, as well as understanding what the 
necessary conditions for these successful functions and outcomes are; 
2) a full appreciation of the history and legal traditions of the criminal justice 
system where a lay adjudication system is practised, in order to determine 
what obstacles might impede successful participation of lay adjudicators and 
how such obstacles can be overcome; 
3) an acknowledgement that a lay adjudication system that lacks the 
appropriate trust in competence and engagement of lay adjudicators may 
result in an unsuccessful and constrained criminal trial procedure, rather than 
democratising it. It may create injustice and undermine the role of lay people 
and the fundamental concerns which sustain essential rights in the criminal 
procedures, including the independence of the judiciary and the equality of 
arms between the parties in the procedure. 
Cleary the introduction of a lay adjudication system as a reform tool for 
democratising the criminal justice system may not always be the most reasonable means 
of promoting legitimacy in the criminal justice system. Lay adjudication is, however, as 
Devlin pointed out, ‘a symbol of participatory democracy’, a practical mechanism 
capable of providing legitimacy to the criminal justice system, and capable of facilitating 
the incorporation of the internationally-recognised principles of a fair trial and 
democracy, as exemplified by the introduction of the citizen judge system in Japan. 
Limitations to the practice of the citizen judge system should be understood, and it 
should be recognised that its mythological ‘symbolism’ will depend on the sensitivity 
with which it is practiced. The citizen judge system has to be practical and capable of 
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striking a balance with legal traditions to provoke potential developments within the 
criminal justice system. Lay adjudication is likely to remain a pervasive symbolic aspect 
of democratic criminal justice system development. If the citizen judge system is 
employed in a balanced manner, as a mechanism for reflecting the public interests in 
the Japanese criminal justice system, it can certainly become an essential and successful 
aspect of future criminal trial procedures. 
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Appendices 
Appendix 1: Interview Questions for Citizen Judges 
1. Facts: Name, Gender, Age, The date of the trial, sentence 
2. Do you think you participated actively in courtroom? 
Possible follow-up questions 
a) Did you take a note in courtroom? 
b) Did you ask a question in courtroom? 
If answer is ‘no’, 
a) Why were you not able to participate actively? 
 
3. Do you think you participated actively in deliberation? 
Possible follow-up questions 
a) Do you think you participated actively in deciding guilty/not guilty? 
• Were you comfortable to discuss with professional judges at the stage? 
b) Do you think you participated actively in deciding the sentence? 
• Were you comfortable to discuss with professional judges at the stage? 
 
4. Did you have a difficulty in understanding the law? 
Possible follow-up questions 
a) Do you think the case was complicated? 
b) Was the presiding judge’s instruction easy to understand? 
 
5. Did you have a difficulty in understanding the evidence? 
Possible follow-up questions 
a) What kind of evidence was presented? 
 
6. Do you believe that you made a decision independently without the pressure of 
professional judges/presiding judges? 
Possible follow-up questions 
a) Did you feel the pressure of professional judges? 
b) Did you feel the pressure of other lay members? 
 
7. Do you think you contributed successfully to the trial as a lay assessor? 
Possible follow-up questions 
a) Do you think if only professional deliberated the case, the result would be different? 
 
8. Do you have any comments?  
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Appendix 2: Interview Questions for Legal Professionals  
 (Public Prosecutors, Professional Judges, and Defence Attorneys) 
1. Facts: Name, Gender, Age, Legal Professional Experiences 
2. Do you think citizen judges participated actively in courtroom? 
Possible follow-up questions 
c) Did you take a note in courtroom? 
d) Did you ask a question in courtroom? 
If answer is ‘no’, 
b) Why do you think were they not able to participate actively? 
 
3. Do you think citizen judges participated actively in deliberation? 
Possible follow-up questions 
c) Do you think citizen judges participated actively in deciding guilty/not guilty? 
d) Do you think citizen judges participated actively in deciding the sentence? 
 
4. Do you think citizen judges had a difficulty in understanding the law? 
Possible follow-up questions 
c) Do you think the case was complicated? 
d) Was the presiding judge’s (your) instruction easy to understand? 
 
5. Did you think citizen judges had a difficulty in understanding the evidence? 
Possible follow-up questions 
b) What kind of evidence was presented? 
 
6. Do you believe that citizen judges made a decision independently without the pressure 
of professional judges/presiding judges? 
Possible follow-up questions for professional judges  
c) Did you think you gave citizen judges the pressure of professional judges? 
d) Did you think citizen judges got the pressure of other lay members? 
 
7. Do you think citizen judges contributed successfully to the trial as a adjudicator? 
Possible follow-up questions 
b) Do you think if only professional deliberated the case, the result would be different? 
 
8. Do you have any comments? 
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Appendix 3: Interview Questions for Lawmakers 
 (Lawmakers) 
1. Facts: Name, Gender, States 
2. A) How did you reach the idea to introduce the lay judge system which is hybrid between    
the mixed bench system and the jury system? 
B) Are there specific expectations from the lay judge system which the mixed bench 
system and the jury system cannot achieve? 
3. What were the barriers to implementing the lay judge system? 
4. A) Did you expect the impact of the lay judge system on the Japanese criminal justice 
system? 
B) If so, what was the impact? 
C) Has the impact actually happened? 
5. A) Do you think there are points in the system which should be re-examined? 
B) If so, what are the points? 
6. Do you think the Japanese lay judge system has been successful? 
7. Do you have any comments? 
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Appendix 4: A Flowchart of the Japanese Criminal Procedure1
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
  
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
  
 
                                                          
1 Ministry of Justice [Japan], ‘Criminal Cases Flowchart’ [Japanese] 
<http://www.moj.go.jp/keiji1/keiji_keiji09.html> accessed 7 April 2016, translated by the author. 
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Appendix 5: The Citizen Judge Trial Courtroom1 
  
  
                                                          
1 The figure was translated and edited by the author from O Niikura, ‘A Change by the Citizen Judge 
System’ (Aoyama Gakuin University) <http://www.aoyama.ac.jp/research/insight/column_niikura/> 
accessed 1 July 2015. 
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Appendix 6: The Historical Developments Related to the Citizen Judge System 
1868 The Birth of the Meiji Regime 
    
1872 The Iwakura Mission 
    
1880 The Establishment of the Chizaiho (CCP) 
1880 The Establishment of the Criminal Law (CL) 
    
1889 The Establishment of the Meiji Constitution 
1890 The Establishment of the Commercial Law 
  The Amendment of the CCP 
1892 The Establishment of the Civil Law 
1893 The Establishment of the Attorney Act 
    
    
1907 The Establishment of the Criminal Law 
    
1922 The Amendment of the CCP 
    
1928 The Start of the Jury System 
    
1943 The Syspension of the Jury system 
    
1945 The End of the Second World War 
    
1947 The Establishment of the Constitution 
  The Amendment of the Criminal Law (CL) 
1948  The Establishment of the Code of Criminal Procedure  
1949 The Enforcement of the Code of Criminal Procedure 
    
    
    
1999 The Establishment of the JRC 
2001 The Amendment of the CL 
  The Amendment of the CCP 
2002 The Establishment of the CCC 
2003 The Amendment of the CL 
2004 The Establishment of the Citizen Judge Act (CJA) 
  The Amendment of the CL 
2005 The Amendment of the CL 
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2006 The Amendment of the CL 
  The Amendment of the CCP 
2007 The Amendment of the CL 
  The Amendment of the CCP 
2009 The Enforcement of the CJA 
2010 The Amendment of the CL 
  The Amendment of the CCP 
2011 The Amendment of the CL 
  The Amendment of the CCP 
2012 The Amendment of the CCP 
2013 The Amendment of the CCP 
  The Amendment of the CL 
2015 The Amendment of the CCP 
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Appendix 7: Nagano Family Homicide Case [Nagano Ikka Sannin Satsujin Jiken] 
 
 
The Case: The Nagano Police received a call about an unusual odour from a storage unit. A policeman found a 
male corpse (X) in a car in the storage unit. The police found that the cause of death was intracranial injury and the 
tenant of the storage unit, 62-year old company owner, was missing. His employees, Tomohiro Matsubara, Kazufumi 
Court Case no. Defendant Date charge Sentence 
Nagano County 
Court H22(わ）96 Ito/Matsubara/Ikeda 
27/12/2011 
25/03/2011 
06/12/2011 
murder attended with robbery 
abandoning a corpse Death Penalty/28 years 
Tokyo High Court H24(う)  572 Ito 20/02/2014 
murder attended with robbery 
abandoning a corpse Death Penalty 
  H24(う)859 Matsubara 22/03/2012 
murder attended with robbery 
abandoning a corpse Death Penalty 
  H24(う)332 Ikeda 27/02/2014 
murder attended with robbery  
abandoning a corpse Death Penalty 
The Supreme Court H24(あ)646 Matsubara 02/09/2014 
murder attended with robbery  
abandoning a corpse Death Penalty 
  H26(あ)447 Ito 26/04/2016 
murder attended with robbery  
abandoning a corpse Death Penalty 
  H24()332 Ikeda 27/02/2014 
murder attended with robbery  
abandoning a corpse Life Imprisonment 
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Ito, and Kaoru Ikeda were questioned and arrested by the police, as were their friends, D and E1440, as it turned out 
there were four victims who were killed. The prosecution demanded capital punishment for three defendants, life 
imprisonment, and two years and six months imprisonment for the other two. The citizen judge panel reached the 
following decision: capital punishment for three defendants (A, B, and C), 28 years imprisonment (D) and two years 
imprisonment (E). However, as a result, two defendants, A and B were sentenced to death, C was given life 
imprisonment, and the sentences of D and E were eighteen years and two years, respectively.
                                                          
1440 The two names were not published in public. 
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Appendix 8: The Four Phrases of the Citizen Judge Procedure 
 
1. Pre-Trial Arrangement Conference Process 
a) Pre-trial arrangement conference procedure among the prosecutors, 
professional judges, and defence attorneys 
b) Accessibility of Citizen Judges to the information discussed in the pre-trial 
arrangement conferences  
2. Selection Process of Citizen Judges 
a) Random selection methods 
b) Responsibility for making a list of candidates 
c) Qualifications and disqualifications for being citizen judge 
d) Challenge procedures (excusals, voir dire procedure) 
3. Decision-Making Process 
a) The trial procedure (the right to the opening speech) 
b) Rights and duties of citizen judges (questioning witnesses and the defendant, 
and taking notes during the trial) 
c) Rules for the presentation of evidence 
d) Judicial Instructions by professional judges/Cooperation between citizen 
judges and professional judges  
e) Verdicts 
I. Deliberation process 
II. Unanimity/Majority verdicts 
III. Legal Reasoning 
4. After the Trial 
a) Right to appeal 
b) Confidentiality 
 
 
 
 
